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Abstract 
This thesis explores factors conducive to successful settlements within communal civil wars. 
Through a comparative analysis of the Sunningdale Power-sharing Agreement and Good Friday 
Power-sharing Agreement in Northern Ireland, it enters a vast literature surrounding both the case 
study as well as the theoretical underpinnings of successful peace settlements. This thesis identifies 
five potential factors contributing to the success of a peace settlement: a third party guarantor, 
inequality reducing measures, power-sharing measures, influence of local actors, and the nature of 
the conflict itself.  Each of these factors is attached to specific indicators that are then cross-
analyzed against public opinion data and trends of violence. This analysis is conducted in a four-
phased approach: during the negotiations to get to the table, during the settlement negotiations, 
during the implementation, and during the aftermath of the settlement. This thesis posits that 
complete power-sharing creates a moderated culture that allows non-sectarian power blocks to 
develop and challenge communally exclusive blocks, so long as they are given a political space to 
develop. Contrary to arguments that suggest that power-sharing confines countries to ethnic 
exclusivity, this thesis explores whether it can in fact create a political space where those divisions 
may be broken down.  
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Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War global conflict has shifted away from inter-state wars, and 
towards internal conflicts.1 Negotiated settlements to those conflicts, complicated by the necessity of 
joint governance, have been few and hard to come by. Alexander Downes, coalescing a series of 
statistical analysis of negotiated settlements, highlights the bleak picture negotiators face in the post-
conflict reconstruction process, finding that two thirds of negotiated settlements to communal civil 
wars ended in failure.2  Military victories, in contrast, are over three times more likely to end in a 
stable regime.3 The salient question becomes, when do peace settlements succeed, and which 
particular conditions facilitate agreements that are able to overcome those odds? Inter-communal 
conflicts plague their countries with brutal violence, pitting former neighbors, friends, and 
sometimes even family members against each other. Existent alliances are diminished as the script of 
communal antagonism takes center stage. This results in intense mistrust begat by episodes of 
violence in which those targeted are selected on the basis of their communal identity rather than 
individual attributes and actions. Despite those histories, some settlements are able to move beyond, 
or through, those divides into a durable and lasting peace. 
Specifying the conditions that facilitate those anomalies helps to illuminate the foundations 
upon which successful peacemaking policy is created. In the face of an increasingly militarist 
peacemaking style from international interveners, it is critical that these factors be rigorously 
assessed in the hopes of informing a more nuanced policy of intervention. To do so, this thesis 
specifically asks what factors helped negotiators to the Good Friday Agreement overcome the 
difficulties that the trajectories of communal conflicts present, which, in turn, doomed the previous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 12. 
2 Alexander Downes “The Problem With Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars,” Security Studies 13, no. 4 
2 Alexander Downes “The Problem With Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars,” Security Studies 13, no. 4 
(Summer 2004): 230-1. 
3 Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2002), 169-70. 
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Sunningdale Agreement. The Northern Irish case represents an important variation on this question. 
A series of attempted peace settlements, ceasefires, and negotiations all receded into conflict. Even 
settlements predicated on the same basic principles as the Good Friday Agreement failed to prevent 
this regeneration. Understanding why the Good Friday Agreement escaped those trajectories offers 
a valuable and interesting insight into the complexities of peace settlements. 
This thesis argues that in the Good Friday Agreement, the coordinated effects of strong 
third party guarantees to the settlement, along with complete power-sharing within political and 
security sectors, created a moderated political climate in Northern Ireland. By guaranteeing the 
protection of communal interests through political, military, and cultural power sharing backed up 
by a third party guarantee, these interests became a less relevant factor to the continued wellbeing of 
Northern Irish citizens. As a result, parties were forced to shift to moderated policy platforms in 
order to remain electorally palatable. This climate allowed for the beginnings of cross community 
cleavages to develop, forming social networks around issue areas that cut across communal divides. 
However, while these networks were effective in their isolated implementation, disempowerment of 
local actors within the agreement undercut their capacity to challenge identity-based political parties.  
This argument fills gaps in existent literature by building bridges between theoretical 
arguments that have isolated themselves. Power-sharing theorists have been excluded from debates 
about dissolving identity divides, because they have been portrayed as reifying communal divisions 
through institutionalizing them. This thesis bridges those two literatures by examining how power-
sharing can, counter-intuitively, create the climate necessary for divides to dissipate. In addition, this 
thesis introduces local actor theorists to both those literatures. As of yet this literature has only 
entered the identity conflict debate tangentially or in isolated contexts. This thesis seeks to identify 
the importance of that literature in a far more comprehensive way by demonstrating the application 
of their arguments to breaking down identity-based divides. Through both of these connections this 
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thesis reformulates power-sharing theory in a way that expands the discussion surrounding its long-
term effects. 
Why Northern Ireland? 
The Northern Irish conflict (1968-1998), otherwise known as the Troubles, provides a 
compelling window into this question for three reasons. First, the conditions that would seem to 
exacerbate the most deleterious effects of these conflicts are magnified. Divides and insecurities 
regarding contact between communities are traditionally more prevalent when populations have 
direct exposure to violence. Table One shows the percentages of population who have experienced 
violence from 1973 to 1998 in Northern Ireland. By 1998, one in seven people were direct victims 
of a violent incident. In that same time frame, one in five had an injured or killed family member. 
Strikingly, over half of the polled citizens personally knew at least one person who had been killed in 
the conflict. Moreover, in the same year, a quarter had been caught in an explosion, and a quarter 
had been caught in a riot.4 Because the statistics indicate that large proportions of each population 
Table One: Exposure to Political Violence, 1973-1998, Northern Ireland 
 
 Percentages 
 1973 1978 1995 1998 
Direct Experience     
Intimidated 15 - 19 18 
Victim of violent incident 3 - 10 14 
Indirect Experience     
Family member/relative killed or injured 8 - 18 21 
Know someone killed/injured 26 - 69 56 
Collective Exposure     
Caught up in explosion 12 20 21 25 
Caught up in Riot 34 14 20 23 
 
(Source: Hayes and Mcallister, 2000) 
 
have significant exposure to violence,  Northern Ireland is a useful case study to examine what 
factors can ameliorate these significant insecurities. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Bernadette Hayes and Ian Mcallister, “Sowing Dragon’s Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and 
Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland,” Political Studies 49, no. 5 (December 2001): 9. 
	   8	  
 Second, the two similar peace attempts – Good Friday and Sunningdale-- conducted within 
the same country and a similar time frame, provides a comparison that is not stunted by radical 
differences between cases. Given the vast discrepancies between different conflicts, the presence of 
this comparison within one conflict offers valuable insights into the mechanisms of successful 
negotiated settlements. This case study, particularly given the similarities in settlements, offers a 
useful comparison that allows for more meaningful and nuanced inferences. 
Third, the conflict in Northern Ireland is unique in that it spawned a series of databases and 
an army of researchers devoted to providing data about the conflict. This plethora of data is useful 
in so far as it grounds the theory of peace settlement literature in a far more substantial way than 
conflicts in which access to participants and communities is limited. In particular, the availability of 
information from non-urban areas helps to prevent urban skews within these theories.  
Basic Definitions 
It is useful, at this point, to define what I mean by communities, and communal conflict. 
The conflict in Northern Ireland broadly followed a split between the Protestant and Catholic 
communities, and as a result represents a communal civil war. When discussing these identity-based 
conflicts, comparative literature often fails to precisely define what it means by terms like ethnicity 
or community.5 Understanding these terms is necessary to formulating our conceptions of how and 
why these conflicts evolve. I have purposely left the term at the vague level of “communal,” rather 
than specifying the religious component of identity in Northern Ireland. This helps to prevent 
misconceptions of the effects of those identity subsets on conflict that often lead to 
misidentifications of motivations for continuing conflict. The types of communities that relate to 
this research are nonetheless important to specify, as it will help clarify the way in which these 
particular communities affect the evolution of conflict.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5Kanchan Chandra, “What Is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter?,” Annual Review of Political Science 9 (June, 2008): 399. 
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This thesis will use the work of Kanchan Chandra’s criteria to define ethnicity, as a model 
that clarifies the role of each community within Northern Ireland. The relevant aspects of each 
community involved are based upon three characteristics: descent based membership, constrained 
change, and community visibility. Membership through descent can be acquired genetically, but in 
this case is acquired through cultural inheritance through a myth of association.6 This qualification is 
closely tied with the attribute of constrained change. While change in between these communities is 
possible, the borders between these communities are not wholly fluid.7 Change can occur rapidly, 
however there are transaction costs that make those changes from, for example, Protestantism to 
Catholicism difficult to make. The final characteristic of the communities this thesis is discussing is 
visibility. The degree of visibility can change between two communities. Although visibility is more 
pronounced when communities are defined by racial characteristics, there are a number of more 
subtle characteristics that can create visibility.8 For instance Catholics in Northern Ireland can often 
be identified by accent, terminology, and clothing. However, given that these identities can change, 
these characteristics are highly imperfect markers of community.  
The usefulness of this definition is that it specifies that components of community which 
affect the conflict. Each of these three characteristics highlights the, at least potentially, exclusive 
nature of these communities. Importantly, exclusivity does not require conflict, so long as those 
identities are not mobilized antagonistically. Exclusivity does, however, mean that in times of 
conflict, groups are not only easily identified and separable, but it also means that mixing becomes 
more difficult.  
Equally important, this definition excludes certain characteristics that have become 
associated with terms like religious community and ethnic community. A myth of common ancestry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid, 399- 400. 
7 Ibid, 415. 
8 Ibid, 417. 
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and culture, while sometimes a feature of these identities, is not integral to them. This suggests that 
those myths are less important to the conflict. However, they may contribute to exclusivity of the 
particular community. When developing the theory behind peace settlements to this particular type 
of conflict, it is important to reach this understanding to more effectively evaluate arguments 
proffered in the literature. 
The Northern Irish conflict did not simply follow a non-state actor on state actor model, but 
instead was defined by divides between these communities. Parties to the conflict while sometimes 
using varied terminology defined themselves as representatives of each of these communities. Even 
state on non-state conflict took a decidedly communal path at times, with state actors, British troops 
or the Royal Ulster Constabulary, becoming associated with the Protestant community. This 
conflict, in its most simplified form, can be described as a conflict over power relations between the 
Protestant and Catholic communities.  
Finally, it is critical to clarify terminology that will be used to describe sets of actors 
throughout the thesis. Throughout this thesis I will refer to a dichotomy between moderate and 
radical actors. Given that these terms are attached to certain stigmas, it is essential to clarify precisely 
what I mean by each grouping. Broadly this split refers to the repertoire of tools that each group 
employs, rather than the desired final outcome. Radical actors are those willing to utilize more 
violent tools to the ends desired. They are willing to challenge political methods with violent 
behavior if their goals are not met. Moderate actors, in contrasts tend to confine themselves to 
political methodologies of change, even if they are forced to sacrifice goals. That does not mean that 
they will accept every political solution, but rather that they will not abandon those solutions in the 
event that they do not succeed. Two things are important to note at this stage. First, this is a highly 
murky dividing line. Critics will be correct to point to the grey area between groups in these 
classifications. With that in mind, it is nonetheless useful to create a split to instill a clarity in the 
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theoretical discussion surrounding peacemaking. By creating groupings based on similar repertories 
and preferences it allows us to analyze how certain policies affect the way actors will respond to 
them without getting bogged down in the enormous complexity of varied motivations form a 
multitude of actors. Second, this split is not meant to attach normative valuations on either 
grouping. Often there is a bias towards ‘moderate’ actors over ‘radical’ actors; I wish to eschew 
those biases. Neither set of actors is considered more legitimate in this thesis; they are analyzed, to 
the extent that it is possible, impassively.   
In addition, this thesis will make blunt categorizations in its use of ‘local actor’ terminology. 
By local actors this thesis is referring to individuals and organizations that are members of each 
locality that are not part of elite organizations involved in the negotiations. The distinctions between 
local and international actors, as well as local and elite actors are less clear than this term 
presupposes. For example, some local organizations have strong connections to internationalized 
networks. With the rise of transnational advocacy networks this is more and more the case. In 
addition, some elite actors may fit other characteristics of local actors, particularly if they are 
members of local manifestations of elite organizations. However, I chose to carve out this particular 
term in order to create a theoretical understanding of the characteristics necessary to make peace 
settlements work. These murky boundaries should not affect those arguments, but rather pose a 
problem for implementation efforts, which is not a subject of this thesis.  
Road Map 
 The remainder of this thesis unfolds in five parts. It first explores relevant peace settlement 
literature. It then provides a chronological overview of the conflict in Northern Ireland to situate the 
literature within the context of the Northern Irish case. This background is followed by two 
chapters exploring the failures in Sunningdale, and the success of the Good Friday Agreement. 
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Finally, it concludes by exploring how these arguments should affect the evolution of peace building 
policy. 
 The first chapter, which analyzes existent literature on negotiated settlements to communal 
conflict, examines five arguments within three core groups that current literature has proposed. The 
first group looks at the internal environment. They highlight the cost of war to elites, the cost of war 
to domestic populations, and the type of conflict as the principal factors determining the success or 
failure of settlements. The second group evaluates the external environment; this group highlights 
third party guarantors as the critical factor for success. The final group includes three distinct sets of 
arguments, each studying the content of the agreement itself. Within this group the factors 
highlighted as critical to ending a war are: the presence of an inequality-reducing mechanism, the 
ability of local actors to influence peace processes, and the presence of power-sharing mechanisms. 
It is the goal of this chapter to identify weighted importance of each factor in order to create a 
holistic understanding of the reasons for success, and in doing so create bridges between literatures 
which are currently disconnected.  
 The second chapter provides a descriptive understanding of the way the conflict in Northern 
Ireland evolved from its beginning in 1969 until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Research into 
the Northern Irish conflict is plagued by its complexity. The conflict is often called the alphabet 
soup of conflicts due to the many groups (and their corresponding acronyms). It is the goal of this 
chapter to contextualize and crystallize the conflict for the reader in order to situate the remaining 
two chapters. In addition, I hope to confront biases replete within popular narratives of ancient 
hatred, and move towards more thorough understandings of motivations towards conflict. As this 
thesis forms its theoretical understandings of the ways conflicts evolve, it is particularly important to 
understand the complexities of actors and actions that form the contours of the conflict.  
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 The third chapter investigates which factors led to the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement 
in 1974. This chapter argues that a failure to create security power-sharing, exacerbated by 
insufficient third party guarantees, created insecurities that became prohibitively difficult to 
overcome. The agreement both excluded traditional community protection groups and then failed to 
replace them with a neutral security force that each community could accept. As a result, the security 
sector became an unguaranteed aspect of the agreement, undercutting the ability of other facets of 
the agreement to operate. With no neutral security force to target communal violence, excluded 
radicals acted as spoilers and created an atmosphere in which moderates lost out to ethnic 
outbidding. Ethnic out-bidders were empowered within that context, because inter-ethnic 
cooperation leads to very concrete and immediate potential security costs.  At the same time, the 
benefits of the agreement were long-term and threatened by the question of security.  
 The fourth chapter analyzes the factors contributing to the success of the Good Friday 
Agreement. This chapter will argue that the confluence of a strong third party guarantee and a 
complete power-sharing created a political climate in which radicalism failed. When identity 
interests, like protection against discrimination on the basis of community, were secured they 
became less relevant to voters. The more radical nationalist parties, Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) and Sinn Fein, were forced to moderate their platforms to remain electorally relevant. Within 
this climate, local actors began to make inroads into the process of diminishing communal 
segregation. In the isolated platforms in which they operated, they began to dissolve barricades 
between these communities. However, the peace architecture severely disempowered local actors. As 
local populations lost ownership over efforts to bridge divides, these attempts became less relevant 
to these communities and were stunted. As a result, incipient cross-communal cleavages failed to 
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budge traditional communal parties like the DUP and Sinn Fein from their electoral position of 
power.9 
 While the results of Good Friday indicate that peace processes should empower local actors, 
the mechanism by which to do so is less clear. The conclusion explores the difficulties in locating 
that mechanism. In the aftermath of intense conflicts, local actors can often be highly conservative, 
and propagate communal divides. Finding a balance that limits the effect of divisive actors, while 
still giving autonomy to local peacemakers, is a necessary step for the peace building community to 
reach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Sinn Fein was the political wing of the IRA, taking its current form in 1970. The DUP was the radical unionist party led 
and founded by firebrand Ian Paisely. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
The theoretical debate to conflict resolution within communal conflict is heated and at times 
divisive, leaving subsets of the literature to be isolated. It is the goal of this chapter to both analyze 
that debate and provide necessary bridges between literatures that have been absent previously. This 
chapter will analyze three core groups within the literature that seek to answer why some negotiated 
settlements to communal conflicts work and others do not. The first group looks at the internal 
environment. They highlight the cost of war to elites, the cost of war to domestic populations, and 
the type of conflict as the factors that determine the success or failure of the settlement. The second 
group evaluates the external environment to explain the success or failure of a negotiated settlement; 
this group highlights third party guarantors as the critical factor for success. The final group includes 
three distinct sets of arguments, which look at the content of the agreement itself. Within this group 
there are three factors highlighted as critical to ending a war: the presence of an inequality-reducing 
mechanism, the ability of local actors to influence peace processes, and the presence of power-
sharing mechanisms.  
There is some overlap within these theorists, as will be noted; however this thesis will treat 
each type of argument as distinct in order to attach a weighted importance to each factor. This 
chapter will evaluate each of these arguments in turn, and identify both gaps and important concepts 
within each grouping. It will then propose a theory that fills these gaps. 
Internal Environment 
Internal environment scholars identify three sets of factors relating to the conflict that 
explain why negotiated settlements succeed: war costs to elites, war costs to the public, and the type 
of conflict occurring. This group tends to assume that once these conditions favor negotiations, 
success is likely. 
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 The first group, within internal environment theorists, expect negotiated settlements to 
occur on the basis of militaristic cost-benefit analysis from the elites. Donald Witman argues that the 
expected utility of continuing the war must be less than the expected utility of the settlement for 
peace to occur. These utilities can be political, but Witman argues that elites tend to concentrate on 
military costs like the destruction of key resources, or the number of soldiers who have been killed.10 
Therefore the military calculus is about both the probability of winning and the expected utility of 
winning. A full military victory is less attractive as these costs increase.11 The conditions that are 
likely to lead to peace then are those in which no one side can achieve a great enough superiority to 
be sure that military action will achieve success.12 This seems to explain why Serbia came to the table 
in Bosnia once the Croat-Muslim alliance began retaking significant portions of territory within 
Bosnia. Not only did the expectation of victory recede, but the expected utility of a future settlement 
also became increasingly reduced. Moreover, these stalemates can indicate a determined opponent 
who promises a war of attrition that is likely to increase the costs.13  
These factors are neither necessary nor sufficient for a peace agreement to be successful, but 
should be considered as helpful facilitators. First, international actors can help to artificially create 
these conditions. The United States put immense pressure on the Protestant and British community, 
as well as the Irish community, to come to the table in Northern Ireland for example. Second, once 
actors have come to the negotiating table these factors become harder to act on. There are a number 
of international and domestic pressures to give peace efforts a good faith attempt in order to avoid 
adopting the reputation of a violent instigator. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Donald Wittman, “How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 4 (December 
1979): 744-6. 
11 Witman, 749. 
Walter 2002, 8. 
12 Walter 2002, 9. 
13 Wiliam Zartman, “The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiation in Internal Conflicts,” in Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars 
End, ed. Roy E. Licklider (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 24. 
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  The second group within internal environment theorists argues that war costs to domestic 
populations create conditions whereby those domestic populations begin to demand cessation to 
conflict. According to these scholars, higher causality rates make populations think they cannot 
prevail. As intensity of conflict leads to greater civilian exposure to that conflict, domestic pressures 
are likely to increase on leaders to halt their campaigns.14 However, it is unclear what mechanisms 
local populations have to pressure militant leaders. This is particularly true when militant leaders 
become the only means of securing safety within communities, and thus have a pedestal that often 
elevates them over political spaces where critique is possible. Moreover it is difficult to identify when 
costs to the domestic population become ‘significant’ enough for this pressure to come into play (i.e. 
does the conflict have to drag on for five years, ten years, or 15 years?). 
 The third group within internal environment theories takes this last argument and advocates 
that within identity-based conflicts in particular, increased violence can exacerbate insecurities and 
reduce the likelihood of incentives towards peace. As a result, contrary to the previous group’s 
expectations, duration and intensity of violence should decrease likelihood of peace. There are two 
factors that make identity conflicts more difficult to resolve. 
First, for these scholars identity conflicts tend to revolve around indivisible stakes. These 
scholars assume that identity conflicts are total wars where reconciliation between groups is 
prohibitively difficult.15 This can be a culturist claim, where these conflicts are value conflicts fought 
over issues close to the heart and are thus less amenable to strategic calculations.16 More 
convincingly, it can be seen as an insecurity-based claim. This is the second factor highlighted by 
these scholars. Once violence erupts, identities become cemented in ways that preclude combatants 
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from working together.17 Frank Wright, in his theory of representative violence, argues that a feature 
of ethnic conflicts is that some violent targeting is based upon the community the victim came from, 
rather than their individual actions. As a result, “Everyone might be a target for reprisal for 
something done in their name and without their approval”.18 In this way Wright argues that a 
relatively small group of people could create a generalized danger. This means that short-term 
measures necessary for settlements to progress, like disarmament, are met with increased suspicion. 
The result is that negotiated settlements become increasingly difficult to implement as the peace 
process develops. 
While communal conflicts can exacerbate insecurity, the stakes within these conflicts should 
not be thought of as drastically different from other conflicts. Ethnicity scholars have identified 
three arguments that indicate that communal conflicts may revolve around similar stakes to other 
conflicts. First, these conflicts are often manipulated by elites seeking to draw attention away from 
domestic crises by increasing the potency of threat rhetoric. 19 Second, local actors often use the 
guise of ethnic conflict to engage in violence that leads to materialistic gains.20  Third, ethnic conflict, 
they argue, is often the result of weak institutions which allow elites to exploit cleavages for their 
own benefit. This exploitation takes the form of patronage being doled out along those ethnic 
divisions. As a result the foundations of the conflict are materialist, and based upon relative 
deprivation rather than ethnic biases.21 This chapter will not go into an extensive discussion of the 
dynamics of identity conflicts; suffice it to say that conflicts, which on the ‘front stage’ appear to 
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have identity based motivations, are often very similar to other conflicts on the ‘back stage’.22 So, for 
example, Protestant and Catholic clashes often split along economic divides between the 
communities. When evaluating the importance of the type of conflict to the success of negotiated 
settlements, we should be wary of exaggerating the importance. The next group of scholars argues 
that these insecurities can be targeted by effective third party guarantees to the conflict. 
Third Party Guarantors  
 Third party theorists advocate that the presence of third party guarantors is necessary to 
ensure that the negotiated settlements are effectively implemented, by creating trust and compliance. 
The majority of these scholars do not see the presence of a third party guarantor as a sufficient 
condition, but rather a necessary condition. Often these theorists also advocate additional 
mechanisms that reduce insecurity, like power-sharing.23 However this thesis will deal with this 
group as separate and distinct in order to more clearly elucidate the weighted importance of a third 
party guarantor.  
 Barbara Walter argues that the success of a negotiated settlement is not predicated on the 
content of the agreement, but rather on the ability of actors to successfully implement said 
agreement. Finding that 62% of all negotiations led to a signed bargain, she infers that the 
meaningful difficulty must be the implementation phase.24 These scholars identify relative 
insecurities between parties to the negotiation as blocks to implementation, as they reduce trust 
necessary to effectively install parts of the negotiated settlement. Negotiations, under this theory, fail 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For a more extensive analysis see, Devotta (2005), Kalyvas (2005), Hale (2008), Crawford (1998), Gagnon (2005), Fujii 
(2009), Brass (1996). 
23 Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2002). 
Caroline Hartzell, Mathew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild, “Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of 
Some Key Variables,” International Organization 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001). 
24 Walter 2002, 5. 
	   20	  
because combatants cannot provide a credible commitment to abide by the terms of the agreement, 
which often leaves numerous opportunities for exploitation after the agreement is signed.25 
These scholars identify insecurities on two levels that can increase the fragility of a 
negotiated settlement. Paul Collier classifies them as micro and macro level insecurities. On the 
micro level there are fears that disarmament and demobilization will decrease your individual 
security. As a result, there are likely to be pressures from each base not to sign or to implement 
necessary disarmament and demobilization measures. On the macro level there is a fear that your 
group will be cheated out of any meaningful position in the post-war government.26 Thus the 
problem of giving arms away represents a further reduction in their ability to check abuses from the 
first post-war administration.27 These insecurities are likely to be felt more keenly by the smaller 
groups, dissuading them from signing peace agreements. The more damage the party feels they can 
suffer as a result from a cheating opponent the less likely they are to implement a treaty. 
The end result of these conditions is that combatants who want to end war are more likely to 
shy away from peace agreements because they know that those agreements will entail disarmament 
policies. When they do enter into negotiations, they are more likely to be highly sensitive and 
reactionary to violations. Given the opacity of information in post-war contexts this behavior is 
likely to manifest even under instances of vague actions, which may or may not be a violation of the 
agreement.28 Therefore, this theory argues, even if you have signed a ‘perfect’ peace agreement that 
targets the underlying causes of the conflict, the implementation of the agreement is the critical 
juncture determining its success.                                                                                                      
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For these scholars third party guarantors provide an answer to general insecurity that parties 
to a negotiation feel. Third party guarantors can provide key functions that reduce these insecurities 
at two stages of the conflict. First, they provide the necessary initial incentive for parties to come to 
the table, either through coercive pressure or through creating a trust in the process. In addition, 
they provide a valuable role during the negotiation process as facilitators and guarantors. Second, 
they play both enforcement and verification roles during the implementation phase of the conflict. 
This section will analyze the effect of these third party guarantors at each of these stages.  
In the first stage of the negotiation process—getting to the table—third parties can serve 
two functions.  The first is primarily a procedural function. Third party actors can supply missing 
information, pass messages, neutrally highlight common interests, and encourage better 
communication. In addition they can arrange for initial interactions between the parties. Within 
those meetings they can structure the agenda and control the content of the meetings so as to avoid 
escalations.29 Second, strong third party actors can also pressure parties into negotiations. They can 
use a combination of incentives, not limited to financial inducements, recognition and legitimation, 
and economic sanctions.30 From these two functions international parties solve for heightened 
insecurities in two ways. First they reduce the worries of abuse, particularly for the minority party. 
Second, they can force actors into these uncomfortable negotiations by leveraging their economic, 
political, and military influence.  
 Similar reassuring functions also serve to encourage the likelihood of a signed agreement. 
The ability of a third party guarantor to promise force can both reassure the weaker side that it will 
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not be defeated, and deter the strong side from instigating military action.31 However, the 
commitment needs to be believable. Parties to the conflict may question both the quality and 
quantity of troops, as well as the veracity of the commitment.32 This suggests that a number of 
factors may impact the inclination to buy into the third party’s guarantee. These include, but are not 
limited to, a past history of interventions, the domestic audience for intervention in the third party 
country, and the resources available to the third party. 
The implementation phase represents the most critical stage for third party actions. As 
Joanna Spear argues, without security on the ground there cannot be a deep implementation of any 
facets of the peace agreement.33 Moreover, the effect of a failure at this level in particular is 
presumably magnified, as it further empowers leaders who are resistant to peace processes with an 
example of a failed process. In Northern Ireland, members of IRA leadership used the failure of an 
IRA ceasefire and the Sunningdale Agreement in the early seventies to avoid entering into 
negotiations for almost two decades. 
Walter identifies two relevant strategies that parties to a peace agreement can use to 
encourage cooperation from the opposite group. However, each of these three strategies is likely to 
be very difficult to implement in the absence of a third party guarantor.  
First, as was the case with the Paris Accords in Cambodia, negotiators can structure the 
demobilization reciprocally. In his seminal book, Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod argues that, 
given certain discount rates, individuals who have short-term incentives to cheat will typically chose 
to cooperate if implementation was established in a tit-for-tat mechanism. Walter applies this 
principle to demobilization. It would be possible, for example, in the case of Northern Ireland, to 
have had Unionist and Nationalist paramilitaries agree to parallel disarmament plans. The second 
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strategy outlined was verification. Through strategies like random inspection visits, observers, and 
surveillance cameras groups can reduce the likelihood of cheating and sooth insecurities of 
vulnerable groups.34 
 These strategies are unlikely to work without international intervention for three reasons. 
Tit-for-tat demobilization can only work if combatants can reliably identify non-compliance and 
consistently sanction it.35 As will be discussed later, the immediate aftermath of the civil war is filled 
with static, or bad information, conflicting signals, and inadvertent mistakes which all together make 
it difficult to determine violations. In addition monitoring and verification is difficult for two 
reasons. First, groups, particularly weaker groups, often lack the money, man-power, and technology 
to effectively implement these verification schemes. Second, the exchange of observers also 
exacerbates fears and defensive vulnerabilities. These problems become aggravated when you 
consider that elites have to compete against radicals within their own parties, thus highlighting the 
salience of each of these incidents.36 
 Third party guarantors can begin to solve for these problems in two ways. First, they can 
solve for verification problems. Walter argues that third party actors can provide prompt reliable 
information necessary to pursue a tit for tat strategy. In addition they can more easily distribute 
observers through the country, including at sensitive military sites, without exacerbating insecurities 
and defensive vulnerabilities. When there are neighborhoods that are sensitive to foreign incursions, 
as we see with Catholic and Protestant no-go neighborhoods, this can be extremely important.37 As 
Joanna Spear highlights, this verification is often critical during unique conditions of opacity in the 
aftermath of conflict. There is often a genuine uncertainty of the amount of troops and weapons 
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that each party has. The presence of casual fighters who aren’t apart of the hierarchy of the army, 
but were still combatants in the war, complicate demobilization efforts. In addition where there were 
weak chains of commands there may be no inventory of weapons available. Moreover there are 
often incentives to lie about your troop numbers prior to the settlement. This ‘gamesmanship’ is 
used to secure concessions during the negotiation process.38 The presence of an international verifier 
can assuage fears of lying and cheating that are likely to be rampant under these conditions. 
 This accurate verification then plays three roles. First, it provides a determination of 
compliance and non-compliance. Second, it is a deterrent to cheating parties. Third, it builds 
confidence in the process from both parties as they are both able to demonstrate their compliance to 
each other.39  
 The presence of a third party guarantor force, or a credible guarantee of one, can also 
alleviate fears of parties to the agreement in cases of sudden and quick attacks. The ability to meet 
an attack with a countervailing force can both reassure the weaker side that it will not be defeated, 
and also reassure it that the threat of force cannot be leveraged over it.40 This reduces the likelihood 
that the larger party will launch a counter attack, but also reduces the likelihood that the weaker side 
will try to launch a preemptive attack while it has the advantage of surprise. In addition the threat of 
force can ensure that the implementation is conducted fairly. When South Africa was integrating the 
ANC Umhkhonto we Sizwe into the South African National Defense Force the British military 
advisory team was there to ensure that the integration process and procedures were applied fairly to 
individuals.41  
 Clearly, though, not all intervention is going to be successful. The content and quality of 
third party intervention must also be judged. Patrick Regan, conducting a statistical analysis of 150 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Spear 1999, 149-50. 
39 Spear 1999, 144. 
40 Walter 2002, 27. 
41 Spear 1999, 147. 
	   25	  
conflicts, finds that poorly constructed international interventions can increase the duration of civil 
wars by causing opposition groups to think that they can achieve total victory through international 
support.42 Page Fortna, provides compelling analysis that the type of international intervention is 
critical. For example, enforcement missions are associated with much shorter peace than consent-
based missions.43 This may seem obvious, but it illustrates a critical point when determining the 
weighted importance of third party guarantors: while they may be a beneficial—and perhaps even 
necessary—condition for a successful negotiation, the factors within the settlements themselves are 
critical to the success or failure of peace.  
Causes of Conflict  
The first group of literature highlighting the content of the agreement identifies solving the 
underlying causes of conflict as the key variable determining the success or failure of the negotiated 
settlement. These scholars identify two main causes to conflict, or grievances: inequality based upon 
political, economic, and social exclusion, and a history of ‘injustices’.44 
 Questions over the relation of inequality to conflict have provoked a series of theoretical and 
statistical assessments arriving at contradictory answers. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) as well as 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) each came to the conclusion that inequality does not increase the risk of 
civil war.45 However, as Gudrun Ostby notes, these studies neglect group-based inequalities which 
have high statistical relation to conflict. In fact, when economic inequality was paired with social 
inequalities those cases lead disproportionately more often to conflict.46 Despite this, Hartzel and 
Hoddie note that out of all negotiated settlements from 1948 to 1998 economic ‘power sharing’ was 
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the least-used method of targeting conflict.47 These scholars tend to advocate that we should 
evaluate peace settlements on their recognition of inequalities as a source of conflict, their 
implementation of solutions to resolve those inequalities, and the effectiveness of those 
implementations.48 
Horizontal inequalities, or group-based inequalities that Ostby is concerned with, consist of 
four primary areas of inequality: political participation inequality, economic assets inequality, income 
and employment inequality, and social inequality. Political participation inequalities can occur at 
multiple different levels, including the cabinet, bureaucracy, and the army. Economic assets include 
land, livestock, and human capital etc. Finally social inequalities include indicators such as access to 
education, health services, water services, or housing.49  Inequality theorists advocate that inequality 
facilitates conflict through two related mechanisms. It provides an individualized sense of relative 
deprivation and second, perceived institutional breakdown facilitates large-scale radical 
mobilizations. 
These scholars argue that inequality facilitates a sense of relative deprivation, where the 
minority group feels discriminated against and feels an injustice has been done to them. This, as 
Gurr argues, creates a tension between value expectations and value capabilities.50 Horizontal 
inequality then facilitates violent mobilizations centered around group characteristics since the 
frustration is grounded in relative performance to those doing well in society.51 Cramer notes that 
this inequality is hugely important, but only when conceived from the outset in political economy 
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terms, whereby inequalities are tied to past histories of political oppression.52 This rhetoric, for 
example, was replete within the Civil Rights Movement of the 60’s and 70’s in Northern Ireland. 
Communal conflicts, for these scholars, are actually the result of institutional discrimination 
rather than pre-existing ethnic biases. When institutions are discriminating on the basis of a 
communal identity, the sense of relative deprivation mentioned above is then coordinated through 
group-based mobilization that the communal identity provides.53 Kristin Bakke and Eric Wibbels 
argue that high levels of inequality exacerbate redistributive claims coming from minority 
communities. This becomes particularly important when cultural policies of the state institutionally 
repress communities on the basis of those identities. This can come in the form of policies towards 
language—as we see with the Turkish state’s ban on Kurdish speaking—or through policies towards 
religious ceremonies, national holidays etc. For these scholars, ethnicity’s usefulness as a mobilizing 
tool means that when inequality is centered along communal divisions it contributes to the causes of 
conflict. This suggests that if you solve for those inequalities within the negotiated settlements, then 
communal identity will become a less relevant mobilizing tool for violence.  
These inequality reduction theories advocate that negotiated settlements will succeed or fail 
on the basis of their targeted solutions towards inequalities. These scholars critique traditional peace 
frameworks of liberalization and democratization. Liberalization, they argue, enforces long-lasting 
privilege of some groups relative to others by putting them in a stronger position to exploit the 
market due to better education and more starting capital.  Democratization similarly reinforces anti-
minority biases with distribution of government jobs, infrastructure projects etc. Moreover, often 
the discrimination is difficult to target in free market systems as disadvantage can be hidden. For 
example, job advertisements are often in newspapers which are read by one group, or spread in 
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social networks with similar problems.  Equal opportunity is not enough to prevent these 
inequalities from being mobilized.54  
Stewart identifies three policy actions that post-conflict regimes can take: 
First, one can change policies towards processes which are directly or indirectly discriminatory. Second, one 
can direct assistance to particular groups, e.g., training people for interviews, subsidizing housing. Third, one 
can introduce targets and quotas for education, land distribution, financial and physical assets etc.55 
 
Nancy Bermeo, in concurrence, argues that through decentralizing governance, you can reduce 
discrimination within that government, and reduce motivations towards violence. Reductions in 
discrimination diminish senses of relative deprivation. When, for example, Jawaharlal Nehru gave 
Tamils a separate state, their separatist movements lost power.  
 However, inequality based theorists advocate that post conflict regimes should move beyond 
those mitigating policies to actively target inequalities.  Beath, Fotini, and Enikolopov advocate that 
insurgencies begin to lose their support when relative deprivation is mitigated by a sense of 
economic improvement, and credit for that improvement is attached to the government.56 Analyzing 
development packages in Afghanistan they found that communities who had received development 
projects had better images of the government and reduced security threats.57 These theorists identify 
a multiplicity of potential policies that can target inequalities. Social inequalities can be challenged, 
for example, by quotas for education, housing etc.  Economic inequalities can be targeted with 
public sector employment quotas, land transfers, subsidization policies etc.58 The specifics of 
inequality-reducing policies are necessarily case dependent, but the uniting factor behind each 
scholar within this group is that the ability to reduce these inequalities is the measure of a successful 
peace agreement. 
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 The second type of grievance that can be necessary to address is a history of targeted 
repression, not necessarily based upon inequality. When a government has targeted an ethnic 
community violently, politically, or culturally, that history can create resentment within 
communities.59 Certain historical memories, like Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland, fueled 
motivations towards violence. The success of a peace agreement under this theory is predicated on 
its ability to do two things. First, it must create checks to prevent future injustices. Second, it must 
create some sort of social catharsis that is able to target and ameliorate the resentment held on the 
basis of past repression.60 
 While the contribution of these scholars is undoubtedly important, its importance should 
not be overstated. First, it is unclear that the reasons that conflict begins are the same reasons that 
explain why conflict ends. It seems reasonable that conflict and the psychological trauma therein 
changes the preferences of actors. As a result, while inequality reduction is important to prevent 
regeneration of conflict, it should not be considered sufficient for peace. Inequality reduction should 
be considered an important function to prevent long-term regeneration of conflict. It should also be 
considered a facilitator of short-term peace, but there are at least plausible conditions in which it 
becomes less important to short-term peace.  
 The final response to these authors is that grievances exist in many minorities that do not 
rebel, which suggests that they cannot be the most salient, or only, factor explaining success of 
violent mobilizations. These critiques argue that grievance has to be coupled with an opportunity to 
rebel, facilitated by resources, alliances, etc.61 As a result, it seems that negotiated settlements should 
target those opportunity structures rather than the grievances. At this point then we can classify this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Havard Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992,” 
American political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 2001):320. 
60 The literature on transitional justice mechanisms is large, and this thesis will not enter it. For a good summary see (RG 
Teitel, 2000). 
61 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004): 565. 
	   30	  
factor as a sometimes necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition to create a successful peace 
agreement. The next group of scholars coopts these arguments under the umbrella of empowering 
local actors within peace processes. 
Local Influence 
 A growing group of scholars have highlighted the importance of local influence within peace 
processes. As of yet these scholars have only entered the debate surrounding ethnic conflicts 
tangentially and intermittently. This section will argue that they ought to play a more prominent role 
in the debate surrounding post conflict institutions within deeply divided societies. These scholars 
make three primary claims. First, they argue that violence in both its origins and its effects is highly 
localized. Second, they argue that local solutions are needed to target the underlying causes of 
conflict. Finally, they argue that local influence is necessary to create ownership over the peace 
process. Local actors within this context refers to local networks not including existing national 
political and militaristic elite. 
 These scholars base their analysis on locating both the causes and effects of violence at the 
local level. Paul Risly and Timothy Sisk argue that motivations to enter into conflict for actors within 
civil wars are generated at the local level.62 Kalyvas finds that despite claims of cohesive group-based 
violence, most violence during wars can be explained by local motivations. He argues that local 
citizens use the guise of war to carry out personal vendettas or to gain ‘booty’. Kalyvas argues that 
the concept of group violence implies the interchangeability of individual persons within those 
groups. He argues that this limits individual agency that is most often the salient explanatory factor 
in their decision to participate in violence. For example, he argues that much of the communal 
conflict in Afghanistan was generated from preexisting familial and economic feuds.63 These back 
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stage feuds are then played out on the front stage of ethnic conflict. Fotini concurs, examining inter-
Muslim fighting in the Cazinka Krajina region in Bosnia. She argues that only local economic 
incentives can explain this fractioned violence.64 Group centered claims hold no answer to why 
internal fighting within groups occurs. 
 Predicated in the previous analysis, these scholars advocate that peace processes will be 
successful only when they are led by local level initiatives. These scholars criticize internationally 
imposed ‘cookie cutter’ solutions that place emphasis exclusively on market liberalization and 
democratic governance, without consultation of local needs. Roger MacGinty and Oliver Richmond 
question whether we should expect the same basic model to be successful in the diverse societies 
emerging from conflict.65 When heavily engineered governance institutions are imposed in post-
conflict regimes, in what Fukayama calls ‘getting to Denmark’, peace processes are marked by 
“continuing citizen insecurity, persistent inter-communal mistrust, slow and poorly distributed 
economic growth, and a perception among many citizens that the benefits of peace are exclusive and 
poorly shared.”66  
The result of this priority of a cookie cutter model, they argue, is that local needs in post-
conflict zones are ignored. Oliver Ramsbothan argues that these processes have ignored economic 
and social dimensions, as well as the pyscho-social dimensions of post conflict needs.67 This priority 
of a Westphalian system of rights limits the capacity of local actors to meet their needs in times 
when they are most vulnerable. These conditions have led many communities in Colombia, for 
example, to cooperate with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) when their basic 
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needs were ignored in conflict resolution programs in preference of democratic process rights.68 If 
we at least partially accept the inequality-based argument, then failure to target localized structures of 
inequality empowers radical actors to mobilize.  
Finally, it is often the case that local actors can best target solutions to the varied conditions 
that plague post conflict governments. Naomi Roht-Arriaza elucidates this argument within the 
context of post conflict justice. She argues that insufficient attention is paid to the local subnational 
town or village, even though this is where people most keenly felt the impact of the conflict.  The 
degree of variation and complexity of violence within local atmospheres makes international and 
national response both inadequate, and in some cases locally irrelevant.  Post conflict justice 
structures are often necessary to change local power dynamics that have been created by conflict. 
However it is difficult for the peace process as a whole to gain ownership from survivors when 
foreign systems of justice are imposed upon them.69 
The second mechanism by which lack of local involvement dooms peace processes is 
through limited local ownership over the negotiated settlement. When societies have little say in the 
shape and orientation of the peace, they are more likely to view the process as an imposition rather 
than a collaborative venture.70 Without this legitimacy, reconstruction processes will always be 
unsustainable.71 MacGinity argues that peace processes often lose this ownership in three ways. First, 
the decisions are top down as the only actors involved are national and international elites with little 
recognition of local elites. This is exacerbated by the technocratic nature of the content of these 
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deals. Second, the deals made are often made in private and have limited transparency. Finally, as a 
result of the previous two factors, these processes often ignore local cultures by placing a primacy 
on the individual at the expense of the collective.72 
These scholars argue that the degree to which peace agreements can attain success can be 
measured through their ability to hybridize local and international peace processes. MacGinty argues 
that successful peace settlements will be marked by four factors. First, there will be compliance 
powers of the international community. Through the use of material and moral power they can 
pressure more powerful actors to include less powerful actors in the process. Second, there should 
be incentive power of the international community. Through economic and political rewards they 
can incentivize powerful actors to give up important concessions. Where these theorists differ from 
third party guarantor theorists is in the third and fourth factors. There must be an ability of local 
actors to resist, ignore, or adapt international interventions to local needs and desires. Finally, local 
actors must be empowered to present and maintain alternative forms of intervention.73 
 This hybridity increases feelings of local ownership and creates innovative solutions to 
localized problems. When local NGO’s and actors are brought into the debate within the 
negotiation process they are more likely to feel ownership over that process. This makes it harder 
for radical actors to spoil that process without sacrificing popular support.74 Wendy Pearlman argues 
that spoiling processes is less likely when more actors are included in the process. This decreases the 
capacity of those groups to highlight fears that they will be excluded by future governments, and 
thereby successfully spoil the agreement.75 Second, it allows for local solutions that can target 
underlying causes of conflict. This is especially important in the context of inequality as a motivation 
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towards conflict. However, particularly in the context of communal conflicts, this can also be critical 
to healing communities. Roht-Arriaza argues that local influence in transitional justice processes 
allows them to resonate with local cultures and communities. This makes them accessible and 
meaningful to those populations, which can often be a critical step in allowing ex-neighbors to 
coexist, and to allow intermediate social structures to rebuild.76 For example, in Peru local 
communities used traditional methods to first dehumanize and then rehumanize locals who had 
joined Sendero Luminoso through public reincorporation ceremonies involving truth telling, 
apology, and symbolic punishment.77 
 These scholars run into a couple of problems. First, local responses to conflict can be 
conservative, particularly in the aftermath of conflicts when radical actors are more likely to have 
control. A former UNDP worker, Roddy Brett, described an experience in Guatemala in which he 
was asked to aid the local community in lynching a member of a paramilitary group who was 
responsible for multiple atrocities during the conflict.78 As a result of incidents like this it is difficult 
to determine what line should be drawn between international involvement and local control.  
Second, it is possible that local actor theorists are less relevant to short term peace. They 
seem to recognize this through their distinction between negative peace, an end to violence, and 
positive peace, and end to the reasons for violence. 79  It seems plausible, for example, that a 
cessation of violence, a negative peace, can be achieved simply by targeting the actors involved in 
perpetrating violence. If those who own the weapons and direct the foot soldiers agree to end the 
conflict, the violence should, at least temporarily, stop. If that is true, then it may be possible to 
achieve a negative peace without involving local actors. As a result, the main theoretical footing for 
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these theorists seems to be in the long-term peace arena. That being said, high levels of ownership 
from local populations may dissuade spoilers to the peace process in the short term as well. 
Moreover, if those mechanisms to achieve short-term peace damn efforts to achieve long-term 
peace then their usefulness is radically diminished.  
However, in order for local actors to gain traction they have to be given a space by an 
institutional framework that empowers them and gives them a legitimacy to act with importance in 
their communities.  
Power-sharing 
 Power-sharing creates that political space. This group of theorists, similar to third party 
guarantor theorists, advocates that the success of negotiated settlements is determined through 
mechanisms to reduce fears of cheating. However, they locate those mechanisms in the content of 
the peace agreement, rather than in external actors. These theorists advocate that power-sharing 
mechanisms in particular can reduce insecurities and empower moderate actors within the new 
electoral regime. 
 These scholars argue that democratic solutions to conflict that offer only a chance of 
winning are not enough to assuage the fears of vulnerable parties.80 Parties to the negotiation will 
not trust them to prevent a rapid grab for power while the demobilized party has given up their own 
enforcement mechanism.81 As a result, Charles Call argues that fears of political exclusion trigger 
renewed armed conflict. However, through mechanisms like power sharing, negotiated settlements 
can provide security guarantees for rebels that give them guaranteed voice in government.82 
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 Power-sharing is a complex concept that has evolved through heated debate, and as a result 
it necessitates a thorough exegesis.  Brendan O’Leary defines power-sharing as an arrangement of 
political institutions to prevent the monopoly of executive, legislative, judicial, bureaucratic, military, 
or cultural power. This can be achieved through four primary methods. Those monopolies can be 
challenged in overtly political bodies by organizing them to ensure shared and self-rule among each 
community. In addition, the military, police, and intelligence agencies must be organized between 
the communities to ensure the political organization is a meaningful check. This should be 
supplemented by economic policies which encourage wealth sharing through a combination of 
parity, proportionality, and autonomy. Finally, cultural pluralism should also be encouraged.83 
 There are three principle types of power-sharing: centripitalism, territorial pluralism, and 
consociationalism. For a discussion of centripitalism and territorial pluralism see O’leary 2014. This 
chapter will focus itself on consociationalism. 
Consociationalism is defined at its core by four characteristics. There must be participation 
of the representatives of all significant groups in government, and there should be a high degree of 
autonomy for these groups. In addition, governance and distribution institutions should be defined 
by proportionality. Finally, there should be a minority veto.84 Consociationalism can be split into 
three categories: complete consociation, concurrent consociation, and weak consociation. Complete 
consociation refers to the process whereby leaders of all significant segments of an ethnically 
differentiated territory are represented. Thus, if one ethnicity splits its vote, then both parties would 
be represented.  Concurrent consociation only requires majority parties to be included. Finally, in 
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weak consociation parties represented must have a plurality of votes.85 Each of these mechanisms 
speaks to a broad split between consociationalist theories. Corporate consociationalism empowers 
nationalist parties by giving them a guaranteed vote. Liberal consociation, in contrast, allows self-
governance over who represents the group. This, liberal consociationalists argue, allows for the 
evolution of politics in post conflict power-sharing states.86 
 Consociationalism serves three primary functions that overcome risks of association and 
facilitate long lasting peace. First, by shifting control over certain decisions to subunits it mitigates 
fears that the certain policies will threaten survival of the group. Often issues such as language, 
education, and access to government services are issues which groups feel are essential to their 
ability to survive. By giving them control over those areas of policy, they are more likely to enter into 
post-war regimes. Second, through dividing planes of power, groups can check against capture of 
the political center of the state. Third, it reduces disparities among groups by giving them 
proportional access to resources and enabling minorities to rise within local state bureaucracies.87 As 
a result, promises of power-sharing assuage fears that have, up until this point, allowed hardline 
elites to justify war as a security precaution. 
 In the long term, inter-elite cooperation in the power-sharing executive and military 
normalizes cooperation as a method to resolve conflicts.88 As cooperation becomes the primary 
locus for interaction between the communities it becomes an increasingly plausible option for the 
public. The result of this is highlighted by Mitchel, Evans, and O’leary, in their concept of ethnic 
tribune parties. As power-sharing institutions incentivize cooperation and compromise through 
institutions like the minority veto and the cross community executive body, moderate policies 
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become more realistic options in the electoral game. Moderate parties then shift their policies to 
capitalize on an increasingly moderate base that is tired of extremist politics. Radical parties respond 
in turn by being nominally ethno-nationalist, but in reality moderating their policies.89 This logic is 
what prevents the ethnic outbidding game, and allows elites to feel comfortable moderating their 
policies.90 Moreover, for elites who would challenge the negotiated settlement, the opposite 
community has enough military, economic, and political access to power to punish infringements.91 
Importantly though, these power-sharing regimes must be reflected in each institution of power. If 
military or economic regimes are not divided then fear and uncertainty will still be the most salient 
factor, and moderates will be undermined.  
 Criticisms of power-sharing are generally located in three conceptual areas. First, they argue 
that power sharing only works in places where it is not needed.92  They argue that existing political 
pressures from domestic populaces, or international actors, could have facilitated a peace agreement 
without power-sharing, in the cases where it has been successful.93 Beyond being impossible to 
prove one way or the other, this argument seems to fly in the face of the difficult conditions on the 
ground during many successful negotiations. Often violence is still occurring leading up to the 
conflict, and past settlements have left groups weary of negotiations writ large. The second concern 
critics of power-sharing have is that it leads to gridlock within the postwar regime. These critics 
advocate that leaders only agree to consociationalism because it gives them power, and they are 
unlikely to moderate given the presence of the veto that allows them to consolidate that power. 
Ineffective governance, they argue, will only regenerate into conflict.94 While this may have some 
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validity, there are two key responses. First, the harms to effective governance should be compared to 
a majority-based system which threatens violence through exclusion. Second, it is unclear that this 
gridlock will remain a feasible electoral strategy after the atmosphere of violence that empowers it 
dies down.95 
 The final, and most trumpeted, critique of power-sharing argues that power-sharing 
institutions retrench the identity divides which begat the conflict in the first place. Paul Brass argues 
that consociationalism reinforces elites who retrench ethnic identities. If Posner is right, and 
institutions form and consolidate ethnic identities, than consociationalism seems to empower those 
who would institutionalize ethnicity’s exclusivity. As Valerie Bunce argues, power-sharing gives 
ethnic elites mobilizing building blocks including: 
the recognition of a common language, the creation of a nationally defined intelligentsia, the establishment of a 
stable core of institutions led by a nativized elite, and the allocation of political and economic resources to 
regional leaders who could use them for divisive, nationalist purposes.96  
 
Both Brass and Rupert Taylor argue that ethnicity is not as objective as consociationalists assume.97 
As a result, they advocate integrationist institutions could achieve the same ends that power-sharing 
theorists advocate are exclusive to consociationalism.  
 As of yet the response to the claim that power-sharing has entrenched ethnicity has limited 
the ability of the academic debate to evaluate the ability of post-power-sharing institutions to evolve. 
The first response has been that power-sharing is still better than the alternative. Majoritarian 
democracy, they argue, can breed violence, and as a result, prevent integration.98 In contrast, they 
argue that power-sharing seems to do comparably better. Mattes and Savun examined forty-six civil 
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wars which ended in peace agreements between 1945 and 2005. They concluded that political and 
military power sharing reduced likelihood of violence.99 
Power sharing theorist’s second response is that power-sharing is a necessary means to 
reduce uncertainty given that ethnic identities become fairly durable after conflict. Lijphart 
acknowledges that ethnicity is in part a construct of elite manipulation and that identity is not fixed. 
However, he, and others like Brendan O’leary and Eric Nordlinger, base their responses to these 
criticisms upon assumptions of ethnic identity that are contrary to fluid conception of ethnicity. 
Lijphart himself alludes to Walker Connor and argues that it takes anywhere from 300 to 700 years 
to assimilate an ethnic group. As a result, for him, it is not practical to try to break down divides.100 
O’leary echoes this sentiment when he states that power sharers do not believe that ethnic divisions 
are as malleable as constructivists suggest.101 Instead they suggest that it is because of these rigid 
divides that power-sharing must be instituted.   
It is important that I qualify my previous claim about limiting the academic debate. The 
concerns about more rigid ethnic identities should not be taken lightly. Indeed, after conflict, 
periods of mistrust are likely to deepen the drive to resort to ethnicity as a means to reduce 
uncertainty. This is particularly true when violence has been indiscriminate, and people were driven 
by fear to begin identifying by those ethnic characteristics. So power-sharing theorists are correct to 
note that integrationist strategies are unlikely to be successful in the immediate aftermath of a 
conflict. However, the power-sharing community has relied on this argument at the expense of 
analyzing the conditions under which ethnic identities break down. Even when they do propose that 
ethnic identities can eventually break down, after stability isn’t the primary concern, that argument is 
unsubstantiated by a mechanism. Moreover there is little analysis about how those claims interact 
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with their previous claims that ethnicity can be prohibitively durable.102 This thesis will seek to fill 
that void.  
Argument 
 This thesis will advance a three-part argument. First, it will argue that a third party actor is 
necessary to create a credible commitment to the negotiated settlement. Second, it will argue that 
power-sharing creates a moderating effect on the political climate that both reduces radicalism and 
creates a potentiality for cross community cleavages to develop. Third, it will argue empowered local 
level actors are critical to capitalize on the moderate political space that power sharing has created. 
This argument begins to fill the gap in existent power-sharing and negotiated settlement literature by 
providing an avenue by which divides can break down in the aftermath of power-sharing 
institutions. In this way it seeks to bridge the power-sharing literature with identity and integrationist 
literature and thereby provide a platform to expand the debate surrounding power-sharing. 
Third party guarantor  
 This presence of a third party guarantor allows parties—particularly smaller parties— in the 
conflict to feel that the settlement represents a credible commitment. This capacity to reduce fears 
of cheating induces cooperation at each stage of the negotiation process. These arguments are 
replete within the existent negotiated settlement literature. However, organizations with a track 
record of remaining in the post-conflict rebuilding process for a lengthier duration are likely to be 
more successful. Reconstruction processes take time, and the typical framework for reconstruction 
used by the liberal peace framework. John Paul Lederach has called for international interventions 
that reconceive of the time frame within which post-conflict transformations take place, from X-
year to twenty-year increments.103 The more committed an intervener, the more credible their 
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guarantee of the post conflict institutions. Critically, as will be discussed later, this proposal should 
not be mistaken for an argument that interveners should control those processes.  
 In the initial aftermath of a peace process, the presence of a third party guarantor creates 
conditions where people begin to feel safe distancing themselves from hardline ethnic entrepreneurs. 
They create temporary cultures of trust that the opposite community will not act violently towards 
them. This allows secondary considerations, like economic development, that will usually not favor 
those hard line elites, to factor into their decisions about which groups to support. While this is not 
a permanent condition, it is a necessary first step. Power sharing institutions allow this culture to 
develop. 
 Power-sharing 
 At the initial stage, as power sharing theorists advocate, power-sharing creates conditions 
where parties to the conflict feel secure in entering into a peace agreement. Smaller communities are 
unlikely to enter into an agreement when they think that they will simply be outvoted, and the same 
exclusionary policies that instigated violence will be imposed.  Moreover, promised inclusion in 
government, as well as a veto power, can give representatives from those communities a powerful 
tool to combat against radical elements of their community during the negotiation process. 
Drummed up fears become much less salient to communities when they know they have a 
guaranteed significant influence over the direction and shape of the government. 
In the aftermath of the agreement’s implementation power-sharing moderates the political 
culture. First, it reduces instances of cultural, political, social, and economic attacks on the basis of 
those identities. Cultural autonomy, as well as veto power, makes it such that the dominant 
population can no longer easily discriminate on the basis of the other community’s cultural identity. 
Some scholars have argued that power-sharing incentivizes people to identify along ethnic divides; 
ironically that guaranteed power to each community makes it such that those divides become less 
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important. If you no longer feel that you are being targeted on the basis of your identity, you are less 
likely to support exclusionary policies designed to protect it. Other issue areas that affect your ‘life 
chances’, like economic policies, come to the political main stage as they become more relevant 
towards increasing well-being. 
Second, visible images of cooperation reduce insecurities community members feel during 
interactions with the opposite community. These images, like leaders shaking hands, are particularly 
powerful when they are of former hardline combatants. They send a message of cooperation with 
the other community, from the very people who were most vehemently opposed to it during the 
conflict.  
The converse effect of this argument is that incomplete power-sharing, particularly within 
the military and policing sectors heightens, insecurities within communities. Without a security force 
that each community can accept, the security sector becomes an unguaranteed aspect of the 
agreement. This bleeds over into other functions of the agreement, as a stable security situation is 
necessary for other facets of the agreement to operate. With no neutral security force to target 
communal violence, excluded spoilers are able to create an atmosphere in which moderates lose out 
to ethnic outbidding.104 Ethnic outbidders are empowered within this context because inter-ethnic 
cooperation leads to very concrete and immediate potential costs, while the benefits are long term 
and threatened by the question of security. This suggests that the only way power-sharing can access 
its benefits is to entrench identity interests in each sector of government. 
The last thing to note with regards to power sharing is that liberal consociationalism should 
be used to allow politics and party identification to evolve. If hardline nationalist parties are granted 
a guaranteed electoral base then they have less incentive to moderate their policies. There have to be 
electoral challenges from the center within their communities, and that is not allowed by a corporate 
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consociationalist model. A liberal consociationalist model, which allows communities to define their 
representatives is more likely to allow for this eventual evolution. This is likely more difficult to 
achieve during negotiation processes; nonetheless, given the strong base of support these groups are 
likely to have during times of conflict it should not be insurmountably difficult. However, in order 
for alternative and competing groups to challenge them electorally, organic local challenges have to 
be encouraged. 
Local 
 Establishing local level peace initiatives will allow for actors to capitalize on the moderated 
climate to form cross-communal cleavages. First, empowering local actors gives authority, 
legitimacy, and political space to alternative groups separate from communal elites, which often hold 
significant control in a post-conflict space. International pressure will often be necessary to ensure 
that national elites accept this. This does not have to occur exclusively within the electoral realm. 
The development of a strong civil society can be an important first step to developing national 
parties with crosscutting policies. Financial and political support of these actors establish them as 
focal points for transition. Grants should be targeted towards the creation of crosscutting civil 
society organizations. Importantly they must also have some control over the direction of the new 
state, elsewise they will be a second tier grouping that has limited potency. 
Second, local level solutions are likely to create conditions whereby people begin identifying 
with alternative sources of groupings. Transitional justice mechanisms, for example, that can be 
critical to healing are more likely to have relevance when they are attached to local institutions that 
people have a shared history with. In addition, ownership over these solutions is critical to moving 
beyond ethnic identities. If international solutions are imposed upon local populations local 
populations will just revert to ethnic identification because those international solutions have little 
meaning to them. Local level solutions are more likely to foster trust and legitimacy in those 
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solutions. Local actors have knowledge of the intricacies of the way the conflict operated in their 
region and can tailor their programs to the unique needs their communities have. This makes these 
agreements more relevant to the populations therein. Giving local-led initiatives, that challenge 
ethnic parties, a prominent place in the post conflict process makes it more likely that they will be 
seen as a viable platform for change. Empowering local actors with both political space and 
institutional legitimacy is necessary to help break down the incentives that power sharing gives for 
people to identify along exclusive communal divisions. 
Not all local actors will reflect the necessary drive towards communal reconciliation that 
these processes will require. Indeed, it seems reasonable to argue that local actors, hardened by 
conflict, could be highly conservative and reflective of communal divides. The challenge that the 
conclusion will begin to take on is how peace process should seek to empower local actors with 
autonomy, while at the same time preventing divisive local actors from coming to power. The 
primary goal of this thesis, however, is to introduce these arguments into the power-sharing debate. 
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Chapter 2: From Sunningdale to the Good Friday Agreement 
 
When the ‘Troubles’ broke out, the world was confronted with a brutal communal conflict 
that had previously been confined as problem of the ‘developing world’. The response from the 
media and the public was to make primitive each community involved. That tendency, motivates this 
thesis’s entrance into the Northern Irish case study. When understanding how these conflicts evolve, 
there is a need to confront our biases and move beyond narratives of ancient hatred and towards 
more thorough understandings of motivations towards conflict. As we form our theoretical 
understandings of the ways conflicts evolve it is therefore important to understand the complexities 
of actors and actions that form the contours of the conflict. This chapter will seek to provide that 
understanding. 
The aim of this chapter will be to provide a comprehensive contextualization of the conflict 
and conditions surrounding both the Sunningdale Agreement and the Good Friday Agreement.  
This chapter does not purport to provide complete analysis as to why the Sunningdale Agreement 
failed where the Good Friday Agreement succeeded. The next two chapters will serve that function. 
Instead this chapter will provide a descriptive understanding of how the conflict evolved over time. 
It will be structured with five components. First, it will provide a generalized overview explaining 
the parties to conflict. It will then analyze the trajectory of the conflict in four phases: the inception 
in the civil rights movement, the Sunningdale Agreement, the Anglo Irish Agreement, and the Good 
Friday Agreement. Through these descriptions this chapter will create a platform that allows readers 
to contextualize the following evidence chapters. 
Overview 
 To make a necessary oversimplification, the Northern Irish conflict centers around a divide 
between predominantly Catholic nationalists, or republicans, who desire independence from Great 
Britain in the form of a united Ireland government; and the other side, the predominantly Protestant 
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unionists, or loyalists, wish to remain within the United Kingdom. At the inception of the conflict 
the Protestant community largely controlled a devolved government, Stormont (est. 1921), that was 
a semi autonomous part of the United Kingdom. As will be discussed later, the conflict between 
Protestants and Catholics began with the partitioning of Northern Ireland from the Republic of 
Ireland in 1921. From that point onwards, the Protestant community subjected the Catholic 
community to a series of discriminatory policies that undercut their influence within the 
government. Stormont maintained control over nearly every aspect of Northern Irish life with key 
exceptions of: succession to the Crown, making of peace or war, armed forces, honors, 
naturalization, and some central taxes and postal services.105 The split within the conflict can then be 
broadly seen as a desire to maintain this status quo versus a desire to increase Catholic leverage 
within the political process through a united Ireland. At the inception of the conflict in 1969 the 
population was predominantly Protestant, representing a strong majority of the population. 
There were of course varied interests within each group. Some factions within each side 
were willing to countenance moderations of those end goals. Moreover the supported mechanism 
towards change varied radically within each group, from para-militarism to political agitation. Within 
the Catholic community, for example, there was a heated internal conflict between the paramilitary 
group the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and their political counterpart Sinn Fein, and the more 
moderate Social Democrat and Labor Party (SDLP).106 The sheer magnitude of groups within each 
side of the conflict, often called an alphabet soup of conflicts due to the many group acronyms, 
lends credence to this claim of diversity within each community. It would be far too dense to explain 
each group in this section. However, the appendix attached to the back gives a brief description of 
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the aims of each group in order to provide a reference point throughout this chapter. This is by no 
means a complete list of parties within the conflict, however it suffices for the purposes of this 
chapter. The following sections will descriptively show how these actors evolved and responded to 
key junctures in the conflict. 
Critically, neither the communities nor the organizations discussed herein should be 
considered monolithic or static. Identity within communities was highly fluid both between 
individuals, and within individuals. Moreover, the organizations discussed equally had large diversity 
of membership. The identities of these communities and organizations should be considered 
multifaceted and ever-changing as a result of a complex interchange of symbolic politics, violence, 
and political intercourse. This chapter will endeavor to reflect that within the constraints of a 
background chapter. However, in some instances referring to those organizations as broad labels 
helps to clarify the chronology of events. 
Civi l  Rights Movement 
 The Troubles, or the Northern Irish Civil War, began in the context of a growing Catholic 
civil rights movement in the late 1960’s. As political and economic exclusion created senses of 
relative deprivation, the Catholic community was mobilized into increasingly radical action. The 
tensions arising from communal clashes centered around this movement gave rise to an increasingly 
empowered paramilitary community, within both sides to the conflict, that justified its actions on the 
basis of protecting a threatened community. This section will highlight the development of theses 
conditions. 
Unionist leaders within Northern Ireland trumpeted the fragility of their political advantage 
over Catholic Nationalists in order to justify policies of radical disempowerment. In 1969 Ulster 
Unionist leader Harry West highlighted this mantra, “If the Unionist Government ever goes out of 
power it will never get back in again. The opposition will so manipulate things that it will be 
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impossible for the Unionist party ever to return to power”.107 This claim was not totally unfounded. 
Of the fifty-two single member seats, and four Queens University seats, that made up the Northern 
Ireland House of Commons between 1929 and 1972, twenty five were lost by unionists at least once, 
seven were held with less than fifty-one percent of the vote, and six were held with only fifty-one to 
fifty-five percent of the vote. Those losses were often offset by gains, but at least sixty eight percent 
of seats were lost or marginally won.108  
Within this context Liberal Unionist Prime Minister, Terrence O’Neil, was elected to 
Stormont.  He, unlike more hardline unionists, was more willing to countenance negotiations with  
Catholic representatives. In 1964 and 1965 he met twice with the Taoiseach (PM) of Ireland Sean 
Lemass. In 1973 Lemass’ widow, Kathleen Lemass, commented on the content of those meetings, 
“Sean explained to me that they wanted to convey the impression to the outside world that the talks 
were just about routine matters. In fact, both men wanted to see Ireland united. Their idea was to 
have several meetings at various levels between Government officials so that the cooperation would 
begin, eventually leading to Irish unity”.109 It is unclear the extent to which this purported desire is 
substantiated. However, O’Neil did represent a reformist movement that incited fear of losing 
power within his Unionist base. 
Hardline unionists justified a policy of radical political and economic disenfranchisement of 
the Catholic minority on the basis of this electoral fragility. This repression was based on three 
prongs: political disenfranchisement, judicial discrimination, and economic discrimination. 
  Protestants began political disenfranchisement of the Catholics in the 1920’s with the 
abolition of the proportional representation system that would have guaranteed the Catholics forty 
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percent of local councils.110 In addition to that abolition Stormont, the Northern Irish legislative 
body, created two categories of voters. The ratepayer category consisted of primary occupiers of a 
household as either a tenant or an owner. However, only two people were allowed from each 
household. This excluded adult children living at home as well as lodgers; both of which tended to 
be Catholic due to lower socioeconomic conditions. The second category included owners of 
commercial property valued at ten pounds or more per year. These people were allowed to nominate 
special voters per every ten-pound value increment of their property, up to a maximum of six voters. 
Given that ninety percent of commercial property was Protestant owned, this gave them vastly 
increased power vis-a-vis their Catholic counterparts.111  
In addition Protestants began crudely gerrymandering districts for political ends to the extent 
that one fifth of Catholics lived in gerrymandered districts.112 The Cameron Commission, a 1968 
report commissioned by the British Parliament, found that in Derry, Catholics made up sixty percent 
of the electorate but only won forty percent of seats due to this system of redistricting.113 This was 
facilitated by a crude housing policy designed to confine Catholics to certain areas. In the County of 
Fermanagh Catholics constituted a majority of the population but were only given one third of the 
public housing units in the post World War Two period.114 This policy was summated by the 
Unionist Chairman of the Enniskillen Housing committee, George Elliot, “it is only common-sense, 
after all, that a Unionist Council is not going to put people into houses who are going to vote against 
them at the next election”.115  
This political policy was paired with repression in both the law enforcement and judicial 
communities. In 1922 Stormont passed the Special Powers Act which allowed the police to hold 
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individuals for an indefinite period without charges or trial.116 In addition members of the Ulster 
Special Constabulary (USC) B Specials squadron, a supplemental force to the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC), had clear connections, including membership, with illegal paramilitary groups 
like the Ulster Volunteer Force.117 Within the judicial system Protestants outnumbered Catholics 
sixty-eight to six in the late 1960’s.  Moreover, fifteen of the twenty-eight appointments to the high 
court of Northern Ireland, between 1921 and 1972, were affiliated with Unionist political parties.118 
The third prong of oppression came in the economic sphere. Protestant elites were complicit 
in deliberate employment discrimination. In 1957 they made formal arrangements with an American 
Company, Dupont, to have the hiring manager be Protestant so as to limit Catholic employment.119 
In 1959 Catholics made up forty percent of the manual laborers, but held only six percent of senior 
positions.120 The Cameron Commission found that Unionist Councils were actively using their 
power to discriminate against Catholics in the hiring process.121 This was coupled with educational 
inequality as well. By refusing to secularize schools the effect was  “an educational system that 
allowed bible teaching of predominantly Protestant ethics and the withdrawal of Catholics to 
religious schools that received funding equal to only 65 per cent of that given to the state-sector, 
Protestant-affiliated schools.”122 Terrence O’Neil tried to represent reformism, but it was too little 
too late. Cardinal William Conway famously responded to questions of O’Neil’s intent by stating, 
“most people see when they are being fobbed off with words and gestures”.123 Catholics saw his 
reforms as empty appeasements designed to diffuse their anger. 
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Within this context the civil rights movement of the late 1960’s began in earnest. On 
October Fifth, 1968, radical elements of the Civil Rights Movement steered a civil rights march in 
Derry through Protestant parts of the city. The RUC in conjunction with B Specials were caught on 
camera brutally oppressing the march.124 In response to the media led outrage, the Prime Minister of 
the United Kingdom, Harold Wilson, pressured O’Neil into reform. O’Neil put fourth a five 
pronged plan. First, he promised fairer housing policies. Second, he promised an impartial 
ombudsperson to hear complaints against the government. Third, he promised an end to company 
votes in elections. Fourth, he promised to review the Special Powers Act. Finally, he promised to 
create a Londonderry Development Corporation to displace the current gerrymandered council. 
Prominently missing from this package was a promise of one man one vote, that would later become 
a key slogan of the civil rights movement.125 Prior to the troubles sixty-five percent of Catholics 
believed that community relations had improved as a result of the O’Neil Premiership.126 In the 
intermediary his five-point proposal was therefore enough for leaders of the movement to call for a 
temporary halt to the marches. However, it was not enough to quell the bubbling frustrations from 
both communities. 
Around this time the Reverend Ian Paisley began stirring up radical Protestant action in the 
form of counter demonstrations. Ultimately, O’Neil’s appeal for calm could not stave off the 
oncoming violence. In January 1969 a splinter group of the Civil Rights Movement, the People’s 
Democracy, organized a march through mostly protestant territory between Belfast and Derry. B-
Specials savagely attacked the march at Burntollet Bridge, which in turn created retaliatory Catholic 
riots in both cities.127 Within this context the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a radical Protestant 
paramilitary group, which had been active since 1966 gained force within the Protestant community. 
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As violence increased, and was communally targeted, communal paramilitary groups gained power 
as sources of control within the anarchy of this upheaval. The UVF group planted three bombs to 
look like IRA attacks in order to outflank O’Neil and demonstrate that he had lost control over the 
situation.128 Slowly, it seemed, political avenues to reform were dimming in hope. 
O’Neil’s failure to attract Catholic voters in the February 1969 elections signaled the 
beginning of the end. James Chichester Clark soon replaced O’Neil, heralding the end of O’Neilist 
reformism.129 As political reform died, violent para-militarism exploded. The Shankhill Butchers, 
named for the butchers knives with which they imparted ‘order’, joined the RUC to target Catholic 
marches.  On August 12th Protestant paramilitaries in combination with the RUC tried to infiltrate 
the Catholic Bogside community after Irish nationalists threw nails and stones at a nearby Protestant 
parade. The resulting three-day battle culminated with the arrival of British troops on August 15th to 
‘calm’ the conflict.130 Despite initial ‘promising’ actions, like the abolition of the B Specials, the 
British soon responded to increasing IRA activism with a war on republicanism.131 
 Increasingly isolated the IRA splintered into more violent factions. The Irish Taoiseach, Jack 
Lynch, had been trying to covertly support republicanism. However, when British pressure forced 
him to stop, the IRA lost that buttress. In September 1969, in response to criticisms from the 
Catholic community over their inaction during the Civil Rights Movement calling them ‘I Ran 
Away’, a group within the IRA splintered of to from the Provisional IRA, or Provos.132 
 In response to growing IRA radicalism, which Chichester Clark was unable to stem, Brian 
Faulkner replaced Chichester Clark in 1971. Faulkner immediately began a practice of more 
consistent targeting of the IRA. On August 9th 1971 he began a practice of interment, which resulted 
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in 342 Catholics being taken in without hearing or trial. While prisoners they were tortured and 
completely isolated.133 This escalation of tension culminated in Bloody Sunday, January 30th, 1972.  
In a struggle between protestors and the British, British troops gunned down thirteen unarmed 
protesters.134  In the angry aftermath of this period, the Provisionals (‘Provos’) became the army of 
the people. They used their communal protector status to enforce a brutal martial law, justified by a 
threat rhetoric which highlighted brutal police and paramilitary violence against the Catholic 
community.135 
 However, the Provisionals were unable to balance their political demands with their 
violence, and were forced to call a seventy-two hour truce. This violence had created a public 
relations nightmare for the British. They were seemingly unable to keep control over their own 
backyard. In response the British dissolved Stormont, thus ending devolved governance in 
preference of direct rule. This was a huge victory for the IRA as it ended a system of government 
that had radically disempowered the Catholic community. British direct rule was certainly not an end 
goal for them, nonetheless it was enough to call a seven day ceasefire on June 22nd, 1972. However, 
unable to come to an agreement with the British Northern Ireland Secretary, William Whitelaw, the 
ceasefire ended after a clash in the Lenadoon Housing Estate in Belfast created casualties within 
both communities. The British, exasperated with stalled progress, instituted Operation Motorman, a 
large offensive designed to root out IRA sympathizers. However, the operation had the perverse 
effect of increasing sympathy for a rejuvenated IRA campaign.136 These cycles of tit for tat violence 
between RUC and British forces and the IRA formed the context that set up the Sunningdale 
Negotiations in 1973. 
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Political exclusion and repression had led to conditions where paramilitary organizations 
were increasing in popularity. In 1968, just prior to the onslaught of the troubles, thirteen percent of 
Catholics supported paramilitary groups. However in 1973 twenty five percent of Catholics believed 
violence was a legitimate way to achieve goals. Catholics were two and a half times more likely to 
experience intimidation, twice as likely to be a victim of a violent incident, and one and half times 
more likely to know someone who had been killed or injured. 137 While this by no means constituted 
a majority of support, it suggests an increasingly willingness to support paramilitary groups when 
two conditions were met: safety was threatened, and political avenues were cut off. 
Sunningdale   
 The Sunningdale Agreement was created within the context of a costly war of attrition that, 
to some degree, had created significant political pressures on each side to reform. However, its 
failure to stem paramilitary violence, and a powerful move from the hardline members of each 
community to outbid the negotiators, created conditions where there could be no credible 
commitment that the tenants of the agreement would be upheld. 
While negotiations began within the context of failed talks between the IRA and Whitelaw, 
most Catholics were willing to support a political agreement well short of united Ireland.138 
Moreover, while IRA popularity was increasing, they were not seen as a legitimate or plausible 
avenue for political change. Within that atmosphere, the negotiations excluded paramilitary groups, 
by only welcoming those who were willing to participate in immediate elections. Given that the 
preceding negotiations excluded Sinn Fein, this effectively excluded the IRA. However, in March of 
1973 the British government published its White Paper, Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, 
which stated willingness to discuss a limited framework of political cooperation between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This was enough to get the SDLP, a more moderate party 
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willing to aim at reform rather then Irish unification, to the table. Under the leadership of Brian 
Faulkner the Ulster Unionist Council voted 381 to 231 to also enter into the negotiations. However, 
this was belied by the subsequent assembly which saw twenty six unionists regain election who had 
explicitly opposed the White Paper and negotiations.139  
In November of 1973 the UUP, SDLP, and the cross ethnic Alliance Party, agreed to a 
power-sharing government at the Civil Service College at Sunningdale.140 The agreement was based 
upon three key principles. First, there was a power-sharing executive of unionists and nationalists 
that presided over a Northern Irish assembly. The assembly had primarily a consultative role, which 
was a far cry from the previous devolved Stormont. Second, there was a council of fourteen 
ministers that would form one tier of an All-Ireland (or Northern Irish and Republic of Ireland 
cooperative government) governing institution. Seven ministers would come from Northern Ireland 
and seven would come from the Irish Republic. The final tier was a 60 member Consultative 
Assembly which was half elected by Ireland and half by Northern Ireland. All of this was 
undergirded by a British constitutional guarantee, and an Irish declaration that there could be no 
change in the status of Northern Ireland without a majority of the people indicating a changed 
preference. However this last statement was belied by the remainder of Articles Two and Three in 
the Irish Constitution, which lay claim to Northern Ireland.141  
 Opposition to Sunningdale came swift, particularly from the Protestant community. The 
Reverend Ian Paisley led to the charge. Protestant objections centered around two facets of the 
agreement, the power-sharing agreement and the Irish dimension codified through the Council of 
Ireland. Protestants, long accustomed to dominating politics, saw the power-sharing agreement as a 
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threat to that power. As a result Paisley ‘outbid’ Faulkner by portraying the agreement as threat to 
their economic security. This would gain particular prominence, when played against the expectation 
of disproportionate benefit that years of institutional decay had created. Catholics were portrayed by 
Paisley and other Protestant community leaders as servants of Rome, and thus likely to discriminate 
against Protestants.  This was compounded by the Irish dimension to the agreement, which 
exacerbated fears that Sunningdale would lead to a Dublin dominated Northern Ireland.142 
Faulkner initially held off these objections. At the Sunningdale Conference he commanded a 
large proportion of moderate unionists. However, in the aftermath of the agreement, anti Faulkner 
unionists waged a war against the agreement.  The Ulster Unionist Council voted 427 to 374 to 
reject the Council of Ireland. Brian Faulkner was forced to resign, signaling the beginning of the end 
of the Agreement.143 In February 1974 anti-Sunningdale unionists won the majority of Northern 
Irelands seats. Eleven of the Twelve Seats were won by members of the United Ulster Unionist 
Council, which was formed from the three major unionist parties in opposition to the agreement.144 
Despite this setback, the Northern Ireland Executive was able to gain enough support amongst 
Faulkner unionists, SDLP members, and Alliance party members to ratify the agreement.145 
 However, Protestant anti-Sunningdale sentiments remained potent, helped in no small 
amount by the rhetoric coming from the SDLP and the Irish government. Both parties were facing 
internal pressures from their constituencies not to ‘abandon’ their people. The Irish government 
consistently denied claims that they were abandoning their claims to Northern Ireland. The Irish 
attorney general when pressured responded by saying that “Any person living on this island and 
knowing our history could not possibly construe the declaration as meaning we did not lay claim 
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over the six counties”.146 Liam Cosgrave, the Irish Taoiseach, was forced to become increasingly 
radical in his claims to Northern Ireland, given the pressures he faced from former Taoiseach Jack 
Lynch who was eager to reclaim his seat.147 This was solidified in an Irish Supreme Court Case, 
Boland v. Taoiseach, which found that Sunningdale did not infringe on the Irish Constitution’s 
articles two and three which laid claim to Northern Ireland. Rather, they stated it amounted to a 
statement of reality, that the Irish government could not currently lay claim to the territories.  
The SDLP, facing significant pressures from republican elements of their constituency who 
thought they were not pushing hard enough for a unified Ireland, also hold some of the blame. In 
response to a Republican heckler, a senior representative of the SDLP famously stated that the 
Council of Ireland was “the vehicle by which unionists would be trundled into a united Ireland”.148 
Within this context any hope for the implementation of Sunningdale died.149 Unionist 
campaigns led by Ian Paisley, William Craig, and Harry West united behind the slogan ‘Dublin is just 
another Sunningdale Away’. On May 14, 1974, the Northern Irish Assembly rejected a motion 
condemning power sharing and the Council of Ireland by a vote of forty-four to twenty-eight. In 
response the Ulster Workers Council called a general workers strike.  The Ulster Defense 
Association enforced the strike. They were led by Andy Tyrie, who announced at the start of the 
strike that, “It’s going to be up to us to do the dirty work again”.  Massive intimidation efforts, 
coupled with genuine disgruntlement, led to a successful strike marked by power and fuel shortages 
throughout the country. The new British Secretary of State, Merlyn Rees, was unwilling to use 
British troops to break up the strike, and back to work campaigns fizzled out. On the fourteenth day 
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of the strike, in the face of a near total power blackout, Faulkner and his Unionist colleagues on the 
executive resigned, and the entire agreement collapsed.150 
The ability of radical parties to outbid negotiators to the conflict signaled the end of the 
settlement. On the republican side, nationalists were able to play on the fears of republicans that any 
non-Irish government would just be a protestant-dominated government. The power-sharing 
government was unable to provide credible commitment to this community. Without a mechanism 
to enforce the agreement should the Protestant community decide to cheat, Irish hardline 
nationalists were able to plausibly highlight conditions of potential disenfranchisement. On the 
Protestant side, expectations of a government that would preference their community led to general 
sense of disgruntlement with the agreement, which counteracted those expectations, that 
empowered Paisley-ites within the protestant community. In addition the rhetoric of the Irish and 
SDLP, in response to radical elements within their community, also empowered a fear that the 
agreement would lead to a Dublin dominated government.          
Increased paramilitary violence enabled this rhetoric.151 Figure two demonstrates that the 
period surrounding the agreement saw a spike of death within the conflict. The three years 
surrounding the conflict saw thirty percent of the deaths in the entire thirty-year conflict.152 These 
‘spoiling actions’ dramatically increased fears that segments of the agreement would not be followed, 
or that it would not be enough to stop the violence from occurring. If military power was not 
shared, in a similar manner to political power, then the agreement would be unenforceable. IRA 
members feared the agreement would solidify a ‘Northern Free State’, copper fastening the partition, 
and that it would empower the SDLP within the Catholic community. The Republican News, and 
IRA affiliated news source, even called the UUUC strike progressive, and capable of uniting the 
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working class.153  Protestants in turn, held similar fears of a loss of power to moderate community 
members. In addition they were able to capitalize on a 
Figure 2: Sources and Scale of Violence 1969 to 1999 
 
Source: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk.154 
preexisting disgruntled community. The failure to include paramilitary groups within the 
negotiations ultimately defeated the agreement before it began. 
Intermediary :  Ulster izat ion and the Anglo Ir ish Agreement o f  1985 
 British policy after Sunningdale, while initially ameliorating, soon transitioned into a 
widespread crackdown on republicanism. This in turn gave rise to a new possibility for the IRA, the 
ability to successfully enter into the political realm. Within that context a political framework became 
a viable end to the conflict, in a way that it had not been since Sunningdale. This section will detail 
the progression from ulsterization towards a context conducive to negotiations. 
 Immediately following the fall of the Sunningdale the British tried to ameliorate both sides 
by legalizing both the Ulster Volunteer Force and Sinn Fein. From December 1974 through January 
1975 the Provisional IRA announced a truce.155 However the Protestant paramilitary community 
responded to that legalization with violence which resulted in a tit-for-tat cycle of violence through 
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1975 and 1976 which ended the truce. The British, in turn, responded to this cycle by criminalizing 
the conflict, and describing the IRA as lawless.156 When Roy Mason replaced Merlyn Rees in 1976 he 
described his job as squeezing the IRA like toothpaste.157 His arrival signaled the beginning of 
ulsterization. The British cracked down on the IRA through intensive and invasive operations within 
Catholic communities, and high levels of incarceration. However, the IRA maintained a solid 
minority of the Catholic community that allowed it to operate. Moreover, there were very few 
people willing to stand up to them given their extensive internal policing.158 British policy, it seemed, 
had given up on a political solution. However, ironically, this new British policy set up conditions 
which would lead to a rejuvenation of political rather than violent action. 
 The IRA began to couple their violent actions with a new strategic political game. IRA 
prisoners began to utilize a previous tactic from the early 1970’s, the hunger strike. In 1979 Ciaran 
Nugent refused to wear prison clothes, and demanded prisoner of war status. The British refused 
him, and as a result he clothed himself in only a bed sheet. By 1980 340 other prisoners joined him 
in what had then evolved into a hunger strike.  British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, 
responded with a firm line, “There is no such thing as political murder, political bombing, or 
political violence. There is only criminal murder, criminal bombing and criminal violence.”159 The 
IRA sought to capitalize on the international outcry the images of hunger strikers were creating. Sinn 
Fein, under the auspices of an independent candidate, nominated Bobby Sands for election. Bobby 
Sands had easy appeal to the public, portrayed as an easygoing activist through publications of his 
poetry. He won his election by a vote of 30,492 to 29,046. However on May Fifth, 1981, he died due 
to medical complications from the hunger strike. Over 100,000 people attended his funeral, and Sinn 
Fein road the public backlash to a prominent role within electoral politics.  
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This confluence of events led to a rare moment within each group in which moderate 
factions were empowered. Sinn Fein, fresh off a surge in public opinion was keen to try its hand in 
electoral politics. Moreover, John Hume was taking control of the SDLP and shepherding it towards 
anti-nationalist territory under the dictum “You can’t eat a flag.”160 Unionists were satisfied with 
direct rule, particularly when contrasted with Sunningdale’s potentiality. Ian Paisley sought to 
instigate a strike to encourage the British to crack down more on the IRA, however it fizzled out 
with little support.161 When political avenues became meaningful strategies to create change, actors 
within both those communities who advocated political action became empowered.  
Finally both the British and the Irish were willing to negotiate. Garret FitzGerald, the new 
Irish Taoiseach, entered into secret negotiations with Thatcher in 1985. On November 15th,1985, the 
British and Irish governments signed the Anglo Irish Agreement.  The United Kingdom recognized 
the Irish government’s right to be consulted in issues pertaining to Northern Ireland. Fitzgerald 
described this role as less than joint authority but more than consultation. This was a large step for 
the British for two reasons. First, even the labor party had been unwilling to make this stance within 
parliament, and had supported conservative policies.162 As a result this was a radical policy which did 
not result from internal pressures. Second, this was a treaty registered at the United Nations which at 
least perceptually bound them more than insular negotiations. This was an equally large step for the 
Irish who, under said treaty, promised not to lay claim to a united Ireland unless the majority voted 
for it.163  
The agreement also sent a critical message to Northern Ireland that only a devolved 
government that appealed to both communities would be accepted by the British. Initial Protestant 
retaliatory violence was met with firm impatience from Thatcher who won reelection in 1987 and 
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made no changes to the agreement.164 However, Paisley, and his DUP, was able to fluctuate between 
twelve percent and thirty percent of popular support meaning that innovative protestant policies 
would find difficulty in overcoming the outbidding game.165 Despite this, increasing demographic 
changes created new political opportunities that would set the stage for the 1990’s. Protestant 
emigration to England climbed, spurred by exhaustion with the conflict, and Catholics stayed home. 
The old ration of two thirds of Protestants to one third Catholics gave way to a population that was 
forty-five percent Catholic.166 
Good Friday Negot iat ions  
 The increased plausibility of political action to create change, complimented by a growing 
international context that promised a guarantee of political negotiations created the context in which 
the Good Friday Agreement was negotiated. This section will detail the development of both of 
those factors. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the agreement the IRA, supported by an influx of funds from 
the Catholic community in the United States and weapons from the Gaddafi government in Libya 
began an increased campaign to delegitimize the peace movement. Initially this campaign, headed by 
new leaders Gerry Adams and Martin McGinnis, was at least marginally accepted by Catholics who 
were increasingly agitated by Britain’s continued use of a shoot to kill policy.167 This was a perceived 
policy that had been implemented during ulsterization, in which the Catholic community accused 
the British troops of shooting to kill without even attempting arrest. However growing exhaustion 
with the war strained the IRA support base. On November 6th, 1987 an IRA attack on a 
Remembrance Day Service in Enniskillen killed eleven Protestant civilians. The public outcry and 
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backlash to this event forced Gerry Adams to reign in his paramilitary factions, and the IRA began 
focusing on British targets rather than Northern Irish ones.168 
 In addition, this IRA violence fed a re-escalation of Protestant paramilitary violence. 
Between 1989 and 1992 twenty-one Catholics died at the hand of Protestant loyalist paramilitaries in 
the Derry area. This created vicious cycle of tit-for-tat violence, illustrated by two gruesome 
episodes. On January 17th, 1992 an IRA landmine murdered seven Protestant workers in 
Cookstown. In retaliation, on February 5th, the Ulster Freedom Fighters murdered five Catholics in a 
betting shop in Belfast.169 This violence was relatively indiscriminately targeted, created a heightened 
sense of insecurity.  
 However, dissimilar to other episodes, this period of violence created a general sense of 
public exasperation with violence that created conditions conducive to negotiations. Within this 
atmosphere a number of key actors were able to initiate steps towards meaningful negotiations. On 
November 9th, 1991, British Secretary of State Peter Brooke publicly stated that Britain had no 
selfish, strategic, or economic interest in Northern Ireland and began exploratory talks directly with 
the IRA. John Hume, and the SDLP, sensing an opportunity opened up talks with Gerry Adams. 
On August 28th 1993, they were able to issue a joint statement calling for an Irish solution, but 
allowing for a vote from the Northern Irish population. This statement brushed the limits of 
Republican ideology. The Irish and British governments followed suit with a joint declaration from 
Downing Street on December 15th, 1993. In this they called for reconciliation within a political 
framework that included the whole Ireland. 170 In response a secret republican strategy paper 
highlighted the necessity to focus on political dynamics of the conflict in order to create a 
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Republican consensus, “for the first time in 25 years…all the major Irish nationalist parties are 
rowing roughly in the same direction.” 171 
 This directive towards political consensus was further bolstered by the arrival of the United 
States. A year after his inauguration Bill Clinton granted a visa to allow Gerry Adams to visit in 
January, 1994. The presence of a third party, willing to act autonomously of Britain, gave the IRA 
significant security to enter into negotiations. On August 31, 1993, the IRA called a complete and 
unequivocal ceasefire, which was followed six weeks later on October 13th by the loyalist 
paramilitaries.172 
 Increasing British pressure, adjusted Unionist expectations and willingness to negotiate. In 
February, 1995, the UK government passed two framework documents in which north-south bodies 
were discussed in the context of the recognition of Irish identity in the North’s Catholic minority, 
rather than just intergovernmental cooperation. The UUP, eager to return to devolved government, 
publicly warmed to both a north-south governance plan as well as power-sharing. By the mid 1990’s 
almost half of the twenty-six local councils shared responsibility amongst both communities, 
including in some communities with infamous reputations for vicious sectarianism.173  
 Despite this, the tension of decommissioning processes still remained salient within the 
negotiations. Prime Minister Major called for the IRA to decommission weapons prior to formal 
talks. However in November 1995, a joint communiqué between the United States and Great Britain 
proposed a twin path of decommissioning at the same time as all party talks. The Mitchel 
Commission, established by the U.S, argued that decommissioning before talks was too much to be 
hoped for. Instead Senator Mitchel proposed that all parties have to declare that they are willing to 
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pursue peaceful means of resolution before reaching the tables. Major added onto this that the 
negotiating convention be constructed and identified through elections.174 
 The IRA was initially unwilling to meet this demand, and responded with a bomb in the 
London, costing 85 million pounds in damage. However, recognizing public opinion was against it, 
due to an exasperation with decades of violence, the following campaign was small scale compared 
to their previous efforts. This is especially striking given that the IRA was given a perfect 
opportunity to break down the negotiation process. A long standing Twelfth of July Orange Order 
March, returning from Dumcree Church, was initially routed around the Catholic Garvaghy Road. 
However, the RUC reversed its decision on July 11th. Catholic areas erupted into protest and were 
immediately quashed by the RUC firing plastic bullets. One unarmed youth was killed. However, the 
IRA stayed its hand and corralled violent factions of its paramilitaries.175  
 In the previous May 1996 elections political avenues toward change had become feasible for 
each party within the conflict. The UUP had won 30 seats, the DUP had won 24, the SDLP had 
won 21, the APNI had won 7, and UKUP had won three seats. Four other fringe parties did not win 
seats, however creative counting squeezed them into the convention as a top ten most successful 
party. Sinn Fein won seventeen seats, but was never the less still excluded from talks, due to their 
failure to renounce violence.176 The political context was set in which each group had a viable 
platform to compete politically. 
 Labour’s victory in the 1997 United Kingdom elections signaled a change to this policy of 
excluding Sinn Fein.  Tony Blair won by a landslide, and, unlike his conservative predecessors, he 
was not reliant on Unionist MPs to hold his coalition together. In July, 1997, the IRA, recognizing 
this was a critical movement for them, resumed their cease fire and was admitted to the talks. The 
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DUP immediately walked out, but the UUP, led by David Trimble, kept his team in the 
negotiations.177 The context was finally set for a serious negotiation process.  
Decreasing paramilitary support, as political options became a meaningful alternative, and 
increased international action created the conditions for what would become known as the Good 
Friday Agreement. The IRA no longer felt they had moral justification to continue a violent 
campaign, and were losing already low popular support. Similarly, particularly after the IRA 
ceasefire, Protestants feared being labeled aggressors in the conflict and were lacking in justification 
to keep the fight going.178 This was reflected in a polling data at the end of the conflict. Twenty eight 
percent of Catholics and thirty one percent of Protestants had at least some sympathy for their 
respective militaries. This represents a significant reduction from 1978 levels where just under half 
of each group supported their paramilitaries.179  Within this context, the arrival of the United States, 
and an increasingly active Great Britain was able to induce parties to the table.180 
Good Friday Agreement 
 The Good Friday Agreement was signed on April 10th, 1998. There were seven main 
components to the agreement.181 First, it created a 108 member devolved Northern Ireland 
assembly. The assembly was to be constituted through a principle of proportionality. In addition it 
created a Executive Authority, First Minister, and Deputy First Minister, and up to ten other 
ministers with departmental responsibilities. All of these positions are allocated on a proportional 
level. Importantly, and distinct from Sunningdale, all decisions made by a simple majority must 
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either correspond to majorities among both nationalist and unionist members, or get at least sixty 
percent of total vote if it is support by 40 percent of nationalist or unionist votes.182  
The second element of the agreement was a North South ministerial council. This was 
coupled with a British Irish council with representatives from British and Irish governments, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands.183 The Irish also 
pledged to change their constitutional claims to sovereignty over Northern Ireland, and Britain did 
similarly, thereby committing to a Northern Irish vote on independence.184 In addition the 
agreement created a British Irish intergovernmental conference, to increase dialogue between the 
two governments. 
 In addition to this there were two facets of the agreement designed to create discussion 
surrounding the initial causes of conflict. The agreement created a civic forum of voluntary groups 
to create solutions targeted at breaking down divides between the communities, and to include 
fringe groups within the process. In addition it created a substantial micro agenda on policing, 
equality, human rights, prisoners and military weapons.185 On the Human Rights level this was 
backed up by the creation of a Human Rights Commission in both Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland. On the militaristic end it was backed up by a commission to oversee the 
decommissioning of paramilitary groups, as well as by a commitment from the British to de-
securitize.186 
 The entire agreement was undergirded by two sets of vetoes. Members of each community 
had veto power over legislation proposed by the other community. In addition, the Northern Irish 
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assembly had veto power over the North South Council.187 These vetoes could then assuage fears 
from each community that they would be bullied into certain marginalizing policies. 
 Republicans were quick to endorse the agreement. At Sinn Fein’s 1998 annual conference, 
ninety seven percent of delegates voted in favor of changing their internal constitution to allow 
members to take seats in the new Northern Ireland Assembly. While the DUP rejected the deal, the 
UUP tacitly endorsed the agreement including the all-Ireland dimension.188 When submitted to 
popular referendum it won with 71.1 percent of the vote, including 95 percent of republican votes. 
This was reaffirmed in the following election in which pro-agreement candidates won resoundingly. 
Candidates in favor of the agreement won 75.5 percent of votes, leading to a ratio of eighty to 
twenty-eight seats.   
 On August 15th, 1998, the agreement suffered its first setback. An explosion killed twenty-
nine people in Omagh, the largest single atrocity of the conflict. However the IRA was quick to 
disown the attack, and even pledged to begin decommissioning. The following election stabilized 
electoral politics with a big four of parties dominating the elections. The UUP won 26.8 percent of 
the vote, the DUP won 22.5 percent, Sinn Fein won 21.7 percent of the vote, and the SDLP won 21 
percent of the vote. This election marked the beginning of a period of stability and the end of a 
conflict that had begun in the 1960s.189 
 Why was this negotiation successful where Sunningdale had failed so dramatically? What had 
changed in the twenty plus years between the two agreements? In the remaining chapters of this 
thesis I will seek to answer those questions. 
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Chapter 3: Incomplete Power-sharing, Insecurity, and the Failure of the Sunningdale 
Agreement  
The Sunningdale Agreement negotiations occurred within the context of growing 
disgruntlement with radical actors. A trade unionist movement was beginning to formulate a class-
consciousness that had the potential to cut across communal divides, and paramilitaries were 
increasingly unpopular. Members of the once staunchly unionist Protestant community were 
beginning to question anti-Catholic narratives about key episodes of the conflict. Yet despite this, 
the United Ulster Unionist Council was able to enact a protest strike that crippled the energy 
supplies of the country, and forced the power-sharing regime into collapse.190 This chapter will 
explore which factors led the Sunningdale Agreement to fail. Understanding why peace settlements 
fail is critical to formulating the building blocks necessary to wholly evaluate why other settlements 
succeed; it allows us to understand which factors changed, as well as which particular items in the 
agreement are most relevant. The goal of this chapter is to provide that understanding in order to 
facilitate a more complete comprehension of the factors which contributed to the success of the 
Good Friday Agreement. 
This thesis will argue that incomplete power-sharing in the military and policing sectors 
within the Sunningdale Agreement heightened insecurities between the two communities. The 
agreement both excluded traditional community protection groups and then failed to replace them 
with a neutral security force that each community could accept. As a result the security sector 
became an unguaranteed aspect of the agreement. This uncertainty bled into other functions of the 
agreement, as an unstable security situation undercut the ability of other facets of the agreement to 
operate. With no neutral security force to target communal violence, excluded radicals were able to 
act as spoilers and create an atmosphere in which moderates would lose out to ethnic outbidding. 
Ethnic out-bidders were empowered within that context, because inter-ethnic cooperation lead to 
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very concrete and immediate potential costs, while the benefits were long-term and threatened by 
the question of security. This problem became further exacerbated by an insufficient third party 
guarantee to the conflict, which heightened the salience of the aforementioned insecurities. The 
inability of the British to act as a neutral third party acted in parallel with incomplete power-sharing, 
as it compounded fears that there was no security guarantee of the conflict.  
If this theory is correct, we should see four points of evidence. First, we should see evidence 
that security power-sharing was incomplete. This should be indicated within the peace settlement 
itself; however, additionally, we must also see evidence that this failure to power-share became 
salient within the community. This would manifest in key episodes in which the security and police 
forces were unable to respond to incidents of communal violence. We would expect these episodes 
to dominate media and public discourses, indicating that these episodes were highly relevant to each 
community’s decision calculi. Second, we should see evidence of an ethnic outbidding culture 
capitalizing on these insecurities. This would be indicated by moderate parties being challenged by 
and/or utilizing the rhetoric of their radical fronts. Third, we should see insufficient third party 
guarantees. We should see evidence of this in both public speeches and in private meetings between 
parties to the conflict. This should also be mirrored in the complaints of both parties to the conflict. 
Fourth, we would expect to see public opinion to begin with significant support for this peace 
settlement, but to decline and rise in parallel with trends of violence. That would indicate that 
support for the agreement was contingent on the security situation, thus corroborating that 
incomplete security power-sharing explains the agreements failure. 
This chapter will first provide a brief chronological exposition of the Sunningdale 
Agreement. In the second section it will analyze each of the four points of evidence outlined above. 
Within this section it will begin by exploring key episodes of violence that heightened the 
importance of the agreement’s failure to fully address the security sector. It will then analyze how 
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those episodes translated into a culture of ethnic outbidding, where moderates either radicalized or 
lost influence. Next, it will analyze how an insufficient third party guarantees accentuated these pre-
existing security concerns. It will then verify that these factors are the core factors explaining the 
failure of the agreement by analyzing how public opinion reacted to critical failures in security 
stability. Finally, it will conclude by exploring areas of future evidence necessary to fully corroborate 
this argument. 
The Sunningdale Agreement: Historical Context 
 
In November, 1973 the moderate alliance of the UUP, SDLP, and the cross ethnic Alliance 
Party, agreed to a power-sharing government at the Civil Service College at Sunningdale. The 
agreement was based upon three key principles. First, there was a power-sharing executive of 
unionists and nationalists that presided over a Northern Irish assembly. The assembly had primarily 
a consultative role, which was a far cry from the previously devolved Stormont. Second, there was a 
council of fourteen ministers that would form one tier of an All-Ireland (or Northern Irish and 
Republic of Ireland cooperative government) governing institution. Seven ministers would come 
from Northern Ireland and seven would come from the Irish Republic. The council was to have 
unspecified executive and harmonizing functions. It would operate on economic and social matters, 
and would be consulted on policing appointments. Moreover, it required unanimity in its decision-
making process. The final tier was a 60-member Consultative Assembly which was half elected by 
Ireland and half by Northern Ireland. All of this was undergirded by both a British constitutional 
guarantee and an Irish declaration that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland 
without a majority of the people indicating a changed preference.  
Unionist campaigns were quick to attack the agreement. Led by Ian Paisley, William Craig, 
and Harry West, they united behind the slogan ‘Dublin is just another Sunningdale Away’. On May 
14, 1974, the Northern Irish Assembly rejected a motion condemning power-sharing and the 
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Council of Ireland by a vote of forty-four to twenty-eight. In response, the Ulster Workers Council, 
a close ally of the UUUC, called for a general worker’s strike demanding the end of the agreement.  
This strike was enforced by the Ulster Defense Association, led by Andy Tyrie. At the start of the 
strike, Tyrie mobilized supporters by announcing that “it’s going to be up to us to do the dirty work 
again”.191  Massive intimidation efforts, coupled with genuine disgruntlement, led to a successful 
strike whose impact was felt by power and fuel shortages throughout the country. The new British 
Secretary of State, Merlyn Rees, was unwilling to use British troops to quell the uprising, and, as a 
result, back-to-work campaigns fizzled out. On the fourteenth day of the strike, in the face of a near 
total power blackout, Faulkner and his Unionist colleagues in the executive resigned and the entire 
agreement collapsed.192  
This chapter’s aim is to analyze why those campaigns were so successful at reducing support 
for the agreement. Radical factions of each community will usually have incentives to spoil the 
agreement so as to maintain their own authority. The question becomes which factors make that 
spoiling and those radical actors palatable. 
Incomplete Power-sharing 
The agreement both excluded traditional security forces and failed to implement a new 
security force that had cross-communal support. Both the militant factions of the Catholic and 
Protestant communities were excluded from the Sunningdale talks. On the Protestant side the 
Vanguard and DUP parties, associated with Protestant para-militarism, were banned from entry into 
the agreement. On the Catholic side, the British similarly banned Sinn Fein. This was a reversal in 
policy from the White Paper platform, which was to allow representatives based upon public 
opinion. As a result it was seen by Protestants as a further example of the British distancing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Mulholland, 97. 
192 Ibid, 97-8. 
	   74	  
themselves from the ‘Northern Ireland Problem’.193 The result of this exclusion was both 
communities feeling vulnerable and unprotected by an already unpopular British military and police 
force that had been previously unable to staunch the violence. 
For the Catholic community, their history with both the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the 
Security Forces lead to a general distrust in the State’s protection. This resulted in an increasing 
distrust that the security sector would intervene in the advent of the Protestant community reneging 
on their portion of the agreement. The Protestant community, for their part, was growing 
increasingly disgruntled with what it saw as the British abandoning their interests. This was 
compounded by the Hunt Report, which had led to the abolishment of the Special B’s in 1970.194 In 
addition the Hunt report advised that: 
The R.U.C. should be relieved of all duties of a military nature as soon as possible and its contribution to 
the security of Northern Ireland from subversion should be limited to the gathering of intelligence, the 
protection of important persons and the enforcement of the relevant laws…The need to retain some 
police stations in border areas should be reviewed…Vigorous efforts should be made to increase the 
number of Roman Catholic entrants into the force.195 
 
Thus while the Protestants maintained significant influence within the RUC and the British Army, 
the failure to include military power-sharing would compound fears of abandonment by the British.  
Incorporation of each militant faction would have at the very least created some symbolic security 
surrounding the agreement.                                                                              
  This section will explore a number of key episodes that indicate heightened salience of these 
insecurities within both communities in the lead up to Sunningdale. However, it is important to first 
identify the general trends within which these episodes occurred. Violence from both Unionist and 
Nationalist paramilitaries spiked dramatically in the run-up to the agreement. Figure one depicts 
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scales of violence during the war from 1969 to 1999 and shows a massive surge of violence 
surrounding this period. Martin Dillon and Dennis Lehane describe the violence around this 
moment as a vicious cycle of tit-for-tat violence. They highlight one period in particular, from 
September to October 1972, where Protestants killed two Catholics for every Protestant killed.196 
One member of the protestant Red Hands described the logic behind this indiscriminate retaliatory 
killing, “At the time I thought more or less that all Taigs were bad and all Prods good.”197 This 
pattern was, if not mirrored, paralleled by Republican paramilitaries. Dillon and Lehane explain that 
they retaliated to this Protestant campaign with similar tit-for-tat discriminatory killing.198 The 
context of the agreement was one in which security was of significantly heightened importance. 
Figure 1: Sources and Scale of Violence 1969 to 1999 
 
Source: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk.199 
This chapter will examine three episodes that highlighted insecurities for the Catholic 
community: Bloody Sunday, the Lenadoon Housing Estate clash, and of course the Strike. It will 
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then analyze the growing IRA bombing campaign within the context key Irish and British security 
policies towards the Protestant community. While some of these events took place prior to the 
explicit negotiations surrounding Sunningdale, all took place during the context in which discussions 
of peace were ongoing. As such, they would form the context in which people evaluated the 
agreement. While the agreement would still be initially possible to sign due to exasperation with 
extremism, these incidents made the agreement fragile and highly susceptible to collapse due to 
increasing and high profile violence. People would be willing to attempt peace to avoid these vicious 
cycles of violence, but when that peace left them vulnerable they would quickly abandon it. 
Bloody Sunday 
Perhaps the most infamous incident of the entire civil war, the effects of Bloody Sunday 
ricocheted throughout the Catholic Community.  On Sunday January 30th, 1972 the Northern 
Ireland Civil Rights Association held a march to protest the British internment policy. Ten to twenty 
thousand people showed up to demonstrate their support of the protest. In the last few hours of the 
protest, a number of the demonstrators began throwing stones at the Parachute regiment of the 
British army, which proceeded to move into the Bogside neighborhood. Within thirty minutes, the 
Army had killed 13 people and injured 13 more. Eight of those killed were under twenty years old.200  
The reaction in Catholic newspapers reflected the general dissatisfaction with security 
responses to these incidents.  One letter to the editor in the Irish Times reflected the broad 
frustration with British intransigence, “Will even yesterday's slaughter in Derry reach the heart and 
mind of that cold, unfeeling man in Downing street?...Edward Heath has been told time and again, 
that a major catastrophe was preparing.”201 Dick Grogan and Martin Crowley published a similar 
article in the same paper titled, in all caps, “SOLDIERS KILL 13 IN BOGSIDE.” Reports decrying 
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the fragility of the Catholic community in the face of an inept and corrupt security apparatus were 
replete in editorials in the following few weeks.202  
The response from both the Protestant leadership, as well as the British legal response, was 
severely underwhelming to a Catholic community demanding justice. Northern Irish Prime Minister 
Brian Faulkner placed the blame with the Civil Rights Association for “having again provided the 
IRA with an opportunity of again bringing death to our streets…The Association”, he finished, 
“bears a tremendous responsibility.”203 The British gave control of the tribunal investigating the 
violence to Baron Widgery, the Lord Chief Justice of England. The Tribunal, which lasted from 
February 21, 1972 to March 14, 1972, got off to a rocky start when Widgery decided to move the 
trial to Colleraine, thirty-two miles away from Derry. Particularly notable about this decision was 
Colleraine’s predominantly Protestant population, in stark contrast to Derry which was 
predominantly Catholic. In addition to the change in venue, he found that the soldiers acted without 
fault, and that there was a “strong suspicion” that some of those killed “had been firing weapons or 
holding bombs”.204 This served as a reiteration of Faulkner’s claim that the blame did not lie with the 
soldiers, but rather with those marching. 
Resentment towards the Widgery Tribunal Report would only escalate as Catholics were 
forced to wait for a formal inquest into the matter. Over a year later the Secretary of State held a 
meeting with the coroner responsible for investigating the deaths. The meeting was held over 
“concerns expressed over the time elapsed since the tribunal and before the arrangements were 
made for an inquest”. The Secretary of State discussed holding off the inquest, and even discussed 
using Section 10 of the Special Powers Act to prohibit the inquest. In the end, he stated that he 
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“assumed the coroner would wish to curtail the proceedings so far as possible”, and they agreed that 
the inquest would be made in London rather than Northern Ireland.205 
The State’s reaction instilled anger within the Catholic population, and caused distrust in the 
ability of the current security forces to prevent harm to their community. Reflecting on the events 
years later, Bishop Edward Daly, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Derry, remarked “what really made 
Bloody Sunday so obscene was the fact that people afterwards, at the highest level of British justice, 
justified it and I think that is the real obscenity.”206 These concerns, echoed by numerous Catholic 
leaders at the time, reflected an inability of Catholics to check extreme and violent actions against 
their community. At a meeting of the Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission on 
February 5th, 1973 the Secretary of State responded to claims that he was unwilling to target 
Protestant paramilitary squads by pushing the matter away and saying he would “look into this 
matter and see what could be done”.207 In the face of increasing Catholic insecurity, this answer was 
radically insufficient. Bloody Sunday exemplified the inadequacies of the security forces to act as a 
stabilizing force against conflict. The failure of the Agreement to create a power-sharing security 
sector would mean that these past episodes would maintain their salience within public discourses. 
The agreement effectively left the same security forces that were in charge of Bloody Sunday in 
charge of the continuing security situation in Northern Ireland in the post-agreement government. 
Lenadoon and Operation Motorman 
The British reaction to the Lenadoon Housing Estate violence, by instating Operation 
Motorman, would only serve to reinforce Catholic preconceptions that the British Army was a 
Protestant puppet. The 1972 violence at the Lenadoon Housing Estate occurred during a meeting 
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between British Secretary of State William Whitelaw and IRA leaders, and would effectively end the 
IRA truce. The South Belfast Ulster Defense Association, led by Sammy Murphy, refused to allow 
Catholics to occupy newly constructed houses in the Lenadoon Housing Estate. Despite the local 
IRA’s insistence, the army refused to target the UDA. Instead, following a violent confrontation at 
the estate, and exasperated with stalled progress in the peace settlements, the British instituted 
Operation Motorman, a large offensive designed to root out IRA sympathizers.208 
However, the operation had the perverse effect of increasing sympathy for a rejuvenated 
IRA campaign.209 The Catholic community saw the army as contributing to the brutality and 
instability that they faced. They were forced to distance themselves from the British and align with 
other protection networks, namely the Provisional IRA.210 This response, in the lead-up to 
Sunningdale, demonstrated that political solutions reflective of their community’s interests, in this 
case the Lenadoon housing project, would be infective so long as there was not a neutral security 
force which could enforce those policies. 
The UUUC Strike 
In response to a power-sharing executive that was ignoring them, and sensing the fragility of 
the Northern Irish Administration, radical unionists under the banner of the UUUC enacted a strike 
demanding the resignation of the power-sharing executive. British and RUC inaction during the 
strike would be the last straw for a Catholic community exasperated with the British response to 
Protestant militarism. The UUUC, in coordination with paramilitary UDA enforced a nationwide 
strike, physically intimidating any who wished to go to work.211   
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The new British Secretary of State, Merlyn Rees, was unwilling to use British troops to break 
up the strike, which signaled the end of back to work campaigns. As Nicholson writes, “Without 
local control over the police, the new power-sharing executive lacked legitimate power to confront 
the strikers. The results were predictable. Loyalist paramilitary groups put up barricades on major 
roads and forced businesses to close.”212  On Thursday the 23rd of May, 1974 the Northern Ireland 
Executive received a deputation from a series of labor representatives. This commission echoed 
concerns that the police stood by while workers were being intimidated by Andy Tyrie and the 
UDA. Mr. Binks, from the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, reflected those concerns. He described 
waiting for two hours to get through to the Queen’s Bridge, with many cars being turned back while 
the security forces did nothing.213 Every reporter could find numerous examples of police standing 
idly while loyalist gangs blockaded roads and intimidated motorists from going to work.214 This was 
reinforced by The Department of Commerce’s retrospective review of the UWC strike, in which 
they found that the security forces were ineffective or inactive in blocking the strike.215 On the 
fourteenth day of the strike, in the face of a near total power blackout, Faulkner and his Unionist 
colleagues on the executive resigned, and the entire Sunningdale Agreement collapsed.216 
 This failure to respond to a belligerent and radical Protestant community ended Catholic 
hopes that an executive, as detailed within the Sunningdale Agreement, could function. Without a 
security apparatus to enforce political processes, they feared being trundled into an all-too-familiar 
pattern of Protestant-dominated politics. Thus, while the Catholic community was not the major 
instigator of the demise of the Agreement, these key failures by the British and RUC to respond to 
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security incidents gave the IRA a strong enough minority of support to justify increased violence 
which would in turn feed a vicious and radical Protestant militarism.  
 IRA Violence 
 
The Protestant community, similarly responding to upscale in targeted violence, grew 
progressively more frustrated with the British and Irish responses to an increasingly vicious IRA 
campaign.  The IRA had been engaging in relatively indiscriminate violence through their bombing 
campaign. The result was that “daily life in Belfast,” and other areas “with regular city entre 
bombings, often took place in an atmosphere of tension in fear.”217 The effect of this indiscriminate 
violence is highlighted by Frank Wright, stating that “everyone might be a target for reprisal for 
something done in their name and without their approval”.218 This created a generalized danger for 
community members that heightened their insecurities dramatically.  
The Blood Friday attack, and a similar attack ten days later, would play a similar role to the 
one Bloody Sunday did in the Catholic community. On July 21st, 1972 the IRA exploded nineteen 
bombs between 2:10 and 3:15 in Belfast. Nine were killed, including a fourteen-year-old boy. Over 
130 were injured in the blasts. Protestant newspapers reflected the tragedy and vulnerability that 
reverberated through their community in the aftermath: 
The three year bloodbath in Ulster reached a new level of savagery when terrorists unleashed a -killer blitz of 
stunning ferocity. 
 
Belfast is rocked and racked by the most ferocious blitz yet mounted by the IRA. Not even the German bombs 
could inflict more devastation on the capital of Ulster in the last war. 
 
On this unforgettable day 26 bombs, borne by car and planted to take the greatest toll of life, shattered the 
bodies of men, women and children in a fiendish holocaust of murder and hate.219 
 
These headlines reflect the Protestant community’s feelings of vulnerability that the IRA bombing 
campaign, which continued the following Monday with three car bombs in Country Derry, had 
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instilled.220 The result of this continued campaign was increasing uneasiness with the British security 
apparatus, and increasing recruitment for the UDA with over 26,000 due paying members leading up 
to 1973.221 Within that context, the agreements post-security apparatuses looked woefully 
insufficient. 
British and Irish Security Policy 
Irish government intransigence in responding to Republican violence fueled Unionist 
mistrust of the Council of Ireland within the Sunningdale Agreement.  IRA militants continued to 
be able to escape to Ireland after launching attacks within Northern Ireland.222 Brian Faulkner met 
with the British Secretary of State at Stormont on the 18th of December, 1973. Within this meeting 
he expressed concerns from his party and community that Ireland was not enforcing laws across the 
border pertaining to security threats in Northern Ireland.223 He expressed similar concerns at a 
meeting at Baldonnel Airport on January 16, 1974 with the Irish Taoiseach, where he cited the 
release of 14 out of 15 terror suspects arrested in Ireland, and the unused Enniskelen border base as 
evidence of Ireland’s refusal to cooperate with Northern Irish security apparatuses.224 In addition, 
the Arms Crisis in Northern Ireland fueled further distrust of the Irish government’s cooperation. 
Two Cabinet ministers, Neil Blaney and Charles Haughey, were caught trying to import guns for the 
IRA, which only heightened tensions with the Irish government.225 
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British security efforts were also seen as radically ineffective. Despite significant military 
operations, the general sentiment was that the government was unable to protect the citizenry. This 
led to an increased recruiting drive for hard-line militants who were seen as the only avenue of 
protection.226 Additionally, interviews with local protestant community members highlighted rising 
tensions. One senior Orangeman remarked, “What’s needed is a return to basic Christian standards. 
Law and order, rooting out terrorism.”227 This reflected growing sentiment that the security 
apparatuses were weak on Republican crime. The Dundonald UDA published the following poster 
excerpt in a drive for money and recruitment: 
The Mountain View, The Blue Bell, The Four Step Inn, where will it happen next? We ask you, will it be 
Glengormley, Ormeau, Catleragh, Albertbridge or Newtownards Road, or will it be the Dundonald area? We 
are concerned for our Protestant people and the protection of our homes and local shopping centres, the loss 
of life, the maiming of men, women and children for life…This we will maintain, if the force of law and order 
cannot give or afford us immediate protection.228  
 
This play on the insufficiency of current security apparatuses was one of the major rhetorical drives 
that led to the UDA’s recruitment spike.  The oath to enter the UDA further reflects that distrust: 
I further acknowledge that I will never divulge to friend or foe, or to any member of the security forces, any 
information detrimental to the well-being of my fellow soldiers in the organization, neither will I reveal any 
knowledge of the workings of the UDA in the event of capture by the security forces.229   
 
Such an attitude reflected an antagonistic attitude between the UDA and the security forces, rather 
than a cooperative venture. For many, the attraction to violent factions like the UDA became a 
survival tactic. One UDA recruit described his rationale, “If we hadn’t done something they had 
been all over us. We had to stop them. Tribal survival. We had to hit back.”230 
 UDA attitudes were intensified by British policies that indicated fatigue with Northern 
Ireland conflict, as opposed to a renewed commitment to protect the Protestant community.  Table 
One shows the amount of British Security Personnel in Northern Ireland from 1972 to 1975, 
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portraying a steady decline of troops on the ground.231 The British public was growing tired of the 
Northern Irish problem, making sending troops over politically unpalatable. This would serve to 
increase fears from the Protestant community that the force which was protecting their interests was 
going to leave in the near future. Protestant concern at these reductions in troop totals was reflected 
in a meeting between the Northern Irish Executive and Prime Minister Wilson, Faulkner expressed 
concerns about British policy, including rumors that the Prime Minister was considering removing 
all troops from Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State were quick to step 
in and say that was not a current policy. However, this failed to appease Faulkner, who said that 
expressions of support were welcome, but not enough.232 
These frustrations were accentuated by British decisions to inter Protestant soldiers. 
Between 1973 and 1975, the British military interred 22 Protestant paramilitary members per month.  
While this was dramatically less than the Catholic internee population, it would serve to instill fear in 
the Protestant population that their security forces were under attack. This was only compounded by 
an increase in internment during the Sunningdale Executive.233 Within the context of a growing IRA 
bombing campaign, this would heighten insecurities within the Protestant communities by threating 
the only effective protection that they had. 
The failure of the Sunningdale Agreement to create power-sharing within the security sectors 
heightened insecurities within both communities. On the Catholic side, fears that Protestant 
paramilitaries would be given free reign would ultimately create a minority of support for an IRA 
bombing campaign. Protestants, conversely, feared abandonment by the British created security 
concerns. Such fears were exacerbated by the IRA bombing campaign and the State’s inaction in 
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response. The Agreements failure to replace paramilitaries with a neutral security force resulted in a 
culture of ethnic outbidding, rather than one of moderate politics.  
Ethnic Outbidding Culture 
  
 Failures to include provisions detailing how security and order would be enforced 
heightened turmoil among Protestants and Catholics and created a culture of ethnic outbidding. This 
either doomed parties who stayed moderate, or forced those parties to radicalize. Critically, what this 
indicates is that the moderating culture that power-sharing creates will never succeed unless each 
community believes security forces will neutrally protect their interests. This seems to give some 
credence to the power-sharing theorist’s claim that power-sharing is, at the very least, a necessary 
first step before long term reconciliation can be considered. However, this should not be seen as an 
argument that power-sharing sacrifices that long-term reconciliation. This section will analyze the 
role of ethnic outbidding, or the outflanking of politic parties based upon claims of abandonment of 
the ethnic community, within both the Protestant and Catholic communities.  
 Protestant Outbidding 
 Unionist campaigns to end Sunningdale would play on this mistrust of the British security 
apparatus. Campaigns led by Ian Paisley, William Craig, and Harry West united behind the slogan 
‘Dublin is just another Sunningdale Away’.234 At his meeting with the Irish Taoiseach at Baldonnel 
Airport, Faulkner expressed these security concerns, and indicated that he was facing significant 
internal political problems from being attached to an agreement which left the security of the 
Northern Irish state in question.235 Capitalizing on Faulkner’s inability to court widespread support 
for a more moderate settlement proposal, Paisley and West would capitalize on the precariousness 
of the island relations by forming the highly radical UUUC. After the UUUC’s formation, they 
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issued a press statement saying that the Council of Ireland was “so obviously a preparation for a 
United Ireland that to deny it is to deny the meaning of truth.”236 This rhetoric gave space to a 
particularly radical element of the Unionist community that played upon fears of a Catholic 
dominated Northern Ireland. One member of the anti-Sunningdale campaign targeted Faulkner 
directly by claiming that “any Government which shared power with Republicans was indeed a 
traitorous administration.'” He would further accuse Faulkner of “conduct unbecoming an 
Orangeman”.237 
 The UUUC’s fear-mongering undercut the influence of moderate factions remaining within 
the Unionist block. Anti-agreement unionists won 26 seats, two more than pro-white paper 
candidates in the 1973 Assembly elections. This limited Faulkner’s space to maneuver in the run-up 
to Sunningdale.238 He was further undermined at the end of 1973, when five of his seven 
Westminster MPS allied themselves with Harry West. Weeks later, on January 4th, 1974, the UUC 
rejected the Council of Ireland by a vote of 427 to 374.239 As a result, many saw the next month’s 
Westminster general elections as a referendum on the Executive. Opponents to the agreement won 
fifty one percent of the vote and eleven of twelve parliamentary seats in Northern Ireland.240 The 
Faulkner wing of the Unionist coalition was effectively outbid by slogans and rhetoric which played 
upon the only element which had not been power-shared, the security apparatus. 
Catholic Outbidding 
The Catholic community, plagued by internment and an increasingly violent Protestant 
paramilitary regime, was subjected to similar, if not more severe, outbidding, both within Ireland and 
Northern Ireland.  In Ireland, Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave was sensitive to opposition from the Fianna 
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Fail party keen to highlight him as abandoning the Catholic community. As a result, The Irish 
government consistently denied accusations that they were abandoning their claims to Northern 
Ireland.241  Moreover they were unwilling to give any concessions on the Council of Ireland, 
extraction, or security issues.242 The Irish attorney general, when pressured on the relation of the 
Sunningdale Agreement to Articles Two and Three of the Irish constitution, which laid claim to 
Northern Ireland, responded by saying that “Any person living on this island and knowing our 
history could not possibly construe the declaration as meaning we did not lay claim over the six 
counties”.243 Liam Cosgrave was forced to become increasingly radical in his claims to Northern 
Ireland, given the pressures he faced from former Taoiseach Jack Lynch who was eager to reclaim 
his seat.244 This was solidified in the Irish Supreme Court Case, Boland v. Taoiseach, which found that 
Sunningdale did not infringe on the Irish Constitution’s Articles Two and Three, which laid claim to 
Northern Ireland. Rather, they stated it amounted to a statement of reality, that the Irish 
government could not currently lay claim to the territories.245 
All the blame does not belong on the Irish government. The SDLP was facing significant 
pressures from Republican elements of their constituency who thought they were not pushing hard 
enough for a unified Ireland. In response to a Republican heckler, a senior representative of the 
SDLP famously stated that the Council of Ireland was “the vehicle by which unionists would be 
trundled into a united Ireland”.246 SDLP member Hugh Lougue echoed this statement, arguing that 
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the British were in the process of disengaging from Northern Ireland.247 This radicalization within 
Ireland and Northern Ireland resulted from a political atmosphere in which security was the 
dominant concern. The moderate Unionist factions disappeared while moderate Republicans simply 
radicalized their policies to maintain electoral legitimacy. 
Third Party Guarantees  
In negotiating Sunningdale, the British and Irish rather myopically put themselves forward as 
neutral third parties. Their failure to effectively guarantee the settlement’s provisions exacerbated 
these insecurities. This failure is evident through official promises for guarantees, key public 
speeches that indicated a weak guarantee, and finally private promises as well as private expressions 
of discontent. The importance of this failure operated primarily within the Protestant community. 
While the Catholic community had similar mistrusts, as I already mentioned, they made significant 
advances with the Sunningdale Agreement. The potency of a weak third-party guarantee was much 
more significant for a Protestant community who had been accustomed to British support. 
Official guarantees of the peace settlement were purposefully vague, which increased 
speculation of the veracity and strength of the guarantee. The British promised, “as soon as the 
security problems were resolved and the new institutions were seen to be working effectively, they 
would wish to discuss the devolution of responsibility for normal policing.”248 This reflected the 
implicit guarantee that they would provide security services for that intermittent period.  The 
agreement also discussed a process for reform to the police forces which would include influence 
from the Council of Ireland.249 The language here was extremely vague and, as we will see later, led 
to extreme confusion as to the role of the Irish government in security matters. As Paul Bew noted, 
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the ambiguous language, when combined with a preexisting unease, created a growing sense of 
frustration and uncertainty regarding the nature of the commitment.250   
Public speeches from the guarantors to the settlement did little to assuage these fears. When 
Reginald Maudling, British Home Secretary under the Conservatives, departed Northern Ireland 
after his first trip, he famously quipped, “For God's sake bring me a large Scotch. What a bloody 
awful country."251 That attitude represented the worst fears of the Protestant community: that the 
British saw Northern Ireland as a problem they wanted off their table. In the lead up to Sunningdale, 
their public appearances would do little to assuage those fears. The Green Paper, published in 1972, 
distanced the United Kingdom from a lengthy stay in Northern Ireland, “No United Kingdom 
Government for many years has had any wish to impede the realization of Irish unity.”252 Prime 
Minister Edward Heath reflected this sentiment in a press conference in Dublin on September 17, 
1973 stating that “these are problems which to a large extent the parties themselves must sort 
out…it’s up to them to get together and work out how to do it.”253 
As the Sunningdale Agreement was passed and implemented, the British were not shy to 
express their distaste for the radical Protestant community.  Prime Minister Wilson noted that 
should the Protestant community refuse to implement Sunningdale, people would “ get very fed 
up”. While Whitehall noted he may have to “face a complete reappraisal of policy”.254 An IRA press 
conference in May 1974, quoted Secretary of State Merlyn Rees as saying “We have not the faintest 
interest to stay in Ireland and the quicker we are out the better.”255  He was further quoted stating 
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that the problem of Ireland could only be solved by the people of Ireland.256 In the early days of the 
strike Prime Minster Wilson would seal this impression in stone. Making a statement about the 
strike, Wilson criticized the Protestant Community, “Yet people who benefit from all this now 
viciously defy Westminster, purporting to act as though they were an elected government; people 
who spend their lives sponging on Westminster and British democracy and then systematically 
assault democratic methods. Who do these people think they are?”257  
The atmosphere was one in which the British guarantee was up for grabs. Many Unionists 
thought the British were willing to allow unification of Ireland and Northern Ireland in exchange for 
Irish membership in the commonwealth.258  The ambiguous back-and-forth policy of the British 
fueled a resentful response in protestant press.259 Ian Paisley’s Protestant Telegraph had no qualms 
actively accusing the British of abandoning their own ‘brethren’.  One October 1973 issue depicted a 
cartoon strip which showed Prime Minister Edward Heath shaking hands with immigrants around 
the world with a caption reading, “2,000,000 Asians’, ‘500,000 West Indians’ and ‘2,000,000 S. Irish 
aliens.” The next strip showed Heath at a press conference stating, “Integrate British Citizens from 
Ulster? – My dear fellow, the whole idea is out of the question.”260 The message was clear, the 
British were willing to abandon the Protestant community.  
 The reaction from the Catholic community would come after the UWC strike, but images 
of policemen standing by while gangs of loyalists blocked roads and intimidated motorists served as 
a visceral check to the assurance that they would be protected in this power-sharing world.261 At that 
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point, vague British commitments to the settlement would hold a similar effect for the nationalist 
community. 
Internal meetings between settlement guarantors and parties reflected these concerns, with 
Protestants most vocal in their expression of the perceived unease. Protestant concerns focused on 
two key areas, the influence of the Republic of Ireland, and the vagueness regarding the British 
commitment to Northern Ireland. The SDLP had increased its position vis-à-vis Sin-Fein in these 
talks, and had secured major concessions from the Protestants. As a result, they were less likely to 
complain. However, as was discussed earlier, the Catholic community certainly held widespread 
distrust of the British security force, particularly in the aftermath of key violent Protestant episodes.  
The role of the Council of Ireland, particularly as it related to security concerns, dominated 
meetings between the British and parties to the conflict.  At a meeting between the Secretary of 
State, the Alliance Party, the SDLP, and the UUP at Stormont in November 1973, UUP 
representatives expressed fears about the Council of Ireland encroaching on Northern Irish security 
efforts. The Secretary of State responded with vague statements of the role the council would play, 
stating that there would be discussions of a possible common law area.262 These concerns would 
grow as the settlement developed. At a meeting with the Secretary of State in December 1973, 
Faulkner noted that he was facing immense internal pressure due to Ireland’s unwillingness to 
enforce security laws.263 At a meeting between the Northern Irish Executive and the Prime Minster 
of England in April 1974, Faulkner expressed concerns that there were little signs of north-south 
security cooperation, and that the British were doing little to help.264 These statements reflected 
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Protestant community attitudes that the Irish were either inept, or actively siding with Republican 
militants. 
These concerns were compounded by Irish internal politics. At a meeting with Irish 
Ministers in February 1974, Faulkner worried that the Fianna Fail opposition would push the Irish 
government even farther away from its duty to target security threats across the border.265 This 
sentiment had been expressed a month earlier to the Taoiseach after the Government had 
immediately released 14 out of 15 terror suspects right after their arrest.266 These meetings 
demonstrated significant concerns about the role of the Irish as a guarantor of agreement, as well as 
the role of the British in checking the Irish. 
The unwillingness of the British to create a clear policy platform as to what their role would 
be and how long their duties would last compounded Protestant concerns. While much was 
shrouded in uncertainly, the British were clear in one thing: they would retain control over 
responsibilities for security.267 The role they would play and the length that role would last was less 
clear. At a meeting between the Secretary of State and the Ian Paisley, Paisley noted the lack of 
clarity about which elements of the White Paper the British government stood by. After receiving a 
vague answer, Paisley stormed out of the meeting.268 This concern over the White Paper was further 
addressed in a letter from David Holden of the Protestant Future Policy Group to William 
Whitelaw, in which he asked the British to reaffirm their intention to remain involved in Northern 
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Ireland.269 It is clear through these letters, and a number after them, that the British intent to quash 
terrorism was being questioned by the Protestant community. 
Protestant organizations became increasingly agitated as they saw the British increasingly 
rebuffing them. At a meeting between the Future Policy Group and the Secretary of State in January, 
1973 the group complained that the British government saw Northern Ireland as a burden, and 
demanded increased representation in Westminster for fear of losing the protection of the British.270 
In a meeting between the Secretary of State and the Grand Orange Lodge, a conservative Protestant 
organization, in January, 1973 the Orange Lodge complained that they were being rebuffed. The 
Prime Minister was inviting Catholic groups to meet with him, while he ignored the Orange Lodge. 
They wished to express concerns that the security forces were insufficiently targeting terrorist 
groups, and they worried that since the abolition of the Protestant volunteer police force (B 
specials), the RUC was losing its power.271 Protestants fears about insufficient Government security 
protection, coupled with concerns about the Irish, would make security the most important issue to 
the Protestant community, eroding the ground of moderate Protestants. 
Correlation between Public Opinion and Trends of Violence 
 
 Public opinion trends correlated with trends in violence, indicating that the failure to secure 
power-sharing in the agreement was the critical factor precipitating the fall of the Sunningdale 
Agreement. 
Public support for a settlement was initially high, indicating that the conflict was ripe for 
resolution and that there was some space for communal reconciliation. In the 1970 elections, the 
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NILP, a cross-community labor party, came second in the elections with 12% of the vote. At the 
same time, the trade union movement was gaining public accolades for their work in keeping 
communal violence out of the work place. Leading up to the Sunningdale agreement a powerful 
coalition of moderates, including the APNI, MILP, Liberals, NIC, ICTU and disenchanted 
unionists, met together to create a concerted stance in favor of the White Paper. British Army 
intelligence memos at the time spoke of a mass silent moderate populace waiting to gain public 
dominance. This would be confirmed by both a Fortnight Magazine poll, as well as the office of 
William Whitelaw who found that there was a substantial swing towards non-sectarian ideology, and 
a clear shift towards support of the White Paper.272  
Leading up to the agreement, the concept of power-sharing was also popular in both 
communities. Clancy writes that, rather than traditional narratives that describe it as unpopular, 
“survey evidence suggests that elite opposition to power-sharing was unrepresentative of the wider 
community.”273 The June 1973 elections would bear this out, with twenty-two pro-assembly 
unionists were elected, nine SDLP members, and eight alliance members. Meanwhile, anti-power-
sharing groups fared much worse, with only eight anti-power-sharing unionists, eight DUP 
members, seven Vanguard members, and three independent unionists elected. This would give 
Faulkner and the moderates a healthy majority.274 In a meeting with the Taoiseach of the Irish 
Republic, Faulkner noted that his office estimated that eighty percent of Catholics and sixty percent 
of Protestants supported the Sunningdale Agreement. 275   
While this support would wane in the rise of sectarian violence, many scholars 
overemphasize its loss. The UUUC winning eleven of twelve seats in the 1974 Westminster elections 
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was seen as a death knell for the agreement. However, this blow is softened by the fact that 
candidates supporting power-sharing ran against each other while those running against it 
coordinated and did not run against each other.  There would still be a 51 to 41 percentage split for 
anti-agreement unionists, but this is far less severe than most commentaries account for.276 
 Part of this initial public support was driven by the development of an alternative source of 
social capital, the trade unionist movement.  For the first time, Protestants were beginning to think 
that the Unionist movement had failed to protect their interests. As a result, Catholics were no 
longer the sole focal point of their anger, thus resulting in the beginning of a socialist labor 
movement. Within Protestant neighborhoods, socialist and Marxist terminology became common 
parlance. The Woodvale Defense Association published a newsletter reflective of this trend: 
For too long the Unionist Party has been maintained by massive working class support, yet its policies seldom 
reflected the problems of the working man. The working class has been represented too long by land lords and 
such as O’Neil and factory owners such as Brian Faulkner. For mild socialist polices we had to turn to the labor 
party and the nationalist minded parties.277 
 
One vanguard organizer reacted to this development, “One of our problems is, how can we keep 
the masses away from Communism? In Sandy Row they’re not talking like they used to, they’re 
influenced by people who want disruption and uniting the working classes! Rumor has it LAW may 
be out-and-out communists.”278 This reaction reflected growing worries within the unionist 
movement as these ideologies attracted large supports for their rallies and strikes.279  
 As this movement grew, Protestants began to find increased sympathy for the Catholic 
community. Furthering this sympathy were similar economic and political strains felt by Protestants, 
which in turn began the development of cross community empathies. These sentiments allowed 
members of both groups to coalesce and challenge radical narratives about some of the most 
fractious episodes between the two communities. One Loyalists Association of Workers member 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Bruce, 92. 
277 Ibid, 88. 
278 Nelson, 128-9. 
279 Ibid, 133. 
	   96	  
described his changed opinions of Bloody Sunday, “I was on the Shankill the night the Paras went 
mad and couldn’t believe what I saw. I thought: suppose they [Catholics] were right about Bloody 
Sunday? This put awful doubts in my mind, and everything I had believed in looked different 
then.”280 One long-standing Paisley follower described his transition towards moderation after being 
interned: 
I couldn’t trust him any more, and realized we were on our own…also, I met Catholics [internees] in there I 
believed were innocent…We used to think we did better than the RCs. I realized the civil rights people had been 
right about us being conned for so long. That’s how I got interested in the redevelopment and I believed from 
now on we’d have to do things for ourselves…I realized some of the Catholic councilors had things in common 
with us.281 
 
These drastic changes in ideology had profound effect on the Unionist movement. 
Paramilitary recruiting went down, and many activists described distancing themselves from those 
groups in favor of local community organizing. Groups like the Hammer Redevelopment 
Association began to challenge paramilitary groups (admittedly in small ways).282 
 However, while the sentiment of cross community endeavor was there, the violent political 
culture would prevent it from flourishing. An inability to trust Catholics as the violence continued 
would prevent any relationships from developing.283 As violence undercut moderation, moderate 
parties formerly wielding great influence began to rapidly lose public support, eventually leading to 
the end of Sunningdale. However, it is important to reiterate that moderate sentiments did not 
entirely dissipate. Immediately after the collapse of the agreement, the leaders of the strike 
unconditionally condemned internment. Finally, even the UDA stopped condoning and claiming 
assassinations. Radicalism certainly had not swept the day.284  
This suggests that while the agreement failed, it was not the result of an initially extremist 
culture, but rather the result of a failure to share security that intensified insecurities. However, if 
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this theory is correct we should see that support for radical parties, and decreased support for 
moderate parties occurs most drastically in communities with the largest uptick in violence. This 
would suggest that the most salient factor explaining the failure of the settlement is the inability to 
power share security that led to ineffectual responses to this violence. 
This next section will analyzing voting trends in the years 1970, 1973, and 1974 and determine 
how they react to differing levels of violence. The results of each election will be viewed specifically 
within the seven voting districts: Belfast, Antrim, Down, Derry, Fermangh and South Tyrone, Mid 
Ulster, and Armagh. 
 On the macro level, we would expect to see initially high levels of voting for moderate 
parties to fade dramatically after the 1972 spike in violence, and then hover around those levels as 
the violence stagnated but remained significant. This would indicate that insecurity is driving the 
reduced support for the peace settlement. Tables two, three, and four show general election results 
from each of these three time slots.285 Moderate parties, and parties which supported the 
Sunningdale Agreement, have been shaded in. 
As Table Three indicates, the 1970 elections saw an overwhelming win for Faulkner’s 
Unionist Wing, who would go on to be the Protestant figurehead of the Sunningdale agreement. 
Moderate parties got a total of 69.7% of the vote. However as the paramilitary violence increased, a 
result of them being left out of the agreement talks, the amount of moderate voting declined rapidly. 
Within the 1973 elections moderates took only 42.5%, a 27.2% drop from their previous total. 
In Table Four, we can see that the moderate share in 1974 hovered in a similar amount total, 
around 41.1% of the vote. This pattern reflects what seems to be a self-evident claim that moderate 
politics suffer during times of violence. However, it is important nonetheless as it seems to 
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corroborate that the specific lack of power-sharing security which fueled this violence, and the 
inability to respond to it, was the most salient factor leading to the fall of Sunningdale. 
Broad trends away from moderation in times of violence are not enough to fully corroborate 
the argument that failure to power-share security prevented the agreement’s success. In order to see 
the complete pattern we have to look at more specific trends of violence occurring in local areas, 
and how those electorates responded. This will help us to come to more precise understandings of 
how moderate politics operated in response to trends of violence. 
 Localized voting trends indicate that moderate voting totals decline in response to inabilities 
of security apparatuses to target violent episodes. In order to compare these trends I first collected 
local district election data from 1970, 1973 and 1974. I coded each party as either radical or 
moderate based upon their policy platforms at each episode. In a very few cases, such as candidates 
of independent parties, it was prohibitively difficult to isolate their platform in relation to 
negotiations between the communities. In those instances, where the vote total was minute, and 
therefore statistically insignificant, I excluded them from the calculations. I then mapped trends of 
violence in each area. I was, unfortunately, limited in access to data about general violence in each 
area. As such, I was forced to only consider deaths as a measure of localized violence. While this 
limits the inferences I can make, it will still serve as a useful reference point. Table Five shows trends 
in violence juxtaposed to trends in moderate voting. District elections in which voting followed the 
pattern laid out previously are shaded in grey. 
 The trends indicate, with the exception of three district elections over three years, that 
moderate voting does correlate with trends in violence. In the 1973 elections, with the exceptions of 
Mid Ulster and Fermangh and South Tyrone, which already had low moderate voting, most districts 
saw dramatic decreases in moderation in response to spikes in deaths related to the conflict. The 
1974 elections show the most interesting data. While moderate politics still suffered, as a result of 
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continued violence, in districts where violence decreased significant levels (Antrim, Belfast, and 
Down) moderate voting increased slightly. This reaction seems to indicate that where security 
becomes less important, moderate politics that allow power-sharing agreements to succeed are 
empowered. However, we should be careful in the inferences we draw given the incomplete data 
relating to violence that did not result in deaths. 
Conclusion 
 The failure to include security apparatuses in the power-sharing agreement led to a situation 
where the existent security forces were unable to neutrally respond to security threats. This 
empowered spoilers to the conflict by shrinking the space where moderate politics could occur. So 
long as security remained a salient concern it would supersede other political concerns. This 
problem was magnified as parties to the conflict consistently expressed concerns about a limited 
third party guarantee, which could help to alleviate those problems. Under those conditions the 
politics of ethnic outbidding were highly salient decreasing further the ground on which moderates 
stood. In the Catholic community this atmosphere resulted in a strong minority of support prior to 
Sunningdale, and an increasingly radicalized community after it. In the Protestant community this 
led to increased support for anti-Sunningdale leaders. This does not suggest that power sharing is 
doomed to failure, but rather that security power-sharing is a necessary antecedent to other types of 
power sharing. This analysis is not remarkable or surprising by itself. However, it is an important 
building block towards understanding the way power-sharing can moderate political climates as we 
will see in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: The Good Friday Agreement: A Success, A Missed Opportunity, or Both? 
 
On June 11th 1996 the Royal Ulster Constabulary reversed its previous decision to reroute a 
long standing Protestant Twelfth of July Orange Order March, returning from Dumcree Church, 
around the Catholic Garvaghy Road. Catholic areas erupted into protest and were immediately 
quashed by the RUC firing plastic bullets, which resulted in the death of an unarmed youth. This 
event provided the IRA leadership with a perfect opportunity to renew violence justified by the 
brutality of this episode. However the IRA refrained from responding, and was able to—for the 
most part—corral its militant factions into the same path.286 Following this period, despite 
provocations on both sides, militant groups reduced their violence dramatically. Two years later the 
Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was passed with 71% of the vote. This chapter will explain what 
changed between Sunningdale and the Good Friday Agreement and which factors contributed to the 
success of the agreement. In order to create a holistic understanding of the agreement, it will identify 
a weighted importance of each variable’s contribution to that peace, and identify where the GFA 
failed to capitalize on its potential. 
This chapter will argue that a confluence of a strong third party guarantee to the settlement 
and complete power-sharing ensured by the agreement led to a moderated political climate 
conducive to peace. However, under-empowerment of local actors within the agreement led to 
imperfect capitalization on that climate resulting in an imperfect peace. 
First, a strong third party guarantee to the conflict created the initial space that allowed 
parties to the conflict to accept the agreement without fear of cheating from the other side. This was 
not a sufficient cause of the success, but rather a necessary precursor that allowed for critical steps in 
the agreement, like disarmament, to take place. 
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Second, complete power-sharing of political and security sectors created two effects. First it 
enticed parties to the table by guaranteeing them a say in the future of the post-conflict state. In the 
long run it allowed for the development of a moderated political climate in which security lost its 
position as the exclusive electoral issue for Northern Ireland. Ironically, once each identity group 
was guaranteed representation and protection through the agreements provisions, communal 
identity lost its salience as relevant division. Radical elites could no longer easily target economic and 
political discrimination, and could less easily threaten the physical safety of the opposite community. 
When each community was no longer at threat as a result of their identity, other factors which had a 
more substantial effect on their wellbeing gained prominence (e.g. when your economic class has 
more relevance to your performance in the workforce than your communal identity, you are more 
likely to define yourself by groups associated with that class than with your identity group).  
As other issues came to the political forum, the potential for cross-communal cleavages 
about those issues developed. While this devaluation of the importance of identity severely undercut 
the influence of radical actors, it was only partially taken advantage of due to an insufficient 
emphasis on local actor empowerment within the agreement and the post-agreement government. 
Local actors are critical to creating these cross-communal cleavages in two ways. First, the local 
knowledge they possess ensures that the programs they develop have relevance to their 
communities, making it more likely that they will achieve ownership within those communities. 
Second, these cleavages are granted extra legitimacy as a result of the trust that local actors have 
within their community. When they are not empowered, attempts to break down identity divides are 
likely to fail as they are seen as less relevant and less effective than ‘traditional communal parties’. 
The result, in the aftermath of the GFA, was a reduction in radical policy, but the failure to budge 
‘communal parties’ from their role as advocator of communal interests. 
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 If this argument is correct we should expect to see seven core indicators. First, we should 
see, in contrast to Sunningdale, an initial and continuing third party guarantee to the conflict that is 
marked by significant political, financial, and military support for the agreement. This should be 
reflected in the rhetoric used to sell the agreement both internally within parties and externally to the 
populace. Second, we would expect to see that the agreement contained power-sharing provisions 
that extended beyond political sectors into the security sectors. Third, complete power-sharing, 
discussed within negotiations and codified in the agreement, should lead to decreased support for 
paramilitaries and radicalism. This would indicate that power-sharing had created trust in the 
government’s institutions to neutrally respond to crises, and to execute impartial legislation. Fourth, 
in the long term we should see that the moderating effects of power-sharing in both the electoral 
sector as well as in attitudinal surveying. Electoral support would indicate that the agreement was 
successful due to its popular support, rather than elite support. This partially corroborates the effects 
of power-sharing by indicating that the agreement had a transformative effect on the population, 
and did not just represent a utility calculation by elites. In addition it would suggest that power-
sharing does not simply alleviate threats from the opposite community, but actively changes political 
and social cultures.  
Fifth, we would expect to see that local (non-political or paramilitary) actors played critical 
roles in selling the agreement, fostering trust in its implementation, and opening up new political 
spaces in its aftermath. This would corroborate the potentiality and importance of local actors in 
creating ownership and investment in the peace process. Finally, we would expect key spaces in 
which local actors failed due to insufficient institutional support. This should be further marked by 
failures to create cross-communal cleavages, and incomplete moderation of communal attitudes. 
 This chapter will first provide a brief contextualization of the GFA. It will then analyze each 
factor (third party guarantees, power-sharing, and local actors) within three stages to the conflict: the 
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negotiation phase, the implementation phase, and the post implementation phase. The goal of this 
methodology is to evaluate the changing relevance and importance of each of these factors in order 
to better understand each of their contributions towards peace. It will then, in the conclusion, 
explore key gaps in current research that necessitate future research. 
Background 
The GFA was signed on April 10th, 1998. There were seven main components to the 
agreement. First, it created a 108 member devolved Northern Ireland assembly. The assembly was to 
be constituted through a principle of proportionality. In addition it created an Executive Authority, 
First Minister, and Deputy First Minister, and up to ten other ministers with departmental 
responsibilities. All of these positions are allocated on a proportional level. Importantly, and distinct 
from Sunningdale, all decisions are made by a simple majority that must either correspond to 
majorities among both nationalist and unionist members, or get at least 60% of total vote if it is 
supported by 40% of nationalist or unionist votes.287  
The second element of the agreement was a North South ministerial council. The ministers 
in the assembly and the Irish government were required to consult each other, reach agreement on 
common policies, make decisions on separate implementation in each jurisdiction where applicable, 
and to take decisions on an all-Ireland basis with a newly created implementation body. This 
necessitated a minimum of six new all-island implementation bodies. This was coupled with a British 
Irish council with representatives from the British and Irish governments, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands. The council was given ownership over 
issue areas including tourism, environmental protection, transport planning, social security fraud, 
animal and plant health, teacher qualifications, and EU programs.288 The Irish also pledged to 
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change their constitutional claims to sovereignty over Northern Ireland, and Britain did similarly, 
thereby committing to a Northern Irish vote on independence.289 Finally, the agreement created a 
British Irish intergovernmental conference, aiming to increase dialogue between the two 
governments. 
 In addition there were two facets of the agreement designed to create discussion on the 
initial causes of conflict. The agreement created a civic forum of voluntary groups to develop 
solutions targeted at breaking down divides between the communities, and to include fringe groups 
within the process. In addition it formed a substantial micro agenda on policing, equality, human 
rights, prisoners and military weapons.290 On the human rights level this was backed up by the 
establishment of a Human Rights Commission in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. On the militaristic end it was backed up by a commission to oversee the decommissioning 
of paramilitary groups, as well as by a commitment from the British to de-securitize.291 
 The entire agreement was undergirded by two sets of vetoes. Members of each community 
had veto power over legislation proposed by the other community. In addition, the Northern Irish 
assembly had veto power over the North South Council.292 These vetoes could then assuage fears 
from each community that they would be bullied into certain marginalizing policies. 
Republicans were quick to endorse the agreement. At Sinn Fein’s 1998 annual conference, 
97% of delegates voted in favor of changing their internal constitution to allow members to take 
seats in the new Northern Ireland Assembly. While the DUP rejected the deal, the UUP tacitly 
endorsed the agreement including the all-Ireland dimension.293 When submitted to popular 
referendum it won with 71.1% of the vote, including 95% of republican votes. This was reaffirmed 
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in the following election in which pro-agreement candidates won resoundingly. Candidates in favor 
of the agreement won 75.5% of votes, leading to a ratio of 80to 28 seats.  This chapter will explore 
why radical anti-peace parties were thoroughly defeated in the aftermath of the GFA, despite their 
previous success in the dissolving of Sunningdale. 
Third Party Guarantees 
 
 In a stark contrast from the Sunningdale Agreement, the GFA was undergirded by a strong 
third party guarantee. Pre-existent third parties, Ireland and Britain, provided more compelling 
guarantees to the settlement, while new third parties, the U.S. and Europe, were able to provide a 
stronger sense of commitment and neutrality.  
 Measures taken by the British and Irish governments were able to counteract previous 
impressions of partiality that had in the past weakened the potency of their third party guarantee. 
The signing of the Anglo Irish Agreement in 1985 sent a message that they would only accept an 
agreement acceptable to both communities: ending the Protestant veto. In addition, from the Irish 
perspective, the commitment to allow for the consent principle undercut concerns that they would 
eventually seek a united Ireland, which had abounded in the Sunningdale negotiations.294 This 
neutrality towards each community was reaffirmed by British statements, including a statement by 
British Secretary of State Peter Brooke that became well-circulated in the run-up to Good Friday: 
“Britain has no selfish, strategic, or economic interest in Northern Ireland”.295 This statement was a 
significant step to challenging Catholic narratives that Britain’s economic self-interest would mitigate 
their effectiveness as a third party actor. However, by itself it was not credible. Both governments 
backed up this rhetoric with a financial commitment to the peace. In 1986 the British and Irish 
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Governments created the International Fund for Ireland to increase cooperation, understanding, 
economic activity and reconciliation.296   
These policy changes resulted in very different perceptions of these governments within the 
domestic population. A 1998 poll found that strong majorities of each community thought that both 
the British and Irish governments were facilitating a successful peace agreement. A total of 81% of 
those polled thought the British were having a positive impact on the trajectory towards peace. 73 % 
of Protestants held this view, and 93% of Catholics held this view. A total of 73% of those polled 
thought that Ireland was having a similar positive impact. Fifty-nine% of Protestants held that view, 
and 95% of Catholics held that view. This created an increased sense of trust in their influence over 
the new state. A 2000 poll regarding North-South political bodies reflected this change of heart, with 
only 16% of Protestants 1% of Catholics opposing north south bodies. 297 Whereas during 
Sunningdale British and Irish involvement was marked by distrust, in 1998 they acted as bulwarks of 
the agreement. The introduction of the United States and the European Union created an additional 
guarantee that signified a long-term commitment to the agreement. 
The introduction of the United States, and their willingness to act separately from the United 
Kingdom, provided an important guarantee for the Catholic community. The Clinton 
Administration’s decision to admit Gerry Adams both prior to and after the IRA ceasefire signaled 
to the Catholic community that the United States would be willing to represent their interests. A 
number of policies indicated Clinton’s willingness to intervene.298 A Sinn Fein strategy paper 
outlined the importance of this new actor: “…there is potentially a very powerful Irish-American 
lobby not in hock to any particular party in Britain or Ireland” and “Clinton is perhaps the first US 
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President in decades to be influenced by such a lobby”.299 In addition USAID was a substantial 
contributor to the International Fund for Ireland, to date giving 628 million pounds in conjunction 
with a number of other countries.300 
 These new policies created a strong image of a commitment to peace that fostered trust in 
the process from both communities. A total of 70% of those polled thought that the U.S played a 
substantial role towards the peace process in 1998, while 93% of Catholics and 55% of Protestants 
held this same belief.301  
 These third parties demonstrated their capacity to enforce the agreement at key junctures in 
the disarmament and security reform processes. An independent commission, constituted by third 
parties, oversaw the decommissioning of paramilitaries.  John de Chastelain, a Canadian General, 
oversaw the entire process. In addition Finnish president Marty Ahitisaari and Cyril Ramaphosa of 
the ANC witnessed IRA acts of decommissioning.302 Given the stumbling blocks to implementation 
of decommissioning processes, their announcement that the IRA had successfully decommissioned 
all of its weaponry was critical to creating trust in that outcome.  
Closely linked with the decommissioning process was the reform process to the police 
services. Decommissioning would be difficult to implement without a reform of the security sector 
that ensured power-sharing within it. International actors were critical to ensuring successful 
reforms. The United States and Canada, represented by Tom Constantine and Al Hutchinson, 
helped ensure that the Patten Commission Report (ICP), discussed below, was enforced.303 The 
European Union, the United States, and Canada each exerted significant influence over the UK and 
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Northern Ireland to ensure that the ICP report was honored in implementation. The U.S. 
Congressional Committee banned the FBI from training with the Northern Irish police until they 
made progress on the reform process. While President Bush lifted that ban in 2001, he did so with 
stringent conditions. This was coupled with significant pressure from human rights organizations, 
which eventually led to progress on reforms in 2003.304 This progress was later critical in facilitating 
decommissioning from the IRA in 2005, when they felt comfortable with the security apparatuses.  
 The content of third party guarantees to the settlement certainly changed dramatically from 
the Sunningdale Agreement to the GFA. Clearly each community felt more comfortable with the 
guarantee. However, the analysis cannot end here. These guarantees were only an initial step that 
gave a platform for power-sharing and local actors to create durable change to communal 
relationships.  
Power-sharing  
 Power-sharing, at its core, is an attempt refocus mechanisms that protect communal interests 
away from informal paramilitary groups and towards political institutions. In contrast to 
Sunningdale, 1973, both the negotiations and the agreement itself created substantial trust in the 
security sector from both communities. The details of the political power-sharing have already been 
discussed previously; however, the details of security power-sharing are worth exploring further as it 
represents the key difference between Sunningdale and Good Friday. The agreement called for a 
complete reformulation of the police force to make it reflective of the diverse needs of both 
communities. In addition, the agreement called for greater accountability of the police force.305  
In order to facilitate these goals, the agreement called for an independent commission with 
representatives from both communities to detail the path forward. This was further undergirded by 
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British guarantees that its previous security installments and its emergency powers, which threatened 
the legitimacy of the security apparatus, would be removed.306 
 In practice the agreement manifested into a series of proposed reforms within the newly 
formed Police Services of Northern Ireland (PSNI). In 1999 the ICP published its report calling for 
a series of 175 reforms.307 These reforms, as relates to this chapter, centered around four thematic 
areas: accountability, training, recruitment, and culture.  
Perhaps most importantly, the commission recommended significant reform to create 
accountability. The report advocated that “everything should be available for public scrutiny unless it 
is in the public interest- not the police interest- to hold it back”.308 To this end the commission set 
up four bodies to hold the police accountable to the community. First, they recommended a policing 
board which had: capacity to audit the finances of the police, influence over short and long term 
policing plans, oversight over operational decisions, control of appointment and discipline of chief 
officers, monitoring of human rights compliance powers, monitoring authority of recruitment levels, 
power to hold inquiries, and control over creating and supervising local oversight mechanisms. They 
then recommended the creation of District Police Partnership Boards, which shared governance 
with the local police by giving them input in district policing plans. Third, they recommended the 
creation of an Ombudsperson who would be civilian-controlled and would have wide statutory and 
investigative powers. Finally they recommended a senior judicial figure, bound by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, have oversight over covert operations.309 
The ICP additionally recommended significant overhaul in training and recruitment 
practices. They recommended changing training practices from counter-insurgency-style practices to 
the training style of the Canadian Mounted Police. In addition, it recommended that the training 
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process be civilianized. The report advocated that this be coupled with a radical change in 
recruitment policy. In order to recruit more Catholics they recommended a 50/50 recruitment policy 
whereby one Catholic and one Protestant were selected from a pool of suitable qualified candidates. 
Finally they also recommended downsizing the entire police force.310 
These reforms were coupled with recommendations designed to reduce the cultural bias of 
the police force. The report changed the name of the Police force from the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary to the PSNI. It created a new oath for the force that did not require pledging to the 
British Crown, and created a new badge that similarly reflected communal diversity. In addition, it 
recommended removing photos of the Queen from police stations, and removing the Union Jack 
from Police Stations.311 All of these reforms were to be overseen by an independent commissioner.  
This report, although only a series of recommendations, formed the initial understanding of 
what the power-sharing security sector would look like. It promised significant influence from each 
community and, importantly, accountability measures over inappropriate police actions. This, 
particularly in the earlier years of the agreement, would strongly assuage fears of one community 
using the security sector to its advantage. 
While these reforms were imperfectly implemented, the reforms that were created were 
strong enough to ensure power-sharing. Initially the reaction to the report created fears that the 
government was gutting the report’s principles. However, significant international pressure from the 
European Union and United States in the early 2000’s resulted in a more loyal interpretation of the 
report’s reforms. By December 2006, the Office of the Oversight Commissioner found that 129 of 
the reports 175 recommendations had been successfully implemented.312   
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Accountability has been one of the fulcrums of the reform process. The Policing Board, 
according to the Committee on the Administration of Justice, "established itself as a more effective 
and powerful body tan the previous Police Authority for Northern Ireland". This report indicates 
that it has been successful at holding the Chief Constable to account and monitoring the recruitment 
and operations of the police. However it has been less then proactive in deepening its role with the 
Ombudsperson.313 Despite this the Ombudsperson has overwhelming support, with a majority of 
the Northern Irish Community believing that complaints would be handled fairly.314 
While some implementation of accountability reforms has been imperfect, the force itself is 
becoming more representative.315 The PSNI is meeting ICP targets to increase Catholic officers to 
one third by 2010-2011. The percentage of Catholics has risen from 8.2% to 19% from 2001 to 
2006.316 This, along with the previous reforms has led to increased trust in security apparatuses.  
This power-sharing guarantee was marked by decreased support for para-militarism from 
both communities. Political, military, and economic institutions were rearranged such that political 
institutions prevented discriminatory targeting of communal groups. As those identities were no 
longer tied to outcomes that affected wellbeing, mobilizers who sought to gain power through 
communal divisions became increasingly less successful. 
 Sympathy within each community for militant factions, just before the Good Friday 
Agreement, was down markedly from the early part of the conflict. Twenty-eight percent of 
Catholics and 31% of Protestants had at least some sympathy for their respective militaries. This 
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represents a significant reduction from 1978 levels where just under half of each group supported 
their paramilitaries.317   
 This reduced sympathy was paralleled by an increasing pressure to enter into negotiations. In 
a September 1997 nationwide poll, 70% of those interviewed thought that unionist parties should 
enter into face-to-face negotiations with Sinn Fein. This was corroborated by polling of the 
Protestant community that found that 93% of UUP supports and 76% of DUP supporters wanted 
their parties to remain within the talks. Unionists also expressed desires for moderation within those 
talks. UUP leader David Trimble held a 15% lead over Ian Paisley when the unionist community 
was asked who they wanted to dictate unionist policy within negotiations. Nationalists were similarly 
desirous of moderation from their leaders, with 75% saying they would be willing to settle for less 
than a united Ireland.318 With security guaranteed by an international presence and shared control 
over the post conflict security apparatus, paramilitaries lost significant recruitment and sympathy.  
While reduction in paramilitary support could also be explained by a general tiredness with conflict, 
corresponding increases in support for de-securitization reflect a willingness to move beyond 
paramilitaries that could only result if the post-conflict state security-apparatus garnered trust. 
 Overwhelming support for decommissioning processes reflect a trust in the post-conflict 
state’s capacity to prevent paramilitary violence. In a January 1996 poll 60% believed that before 
serious talks could take place paramilitary organizations would have to decommission all of their 
weapons.  A June 1996 poll found that 58% believed that Sinn Fein should not be allowed to join 
talks in the absence of the IRA renewing its ceasefire. These polls indicate a public pressure for 
paramilitaries to reform before being granted legitimacy as political parties. These numbers, 
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however, were skewed between the two communities, with Catholics overwhelmingly less likely to 
support decommissioning.  
However, post-settlement polls indicate that initial, pre-settlement Catholic reluctance to 
support decommissioning reflected a desire to prevent themselves from losing leverage prior to the 
imposition of the agreement, rather than a fear of cheating during the power-sharing executive. A 
1999 poll found that 50% thought there needed to be total decommissioning before the power-
sharing executive was put in place, while 36% thought there should be at least partial 
decommissioning. Only 10% thought there should be no decommissioning. A poll in 2000 found 
that only 4% thought the IRA had done enough towards decommissioning. The results were even 
lower for Protestant paramilitaries, with only 1% believing the UVF had done enough, and 4% 
thinking the UDA and UFF had done enough. This was coupled with a faith that the agreement 
could prevent or prosecute violence, with 80% believing that the agreement would either decrease or 
stagnate violence in 2001.319 These trends indicated a desire, within both communities to dissolve 
paramilitaries, and a belief in the agreement to guarantee the security sector.  
In the long-term this power-sharing security led to a substantially moderated electoral 
culture. Paul Mitchell, Geoffrey Evans, and Brendan O’leary argue that post-agreement electoral 
politics became dominated by what are known as “tribune parties.” These parties, usually more 
extreme, move to more moderated positions to increase their relevance for governance, while at the 
same time remaining the “strongest ‘defender’ of the ethnic cause”.320 These parties are 
simultaneously pragmatic in regards to resources while intransigent in regards to identity. Within 
Northern Ireland, Mitchel et al. argue that the DUP and Sinn Fein have fit this mold of extreme 
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parties that moderate.321 Power-sharing created a political climate that required moderation from 
these extreme parties, in order for them to survive electorally. 
Initial analysis of voting patterns from 1998 to 2003 seem to conflict with moderation 
arguments, instead showing a growth in radicalism. In Republican politics, Sinn Fein quickly 
replaced the SDLP as the Catholic community’s representative, maintaining a steady upward 
trajectory from the late 1990’s. One fifth of 1998 SDLP voters switched to Sinn Fein in the 2003 
elections, while only 5% of Sinn Fein voters switched to the SDLP. Sinn Fein was clearly profiting 
from an SDLP collapse. Unionist voting trends followed similar patterns. In 1998 the UUP lost 13% 
of its voters to the DUP, and lost an additional 22% in 2003, while the DUP only lost 4% of its 
voters to the UUP.322  Electoral trends within both communities indicate a rise of radicalism in the 
aftermath of the GFA, contradicting the argument that power-sharing moderates political spaces. 
However, two parallel trends suggest that we should not be so quick to discount that argument. 
First, the electoral victories that these parties achieved coincided with distinct moderate 
policy changes. On the republican side, Sinn Fein’s growth was predicated on its acceptance of the 
consent principle, as well as its participation in the agreements institutions. These policy changes 
gave nationalist politics a much more acceptable face. As Mitchell et al. noted, Sinn Fein went from 
being a party violently opposed to consociation in the late 80’s to a party that in 2006 nominated the 
leader of the DUP to be the First Minister of Northern Ireland. The DUP’s rise similarly coincided 
with its moderated platform. In the face of IRA stalling its decommissioning process the DUP called 
for a renegotiation of the GFA rather than its disbandment.323  These moderated policies allowed 
them to portray themselves as more reasonable parties that were simultaneously the strongest actors 
to protect the interests of their communities. 
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Changing polling data on key election issue areas seems to reflect this argument by 
demonstrating that the voting bases for each of these parties was also moderating. First, support for 
the consent principle, and parallel support for the Northern Irish Assembly rose within members of 
Sinn Fein and the DUP. Between 1998 and 2003 support for the assembly increased from 76% to 
94% amongst Sinn Fein voters, and from 57% to 76% amongst DUP voters. Amongst Sinn Fein 
voters, support for the consent principal reached 75% by 2003.324 Within the protestant community 
opposition to North South cooperative bodies declined by 13% among UUP supporters and 25% 
among DUP voters. 
Polling for decommissioning and overall support for power-sharing corroborates these 
trends. Within the Catholic community, support for decommissioning rose from 81 percent to 93 
percent, while within Sinn Fein it rose from 63% to 85% from 1998 to 2003. Support for power-
sharing rose amongst all major parties between 1998 and 2003, with as 12% increase in Sinn Fein 
voters, a 18% increase in UUP voters, and a 33% increase in DUP voters. This is despite significant 
difficulties in decommissioning, suspended assemblies, and stagnation.325 This moderation of party 
members seems to indicate that the success of ‘radical’ parties resulted from the parties’ decision to 
moderate their platforms. However, this alone does not explain this trend, as clearly the SDLP and 
UUP were equally— if not more— moderate. 
Both Catholic and Protestant voters indicated that Sinn Fein and the DUP respectively were 
the most effective party to represent their interests.  This was not a result of seeing the more 
moderate parties as selling out, which would seem to confirm an ethnic outbidding thesis, but rather 
the result of these parties being seen as more likely to strongly and effectively stand up for 
communal interests.326 This demonstrates that within this period more moderate politics won out, 
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but within the guise of traditionally radical parties. Without the rise of alternative power sources to 
rival these parties as strong advocates of each community’s interests, these parties became the 
voter’s logical path towards increasing life chances of community members. 
The 2007 elections saw the rise of non ethno-national issues taking the forefront within 
party competition, demonstrating decreasing significance of identity politics. Both Sinn Fein and the 
DUP significantly moderated their platforms to appeal to moderate voters. Sinn Fein facilitated the 
decommissioning of IRA weaponry in 2005 and recognized the legitimacy of the Police Services in 
January of 2007. The DUP, for its part, committed itself to the power-sharing principle.327 This 
moderation led to a campaign that was muted with regard to communal differences. Papers at the 
time described the election as “humdrum” and noted that it lacked excitement because the extremes 
had moderated. This shift, in turn, lead to a campaign that focused on policy issues like water rates, 
corporation tax, health, education and housing costs. Media reports consistently found that the most 
important issue in their doorstep polling was the prospect of water charges.328  
As power-sharing guaranteed protection of communal interests and those issues lost 
relevance to voters in comparison to alternative issue areas, people began to see communal divides 
as less relevant to their political identity. John Garry conducted a study by interviewing over 1,000 
voters following the March 7th election.  Only 15% of those interviewed described themselves as 
strongly unionist or nationalist, and over 40% opted to call themselves neither unionist nor 
nationalist.329  With regards to power-sharing, only 10% ruled it out as an effective system of 
governance, and 75% preferred to remain in the UK with a strong devolved assembly. While a large 
percentage of Catholics wanted a United Ireland, they were still a minority. This moderation was 
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reflected within identity preferences, with a fifth of each community self-describing as “Northern 
Irish”. This preference represents a significant change from Evans and Duffy’s analysis in the early 
1990’s in which communal identities were still strong. These changes curbed the actions of party 
leaders. Dissident republican violence in March 2009 was strongly condemned by Sinn Fein Deputy 
First Minister Martin McGuiness, and unionist colleagues welcomed that condemnation. The 
political atmosphere increasingly moderated to the point where violent militarism did not 
significantly affect moderate voting. The 2011 election, called the most mundane in living history, 
followed this trend, reflecting a growing moderation in inter-communal interactions.330 
That moderation was reflected within attitudinal surveys, although to a lesser extent. A 2007 
survey by Muldoon et al. found evidence of a community desirous of breaking down boundaries, but 
not yet capable of doing so. Within their interviews all participants downplayed themes of division 
and opposition, and instead emphasized common ground.331 The interviews found respondents 
increasingly able to identify with the opposite community. As one third-generation Catholic noted: 
I can identify with a lot of . . . individuals and they might be the exact opposite of me in terms of 
their identity and beliefs, people like David Ervine, you know, who I really admire and I really, I 
respect him, you know, I don’t agree with . . . he has just one outlook, I’ve another outlook, but I 
really like how he carries himself.332 
 
This kind of tolerance of the opposite community was accompanied by some decrease in 
importance of communal identity. From 1998 to 2010 the percentage describing themselves as 
Northern Irish increased from 23% to 29%, while the percentage describing themselves as unionist 
dropped by 7% and the percentage describing themselves as nationalist dropped by 14%. Finally, the 
percentage describing themselves as neither nationalist nor unionist rose from 33% to 46%.333 
Within that time period the percentage preferring to live in a mixed religion area rose from 65% to 
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82%, the percentage preferring a mixed workplace jumped from 82% to 94%, the percentage 
wishing to see mixing in schools jumped from 49% to 69%, and the percentage who would mind a 
lot or a little if a close relative married someone of a different religion dropped from 25% to 19%.334 
Moreover, where national identities remained strong, there were increasing trends towards religious 
and national identity being seen as personal rather than social. 335 When political power-sharing 
alleviated discrimination based on identities, those identities became increasingly less relevant and 
charged. 
These trends towards decreased communal confrontation were, however, incipient rather 
than widespread and stabilized. Without cross-community architecture ready to take the place of 
entrenched enmity, these trends towards moderation failed to positively impact communal 
segregation. Nic Craith argues that both Catholic nationalists and Protestant unionists have 
developed separate cultural infrastructures. Each groups has separate schools, newspapers, 
organizations etc.336This limitation has allowed communal divisions to remain. Many interviewees 
previously discussed in Muldoon et al. continued to emphasize the salience and importance of 
national and religious identity. Members of mixed marriages reported prejudice and stigmatization as 
a result of their marriage. These trends were reflected in 2003 and 2004 surveys of 16 year olds 
which found that these children were much more likely to identify themselves based upon 
communal characteristics.337 Moreover, a number of studies including Brewer and Pierce (2005) and 
Roccas and Brewer (2002) found lingering oppositional identity construction, meaning that for many 
people, these identities were still seen as incompatible.338  This sense is reflected in demographic 
statistics, including the troubling fact that 90% of people still live in an area where their group 
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comprises the majority.339 Moreover, electoral data indicates that there is very little crossover in 
voting. Only 1.4% of UUP and DUP voters were Catholic in 2003, while only 1% of Sinn Fein 
voters and 1.7% of SDLP voters were Protestant.340 Evidently, while power-sharing has significantly 
moderated communal interaction, communal divides remain. 
 The presence of communal divides decades after the GFA has been used as an argument 
that power-sharing will always confine societies to their communal divides. However, 
institutionalization of identity is not capable of producing division and conflict by itself. It must be 
coupled with unequal treatment of each identities within those institutions, as that confirms that 
identity is critical factor effecting life wellbeing. If they are treated equally, then your participation 
within an identity does not affect your wellbeing. This next section will argue that the culprit lies 
with an imperfect and internationalized implementation of power-sharing. 
Local Influence 
 It is easy to denigrate local institutions, and particularly religious institutions, as propagators 
of divisiveness and conflict that peaceful solutions must avoid. However, those institutions can also 
be critical tools for peace that break down the divides conflict has erected. This section will explore 
the effect of local actors on the peace process in two stages of the agreement: the negotiation stage 
and the post-conflict recovery stage. By examining evidence from local projects related to policing, 
local church actors, district partnership programs, and transitional justice program I will demonstrate 
two things: first, that these local actors have capacity to break down identity divides, and second, 
that their disempowerment resulted in limited application of that capacity. Local actors are 
distinguished within this context from paramilitary groups and existent political elites. Instead, local 
actors represent new or old civil society organizations or figures, as well as community control over 
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post-conflict planning that is distinct and separate from elite control. The aim of this section is to 
construct a bridge between research relating to local actor empowerment and identity divides. 
In the first stage of the negotiations local religious actors were critical to normalizing and 
legitimizing peace narratives. The Ecumenism movement, a movement designed to increase 
interactions between churchgoers from Protestant and Catholic denominations, helped standardize 
the language of peace within religious discourses. Progressive Presbyterianism, Methodism, and the 
Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland (ECONI) all converted mainstream religious 
discourse into a discourse that was accepting of reconciliation.341 These actors used their authority 
within their religious traditions and trusted symbols, terminology, and arguments of their faiths 
towards the service of peacemaking.  Mervyn Gibson, a Protestant Evangelical reverend described 
the role this played in converting community members to peace narratives: 
I spoke at [a] local Ulster Rally at the Shankill. I made an extremely conciliatory speech at a hardline rally and 
that speech was cleared by everybody present, because I wrote it and then said to everybody, “this is what I’m 
going to say, anybody with any objections, tell me now, so I’ll not get it the neck afterwards.” Everybody said, 
that’s great, and that speech accepted IRA decommissioning, that speech said we need to build new 
relationships with our neighbours and with the South. All those things are in that speech and that was a 
hardline rally. So you can say things coming from those sectors that [other] people can’t, but the idea is that you 
can bring people with you’.342 
 
By owning the discourse of peace and reconciliation they made it easier for people to stand up to 
radicalism. When Paul Reid, the leader of the Protestant Christian Fellowship Church, announced to 
his congregation in East Belfast that he had been in dialogue with Republicans for years, his 
congregation began a series of ‘bridge building’ initiatives including seminars that created forums for 
discussions between Catholics and Protestants including paramilitary members from each 
community.343 These discourses were given extra legitimacy because they came from local actors 
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with existent, trusted social capital. As a result they helped to change the way communities saw each 
other. 
The authority that these actors had allowed this discourse to thrive during contentious 
episodes that threatened security. Local mediation efforts were built upon these ecumenical 
relations. These relationships allowed for cross-community responses to local conflicts. These 
responses were more readily accepted by local actors, because they already had a sense of local 
legitimacy due to their capital in trusted religious networks.344 For example, when the IRA murdered 
Ray Smallwood, a leading Protestant peace activist, just prior to a Loyalist Ceasefire in 1994, Fathers 
Gerry Reynolds and Alec Reid used their protestant ecumenist connections and publicly prayed 
beside his coffin. This gesture helped to minimize tensions during this period. In addition to making 
reconciliation, discourse palatable church actors were also critical conduits for negotiations between 
paramilitary groups. 
 Church venues offered neutrality and a sacred safe space that encouraged paramilitary 
groups to engage in negotiations. Both the Clonard Monastery and Fitzroy Presbyterian church held 
sacred spaces within their local populations which “allowed church people from the Protestant, 
Methodist, and Presbyterian background to engage with Republicans and try to get an understanding 
of just what Republicans were about… it forced us to challenge some of our misconceptions.”345 As 
Anglican Primate Robin Eames noted, these spaces allowed them to maintain talks during some of 
the most fractious periods of the conflict, “It was awesome. These were the faces of those I had 
condemned, but…I found them open to talk, open to listen. Not dogmatically attacking the position 
that I held.”346 These venues illustrate the need to engage with local networks of trust in order to 
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create stable negotiations. That trust is a necessary precursor for actors to feel comfortable to the 
extent where they can let go of communal prejudices.  
 In addition to the venues, local religious leaders also exerted significant social capital that 
encouraged negotiations. Religious leaders were able to build relationships of trust between parties 
to the conflict. They gradually developed relationships with these parties by using their position 
within the community to create contact. This would then blossom into a trust in the Church that 
facilitated dialogue. As Father Alec Reid noted, “It was a question of trust. People would believe that 
the churches had no selfish interest in it and they were not following some kind of agenda—private 
agenda or personal agenda; they were following the principles of the Christian faith, the principles of 
peace”.347 Those networks created opportunity for critical negotiations during a number of key 
moments throughout the peace process.  
 These local religious leaders played critical roles in the 1994 loyalist ceasefire, the Downing 
Street Declaration, and the negotiations between Gerry Adams and John Hume.  Anglican Primate 
Robin Eames and Presbyterian minister Roy Magee were critical interlocutors during the ceasefire 
negotiations that, as Roy Garland, a member of the UPP, notes, gave legitimacy to the 
deliberations.348 Brian Rowan, a former security correspondent for BBC Northern Ireland, recalls a 
meeting between Eames, Magee and the Combined Loyalist Command: 
You then have that ceasefire being pushed away because of the killings that are going on. It then gets to the 
point of writing the Combined Loyalist Military Command ceasefire statement and Eames is behind the line of 
[them admitting] ‘abject and true remorse’ in the statement and [having] to say sorry. Eames continues to be 
involved in the background, you have that stalemate over decommissioning and Eames then persuades the 
Loyalists towards this statement of ‘no first strike’. This is about giving greater confidence to the nationalist 
community.349 
 
Eames was able to use the trust from the Protestant community to confer legitimacy and importance 
upon the negotiations in a way that would have been impossible otherwise. Their involvement gave 
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a neutral local influence over the process.  When Ireland and the United Kingdom were getting 
ready to distribute the Downing Street Declaration, the British went to Eames and gave him veto 
power over its content. Eames then used his connection to loyalist paramilitaries to ensure their 
input. This act of empowering local actors who had legitimacy in the community conferred a similar 
legitimacy on the declaration and the proceeding peace negotiations.350 
 Catholic clergy played similar roles within Republican negotiations. When Gerry Adams and 
John Hume began talks in the late 1990s they reached out through Father Alec Reid and Bishop 
Edward Daly in Derry. These were both actors that the local community trusted and thus made the 
discussions relatively immune to critique. In addition, the sacred spaces wherein they met— the 
Clonard Monastery and Bishop Daly’s house— offered a confidentially and neutrality within the 
discussions that protect the incipient talks.351 
 In the first stage of the peace process, local actors would be critical to grant legitimacy to the 
negotiations. By empowering existent trusted religious networks, these talks were less susceptible to 
outbidding, and held more local ownership. Discussions that verged away from communal biases 
and discourses of insecurity gained footholds as result of those factors. 
 The most important role local actors can play is within the post-conflict reconciliation phase. 
They have the capacity to form cross-communal cleavages that can break down the divides of 
conflict. They do this by granting local ownership and legitimacy to civil society and political efforts 
to challenge those divides. This section will explore the role local actors had in breaking down 
divides through four case studies: local policing boards, religious ecumenism, district partnership 
programs, and a transitional justice program in Ardoyne. 
 Poli c ing Boards 
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 Police practices formed one of the most significant fissures throughout the conflict. The 
GFA established the beginnings of localized control over their governance. The Agreement 
established the Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland in order to reform the policing system 
and to ensure “there are clearly established arrangements enabling local people…to articulate their 
… concerns about policing and to establish…policing priorities and…to ensure police impartiality 
and freedom from partisan political control.”352 This manifested in the creation of a policing board 
to hold the Chief Constable accountable, with authority to approve annual policing plans and 
determine policing priorities. The Policing Board would have 19 members: ten would be members 
of the legislative assembly, but not ministers, the remaining nine would be independent 
representatives of various parts of society including businesses, trade unionists, etc. Through the 
specification of its composition the agreement ensured this board was representative of the entire 
community. In addition to instating the board, the agreement declared that each district council 
should establish a district policing partnership board (DPPB). These were designed similarly to the 
national board and were designed to be representative in terms of religion, gender, age, and cultural 
background. These boards would meet monthly with the local police commander and could compel 
the police to consider these views. 353 
  This local infrastructural control has begun to make inroads into communal divisions 
surrounding policing. Nearly 80% of both groups are willing to engage the police. Strikingly, 
Catholics seem to have more faith in the system than Protestants, with two thirds of Protestants 
believing it to be too lenient while only 45% of Catholics hold this belief. Moreover, only 8% of 
Protestants and 19% Catholics thought the police were not representative of their community.354 
About a third of Protestants and Catholics said they were confident that DPPs were helping to 
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address local policing problems. One participant described the tenor of discussion at a West Belfast 
District Policing Partnership: 
On one side, those with a long history in the IRA and Sinn Fein and their community. On the other, those 
once with the RUC … The meeting was a constructive and critical encounter. The cut and thrust of the 
exchange reflected clear progress being made in tackling anti-community crime.355 
 
This indicates a willingness to cooperate in policing from within both communities.  
 
However, these boards were not an unqualified success. Only 30% of Protestants and 33% 
of Catholics were completely satisfied with policing in their districts. Moreover Sinn Fein members 
who endorsed these partnerships were consistently threatened for attendance at these meetings. 
About half of each group did not have confidence in these district partnerships. The reasons for this 
failure will be discussed more extensively later. However, critics of the agreement regularly cite the 
decision to strip these boards of their as a key source of frustration. This seems to suggest that the 
failure in these boards results from the disempowerment of local actors.356 
 Relig ious Ecumenism 
 Local religious peacemaking served three primary functions in the aftermath of the 
agreement. It opened spaces where people could feel comfortable talking about sectarianism and the 
history of the conflict, it created cross-communal issue areas, and it helped to diffuse crises as they 
arose. Religious peacemaking facilitated dialogue and interaction between communities by using 
their ecumenist networks to bridge communal divides.357 
 Church peacemakers used their moral authority to create platforms capable of reconciling 
with the past. On a symbolic level they helped to revise rituals that had previously enshrined 
communal differences. Through things like shared liturgy, worship, bible study, and prayer meetings 
they were able to bridge divides within religious ritual processes. They used these rituals to facilitate 
social transformations within individuals, which allowed them to look at the other community 
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differently. This helped to create the grounds for social solidarity to open up discussions capable of 
more directly targeting the past. Groups like the Magherafelt Interdenominational Group capitalized 
on these platforms and created forums to respond to local community issues. They were designed to 
create church cooperation to address shared communal reconciliation needs, and other community 
issues. The Irish School of Ecumenics completed a six-year project titled “Moving Beyond 
Sectarianism”, which conducted workshops on identity and anti-sectarianism and taught people 
skills to help their neighbors to move beyond sectarianism.358  
 In addition, many groups held forums to specifically address the atrocities of the past. The 
Church of Ireland held a series of public lectures on forgiveness; ECONI similarly published a series 
of fifteen reflections on forgiveness. These were coupled with courses which encouraged cross-
community contact. The church used its moral authority to delve into an area that other actors had 
no social capital to effect. They were able to use this to great effect, transforming parishioner 
narratives and remembrance of the conflict.359  
 From those foundations religious peacemakers helped to form networks to target issue areas 
that bridged communal divides. Churches partnered with groups like the Ballynafeigh Community 
Development Association to create development programs that provide services on a cross-
community basis. They provided help to elderly in both communities, help with people with learning 
difficulties, and other similar programs. This had the effect of creating new social networks that 
bridged identities, thus creating cross-community cleavages.360 By mainstreaming diverse issue areas 
they sought to help dissolve the lines of fissure that perpetuated the conflict. This potential to form 
cross-communal bridges resulted from the application and usage of preexisting local networks.361 
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 Finally church activists were critical to diffusing incidents that threatened the stability of 
communal relationships. The events surrounding the Holy Cross Protests in 2001-2001 are 
illustrative of the importance of this localized response to a communal fissure. Loyalists protested 
Catholic parents and children walking through area to attend a girls primary school. This ‘intrusion’ 
had become a particularly touchy subject, as Catholic population growth had led to the 
encroachment of Catholic neighborhoods on traditional Protestant areas. The protests quickly 
became violent with bottles of urine thrown at children as they walked by. The Reverend Norman 
Hamilton, a Presbyterian, and Father Aidan Troy, a Catholic, stepped in to help escort the children 
through these districts. Their joint work formed the foundation of future cooperative ventures to 
diffuse tense communal encounters. From their partnership came the development of the North 
and West Belfast Parades Forum, a grouping of paramilitaries, political representatives, community 
people, and churches. This forum not only created a formalized reconciliation platform to tackle 
contentious boundary issues, but also normalized interactions amongst these groups.362  
The GFA, in specific instantiations, formalized the role of these local religious leaders. For 
example, the British government used Reverend Harold Good and Father Alec Reid to witness acts 
of decommissioning.363 These actors created trust that decommissioning was being faithfully 
executed, in a similar way to that of the international oversight. Religious peacemakers were critical 
conduits of peacemaking, by utilizing existing networks and trust to help found cross community 
endeavors. 
 Distr i c t  Partnerships  
 The GFA was paralleled by a limited peace architecture that provided localized control over 
special funds. The European Commission for Peace Program created 26 district partnership 
representatives that controlled a budget of 55 million euros from 1995 to 1998, a further 17 million 
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from 1998 to 1999, and a further 400 million from 1999 onward.364 Each partnership was controlled 
with equal weight from local government, community and volunteer sectors, and other local interest 
sectors.365 This had the effect of creating non-confrontational mechanisms to target community 
issues. Members of these partnerships described effective working relationships between members 
of each community: “tensions are diffused by respectful banter…and by non-confrontational 
methods”. Members described the growth of cross community friendships, as enmity gave way to 
trust. It also formed local alliances where “the community could make decisions for itself” separate 
from the political wrangling of national elites.366 
 A survey conducted by Nicholas Acheson and Arthur Williamson provides some cautiously 
optimistic evidence regarding the effects these organizations had. Over 90% of respondents said that 
their organizations had provided opportunities for people to do things together and to cooperate on 
common tasks. Well over three quarters said that these activities had indirect community relations 
spinoffs, with only 9% saying their staff felt anxious about those programs. While very few reported 
moving away from their background community, nearly half of those that did reported doing so 
because of being involved in a cross-community project.367 These organizations were able to tackle 
divisive issues, with 60.1% reporting addressing equality of access to services between communities, 
and 78.1% finding that those discussions were not at all divisive. Indeed, 65.7% of workers found 
that they had developed friendships across communities as a result of these partnerships.368 
However, a failure to directly target communal divides suggests that communal bridges remained 
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weak. As will be discussed later, external funders played a large role in preventing these 
developments.  
These programs demonstrate the capacity to create localized cleavages that exist separately 
from communal divides through strong local actor civil society programs. By empowering local 
networks, groups were able to begin to form bridges between the communities that would not have 
been formed had the peace architecture been exclusively targeted at national elites. 
 Transi t ional  Just i ce  
 The Ardoyne Commemoration Project is illustrative of the importance of utilizing local 
knowledge and trust to tackle past atrocities that had erected boundaries between the two 
communities. Ardoyne is a working class Republican community in North Belfast. In the immediate 
aftermath of the GFA the community undertook a reflection project to record and reflect on thirty 
years of conflict. Over a four-year period they collected and edited over 300 interviews, testimonies, 
and eyewitness accounts relating to the 99 people who had died within their community. This 
resulted in the publication of a 543 page book, Ardoyne: The Untold Truth, which displayed that 
process. This process was driven by local community actors who felt that the peace process had 
excluded them and their need for catharsis.369 
 Through a series of interviews with participants in the Ardoyne Commemoration Project 
(ACP) Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern identified two key benefits this project had in local 
reconciliation. First, it offered a sense of recognition of the individualized harms that had been 
perpetrated on the members of the community. Many of those involved noted that it was 
therapeutic simply by providing an audience and a space to talk about the traumatic events they had 
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faced.370 This became particularly important within the context of what was seen as a denial of truth 
from national peace infrastructures. Participants described a national peace process that had 
shrouded the experiences of conflict in silence. In addition, media was identified as a perpetrator of 
systemic misrepresentation of the costs of the conflict.371 As one participant described, this project 
became a way of truth-telling in the face of that dual-pronged denial.372 A localized atmosphere 
where they could feel comfortable expressing their harms was critical to reaching that catharsis. 
 The second benefit offered by the ACP was the possibility to regain control of the narratives 
of suffering. One participant described this capacity to individualize and own the suffering they 
faced: 
I think the success of the book [Ardoyne: the Untold Truth] was that it allowed people’s own voices to tell the 
story. That’s where everybody could identify with it because it was very much their story, it wasn’t somebody 
else telling it. It was how they felt and saw things, and it worked for them, and people became real again. They 
no longer were just a statistic or a name on a wall, and it brought people to life again.373   
 
The testimony allowed them to regain a sense of control over their experiences and memories of the 
conflict. Through this mechanism they were able to challenge the label of victimhood that was 
closely linked with helplessness and powerlessness. At the end of each testimony they were handed 
back their testimonies in a symbolic gesture that indicated they controlled and owned that history. 
Through this process they could redefine themselves as proactive agents capable of feeling like they 
were productive members of that community once again.374  
None of this would have been possible with a truth process that was conferred by outsiders 
who lacked the trust and understanding of local experiences of conflict. Local control over this 
reconciliation process conferred legitimacy on the process. Local knowledge made sure that the 
process was relevant to its participants which made them more likely to feel ownership over the 
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process. By making the experience bottom-up locals owned the project and were able to gain 
substantial catharsis. This indicates the transformative process that local influence can have over 
social and communal relationships. However, this effect is severely limited when peace frameworks 
undercut the influence of local actors. 
Limited Local Empowerment 
This section will argue that the impact of local peacemaking was severely undercut by an 
international peace process that failed to empower local actors, or actively constrained them. This 
section will look at each of these failures in turn.  
Local peacemaking was significantly under empowered by the international peace 
framework. Local peacemaking efforts are often difficult to maintain, as existent institutions are 
reluctant to support them. As a result it is imperative that the international peacemaking effort 
utilizes its resources to free those groups from the confines of those institutions. The religious 
ecumenist movement serves as a useful example of this. Ecumenist leaders like Ken Newel, Harold 
Miller, and Charles Kenny, all described facing significant blockades from within their own church 
hierarchies who preferred to subscribe to doctrinal differences.375 Roy Garland, a loyalist politician, 
described this attitude towards the Corymeela Community, “it was sidelined from the churches. If 
you ask me I think the churches were not all that keen on Corymeela”.376 Women’s groups often 
found it difficult to create autonomy from their churches who operated on patriarchal structures 
that denied these groups support. If there weren’t active constraints, these groups would have to 
battle significant apathy within these institutional structures.377  
The result was that many peace groups simply failed to continue. The Enniskillen Together 
Peace Group, formed in the aftermath of the bomb that exploded on Remembrance Day in 1987, 
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but petered out as it failed to get any funding or institutional support to maintain its profile. The 
Drumcree Faaith and Justice Group was founded to respond to violence associated with Orange 
parades, but has since fallen into anonymity due to limited resources.378 Even when local 
peacemaking efforts were continued they were significantly limited in their capacity. Andries 
Odendaal describes limited financial and external support for the previously mentioned local 
policing boards.379 With limited funding it became difficult for local peace efforts to remain 
sustainable. This is of course difficult to quantify, and there were substantial resources poured into 
these programs, however the mechanisms by which funding was attached limited the sustainability 
of these programs. Funding recipients described funding as insufficient, inconsistent, and with 
limited long-term application.380 Perhaps more importantly, these groups were often restricted by a 
limited peace framework that excluded non-political actors from influence in the trajectory of the 
post conflict state. 
Even when the architecture of the Good Friday Agreement sought to give space to local 
actors, it was often coupled with a parallel restriction that made those institutions paper tigers. While 
the policing boards were supposed to have review over their local police, the Police Act of 2000 
stripped the boards of any effective powers. The act had three primary effects; district policing 
partnerships were confined to consultative powers, persons convicted of terrorist offense could not 
serve on DPP’s, and DPPS could not deal with any past issues.381 This reflects a general policy 
within the agreement that limited the authority of local peacemakers in preference of political actors. 
Without any institutionalized authority any social networks built upon cross-communal cleavages are 
seen as less realistic alternatives to existent power structures. 
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Funding systems for peacemakers discouraged, or at the very least did not encourage, cross 
community groups. Participants in Acheson and Williamson’s study on district partnership programs 
noted that engaging in cross community work was “like pushing water up a hill”.382  One interviewee 
described a “lack of willingness” from European funding sources to support reconciliation work. 
Instead they followed “the path of least resistance” which was to “just go along the communal 
ground”.383 More than 80% of respondents reported no external pressure to work in a cross 
community way. Some participants described this as actively inhibiting cross community work even 
when there was a demand among community organizations.  As a result local actors who had the 
capacity to create cross-communal cleavages found it very difficult to work within the international 
peace framework. While limited local empowerment is difficult to prove, as a counterfactual, these 
indicators suggest that local actors were undercut in significant ways that would prevent the 
formation of alternative cleavages with social capital and legitimacy to challenge nationalist elites. 
This does not by itself substantiate the connection between limited local empowerment, and failures 
to target communal divides but it does suggest a strong correlation between the two. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has demonstrated that the confluence of power-sharing and a third party 
guarantee created a moderated political climate where radicalism ceded authority to moderation. 
This created a significant opportunity to break down identity divides. However, as was detailed 
above, reconciliation between the communities was far from perfectly implemented, with communal 
fissures remaining highly relevant for local actors. The common explanation for this result is that 
power-sharing institutionalized identity divides constricting people into them institutionally. If 
institutions constricted people into certain identities then the evidence presented above that 
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communal divides have been eroded makes little sense. That constraint should have acted on top of 
existing prejudices and built them up.  
However, if this thesis is right and power-sharing created a potential space where those 
identities became less relevant, then we need an alternative explanation for this stagnation in 
progress with regards to communal reconciliation. The conclusion will examine the connections 
between limited empowerment of local actors and this result. However, the mechanism by which 
local actors ought be empowered is certainly not a closed debate. Finding the right balance between 
providing autonomy for local actors to build peace, and preventing local actors who are going to 
harm the peace process from engaging in spoiling actions is a difficult process. The debate 
surrounding hybridized peace structures is critical to continue to understand how these peace 
architectures can be constructed in the way that fosters reconciliation. 
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Conclusion: Hybrid Peace in Communally Divided Peace Processes 
Seventeen years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the peace holds, but 
equally remains shallow.  In late 2012 into early 2013, Protestant protests erupted in response to the 
Belfast City Council’s decision to limit the flying of the Union Jack to eighteen days per year. 
Protesters turned violent and, reminiscent of skirmishes during The Troubles, threw concrete 
blocks, paving slabs, bricks, planks of wood, gasoline bombs and Molotov cocktails at police.384 In 
the nearly two decades since its institution, the agreement has withstood a number of similar crises, 
including the temporary dissolution of the executive branch and a stalled decommissioning process. 
The question at stake is how the agreement can be at once durable and simultaneously fragile. 
Through answering this question we can arrive at an understanding of the value of power-sharing’s 
contribution to peace and whether the fragility that resulted should preclude future attempts at using 
power-sharing 
 This thesis offered a two-pronged argument that answers that question. It argued that, in 
contrast to the Sunningdale Agreement, a complete power-sharing of each government sector, 
coupled with a strong third party guarantee, created a moderated political climate. As identity 
interests were guaranteed by the agreement, they lost their relevance to the political debate. This 
shifted the focus of politics towards more commonplace issue areas, less conducive to radicalism. 
While the DUP and Sinn Fein maintained electoral control, they did so with significantly moderated 
platforms. The second prong of this thesis’ analysis argued that in areas where local actors were 
empowered, those groups were able to reduce the divisions between the two communities in 
question. However, the international architecture of the peace agreement radically undercut the 
influence local actors would have on the shape of the new regime. As a result, there was limited 
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space available to alternative power networks capable of challenging traditional communal political 
parties and social organizations. This indicates the need for peace settlements, particularly within 
communal conflicts, to empower local actors within their institutional framework. The mechanism 
by which to do so, however, is less clear. 
Local actors are, of course, not immune from communal divisiveness. As Brewer notes, civil 
society can have a darker side that resists peace and seeks to define it in negative ways—i.e. as 
threatening the community.385 In the aftermath of brutal conflicts, organic civil society actors may 
still reflect or be influenced by biases begat by inter-communal conflict. Indeed, many local actors 
empowered by the Good Friday Agreement were communally isolated.  Table one details the 
community background of management committees of local peace and development organizations. 
The vast majority (73.9 %) of organizations have management committees that are wholly or mainly 
from one community. That insularity affects their capacity to conduct inter-communal work. 
Participants in the Ardoyne Commemoration Project, for example, described a difficulty in 
contacting unionists, and getting them to participate in the commemoration project.386 
Table 1: Community Background of Management Committees 
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Community background 
of members of management committees.  Numbers  Valid per cent  
Wholly Catholic  40  13.1  
Mainly Catholic  69  22.5  
Mixed  80  26.1  
Mainly Protestant  75  24.5  
Wholly Protestant  42  13.7  
Total valid respondents  306  100  
Missing  50   
Total  356   
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Source: Acheson and Williamson387 
 
As this example suggests, in the immediate aftermath of the agreement, not all local actors will 
reflect the cross communal cooperation that the goals of reconciliation demand. There is a fine 
balance that must be drawn between the desires to encourage cross communal liberalism, and the 
requirements to grant local actors both space and autonomy necessary for them to be effective in 
challenging traditional, and radical, communal parties. The remainder of this conclusion will explore 
that debate, with the aim of providing guiding policy suggestions. 
 In order to ensure local actors are not crowded out by the peace process, peace settlements 
must hybridize their institutional frameworks to give space to local, national, and international 
actors. Roger MacGinty, as detailed in the literature review, has already developed a conceptual 
model explaining the way that hybridity should operate. I will seek to specify it in this conclusion, by 
detailing what its implementation could look like.  
 MacGinty’s hybridized model is constituted of four core parts. It has both compliance and 
incentive powers of international or regional agents. In addition local actors must have capacity to 
resist, ignore, and adapt existent interventions. Finally, they must also be able to create alternative 
forms of peacemaking. 388 The interplay of these four parts, and the relative power of each 
component is necessarily case dependent. However, a preference for bottom up peace in which local 
actors are given significant capacity to resist, adapt, and create peace is critical to changing the power 
dynamics away from radical communal parties in the aftermath of violence. A dependency on 
international actors results in a reliance on those actors and existent elites. So long as that reliance 
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continues, the power dynamics between local actors and radical communal elites will never change 
sufficiently to challenge radicalism. This section will look at each component in turn. 
 Compliance and incentive powers of international actors help to enforce agreements, but 
where possible they should remain a reassuring presence rather than an active participant in the 
agreement. These powers are critical to disciplining attempts at deviance from the tenets of the 
agreement. However, the compliance powers must be constrained by, and adhere closely to, the 
tenets of the agreement agreed upon by local parties. Overstepping those boundaries will inevitably 
decrease local participation with the peace agreement, as it will seem a foreign imposition. It may, 
therefore by prudent for third party actors to use less aggressive incentive powers. Through the use 
of targeted development packages, for example, they can encourage support of, and compliance 
with, the agreement. These funding packages are given to local municipalities or organizations who 
are participating within the bounds of the agreement. However, it is essential that the ‘strings 
attached’ to these packages be minimal, and that control over the implementation of said 
development packages be local.389 Development packages can be tied to a basic compliance with the 
new regime, but must not be bound by national development plans or orientations. This would 
result in loss in ownership over the peace process as national plans brush over the intricacies of local 
needs. 
 Local actors must be given the necessary political space to resist, ignore, or adapt certain 
manifestations of the agreement. Without the capacity to affect the agreement’s implementation the 
agreement will fail in its primary focus, to encourage interaction and support from the population. 
National level plans for development and reconciliation can never account for the diversity of 
experiences with conflict that local municipalities had. The capacity to adapt or even ignore certain 
facets of the agreement is critical to ensuring the agreement is relevant to the needs of local 
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populations. In addition, it grants political space and legitimacy to a set of actors separate from 
national elites. National elites are likely to be those who negotiated the peace agreement, and as a 
result tend to at least include more radical factions of each community.  Local boards, with 
representation from diverse interest areas, must maintain control over the way the agreement 
manifests in the locality.390 This cannot simply be through the dispersal of funds as it was in 
Northern Ireland. They must also have some institutional control over the policy making process of 
the local state. This establishes these alternative networks with legitimacy sufficient to encourage 
local populations to seek them out, rather than radical party elites. This can and must be restrained 
by certain conditions to prevent actions which propagate divides. However, some level of power-
sharing within these local boards seems sufficient to prevent those actions, by creating a check to 
prevent abuse from radical participants. Finally, there may be certain facets of the agreement over 
which local control is not granted. For example, while the process of decommissioning can change 
within localities, overall targets for reducing weaponry are critical to ensuring trust with the 
agreement. 
 Equally important, local actors must be given an institutional platform to create alternative 
forms of peacemaking. These parallel frameworks of peace help to make the peace relevant and 
empowering of local actors, and additionally create a space for new sources of social and political 
capital to develop. Parallel forms of dispute resolution and reconciliation, for example, tap into local 
knowledge of the way the conflict affected their community, and can thus more narrowly tailor 
reconciliation programs to those specific needs.391 In addition those programs will often have more 
meaning when they come from traditional moral authorities in the community. However, these 
programs must be constrained by a broader ethos of equality between communities. Parallel forms 
of peace, while not always necessarily being targeted to both communities, must on the aggregate 
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have equal benefit. Accountability to this principle can be generated at the local level, but the 
presence of a third party can help to assuage fears that those local accountability measures will be 
insufficient. International actors offer an important symbol of neutrality, but peace builders should 
be wary of expanding their influence beyond that presence. 
 When giving space to these parallel peace frameworks, preferences for cross community 
endeavors should be supported. Community development programs, or other similar programs that 
target the needs of the community in the aftermath of conflict, can create new groups that have 
relevance and importance to both communities. For example, class based initiatives like housing 
project developments or poverty reduction programs that have plans to target those problems 
within each community can create relationships within the organizations themselves, but also 
between the organization and the community. These relationships are far less likely to develop when 
local actors are excluded from these processes, and the only solutions to communal problems come 
from national, communally divided, institutions. A failure to encourage these partnerships within 
district partnership boards in Northern Ireland resulted in a stunted implementation of reform. 
Requirements for equal participation from each community on boards of organizations receiving 
money, or similar measures to that end, can help to ensure that the post-implementation peace 
architecture actively targets divides. 
 It is perhaps a little ironic that this conclusion is seeking to define a specific implementation 
plan for including local actors, given that one of the core problems this thesis has identified with 
internationalized process is their use of a one size fits all policy program. As a result, these 
suggestions should be seen as general guiding principles that are flexible to the complexities of each 
case. Where specific policies were specified, the goal was to be illustrative of the principle rather 
than constrictive in defining which particular policies peace builders should use. More mechanistic 
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mapping is needed to specify the way that local influence operates within divided societies, but it 
should be clear from this thesis that local control is a necessary precursor to a stable and deep peace.  
 The implications of this thesis can be cautiously applied to a diversity of cases.  There are a 
few restrictions to this application. The enormous financial resources that went into the Good 
Friday Agreement, and the infrastructure to deliver those resources separates Northern Ireland from 
many other cases in which those factors are unavailable. As a result the implications of this 
argument should be considered within a framework that recognizes the importance of the economic 
advantages of the Northern Irish case. In additions newer conflicts are more and more seen to have 
illicit networks that fund their continuance. Colombia’s drug networks are a prime example of this. 
As a result it is unclear how well the incentives described in this thesis apply to cases in which 
profitable illicit networks introduce other types of incentives. Finally, the small population size of 
Northern Ireland limits, to some extent, the presence of a diversity of actors that could have 
inspired more spoiling. However, these restrictions ought be seen as cautions and not a justification 
to avoid the implications of this thesis. Within those constraints the argument behind this thesis can 
be adjusted to the context of individual cases. 
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Appendix A 
 
Political Parties 
 
Sinn Fein (SF)  Took its current form in 1970 after the split       
 the IRA, it is the political wing of the PIRA. 
  
Social Democrat and Labor Party (SDLP)   Socialist Irish nationalist party founded by, among 
others, John Hume in 1970. 
 
Democrat Unionist Party (DUP)  Ultra unionist party founded by Ian Paisley in 1970. 
Now led by Peter Robinson. 
 
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)  Conservative moderate unionist party founded in 
1905. Governed Northern Ireland from 1921 to 1972. 
 
Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)  Left-wing unionist party linked to the Red Hand 
Commandos and the Ulster Volunteer Force. 
 
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI)  Cross community party founded in in 1970. 
 
 
 
Paramilitary Organizations 
 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) Paramilitary organization founded in 1919. Main goal 
is a united Ireland. 
 
Provisional IRA (Provos) Half of the division created within the IRA in 1969. 
Advocate violent military action instead of political 
action. 
 
Official IRA The other half of the split within the IRA. Advocated 
a political resolution to conflict after 1972. Marxist 
inclinations. 
 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)  Ulster loyalist paramilitary group formed in 1965. 
Formed in response to IRA activity. 
 
Ulster Defense Association (UDA)  Largest Protestant paramilitary group. Founded in 
1971 to ‘protect protestant communities’ from the 
PIRA. 
 
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)  Pseudonym used by UDA to avoid being outlawed by 
British government. This strategy works until 1992. 
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Red Hand Commandos (RHC) Small and secretive loyalist paramilitary group closely 
associated with the UVF. Founded in 1972. 
 
Security Services 
 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Police force in Northern Ireland since 1922. Heavily 
dominated by Protestants. 
 
Ulster Special Constabulary (USC) Also called B-Specials. This was a quasi military police 
force known for its brutality. 
 
Police Services Northern Ireland (PSNI) The successor to the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Brief Timeline of the Northern Irish Conflict up until 1998 
 
1968 
5 October: clashes in Londonderry/Derry between civil rights demonstrators and police 
 
1969 
14 August: British troops deployed ‘in aid of the civil power’ 
28 December: Announcement of the formation of the ‘Provisional Irish Republican Army’, meaning 
the  IRA is now split into an Official IRA and a Provisional IRA. 
 
1970 
Reginal Maudling, upon leaving Northern Ireland, remarks 'Bloody awful country; give me a whisky' 
 
1971 
9 August: Internment begins. 
September: Formation of the UDA [Ulster Defense Association] 
 
1972 
30 January: ‘Bloody Sunday, the Parachute Regiment kill 14 civil rights demonstrators in 
Derry/Londonderry 
24 March: Stormont government and parliament abolished. Direct Rule assumed by Westminster. 
 
1973 
9 December: Sunningdale power-sharing agreement 
 
1974 
28 May: Collapse of Sunningdale settlement. Power-sharing Executive collapses after general strike 
organized by the Ulster Workers Council 
 
1981 
10 Republican hunger-strikers die 
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1985 
15 November: Anglo-Irish Agreement.  
1990 
9 November: The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, declares that Britain has 
‘no selfish strategic or economic interest’ in Northern Ireland. 
 
1993 
15 December: British and Irish governments issue Joint Declaration. 
 
1994 
31 August: Provisional IRA declares ceasefire 
13 October: Combined Loyalist Military Command (ie. UVF plus UDA etc) declares ceasefire. 
 
1996 
10 June: start of multi-party negotiations 
 
1997 
20 July: Provisional IRA resume ceasefire 
 
1998 
10 April: Good Friday Agreement 
15 August: 29 people killed in Omagh bombing by Real IRA (dissident Republican group). 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
Table 1: British Security Personnel in Northern Ireland 
Year British Army Total British Regiments UDR / RIR 
Total 
1972 (Jul) 30300 21800 8500 
1973 (Jan) 26000 16900 9100 
1974 23900 16200 7700 
1975 22700 15000 7700 
Source: Hadfield392 
 
Table 2: 1970 Westminster Election 
Party Number of Seats Vote % Valid Poll 
Unionist Party (U) 8 422,041 54.3% 
Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) 0 98,194 12.6% 
Unity 1 76,185 9.8% 
Independent (B. Devlin) 1 37,739 4.8% 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 Brigid Hadfield, ed., Northern Ireland: Politics and the Constitution (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992), 91. 
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Protestant Unionist Party (Prot. U.) 1 35,303 4.5% 
Republican Labour Party (Rep. Lab.) 1 30,649 3.9% 
Nationalist Party (Nat.) 0 27,006 3.5% 
Ulster Liberal Party (U. Lib) 0 12,005 1.5% 
National Democratic Party (Nat. Dem.) 0 10,349 1.3% 
Others 0 29,642 3.8% 
Moderate parties are shaded in. 
Source: Cain393 
 
Table 3: 1973 Local Northern Ireland Election 
Party Seats First Preference Votes % Valid Poll 
Official Unionists 24 211,362 (29.3%) 
Unionists 8 61,183 (8.5%) 
Democratic Unionist Loyalist Coalition 
(DULC) 8 78,228 (8.5%) 
Vanguard Unionist Loyalist Coalition 
(VULC) 7 75,759 (10.5%) 
Belfast West Loyalist Coalition (WBLC) 3 16,869 (2.3%) 
Other Loyalist 0 3,734 (0.5%) 
Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP) 19 159,773 (22.1%) 
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) 8 66,541 (9.2%) 
Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) 1 18,675 (2.6%) 
Republican Clubs (Rep.C) 0 13,064 (1.8%) 
Nationalists 0 8,270 (1.2%) 
Republican Labour (Rep.Lab) 0 1,750 (0.2%) 
Unionist Liberal Party (U.Lib)) 0 811 (0.1%) 
Communists 0 123 (0.0%) 
Independents 0 6,099 (0.9%) 
Total 78 722,241 (100%) 
Moderate parties are shaded in. 
Source: Cain394 
Table 4: 1974 Westminster Election 
Party Number of Seats Vote % Valid Poll 
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 7 2232,103 32.3% 
Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP) 1 
160,43
7 22.4% 
Pro-Assembly Unionists (U. Pro-A) 0 94,301 13.1% 
Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party 
(VUPP) 3 75,944 10.6% 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 Fionnuala Mckenna and Martin Melaugh, “Results of Elections Held in Northern Ireland Since 1968,” CAIN, 
accessed February 8, 2015, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/elect.htm. 
394 Ibid. 
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Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 1 58,656 8.2% 
Independents 0 23,496 3.3% 
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 
(APNI) 0 22,660 3.2% 
Unity Party (Unity) 0 17,593 2.4% 
Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) 0 17,284 2.4% 
Republican Clubs (Rep C) 0 15,152 2.1% 
Moderate parties are shaded in. 
Source: Cain395 
 
Table 5: Moderate Voting Juxtaposed with Violence Trends 
Town 1970 
(Moderation) 
1970 
(Violence) 
1973 
(Moderation) 
1973 
(Violence 
1974 
(Moderation 
1974 
(Violence) 
Antrim 77% Moderate 
Voting 
3 Deaths 
Since 1969 
-54% 
Moderation 
+300%  +29% 
Moderation 
- 33%   
Belfast 82.2% 
Moderate 
Voting 
13 Deaths 
Since 1969 
-50.4% 
Moderation 
+1269%  +23.5% 
Moderation 
-31%  
Derry 100%Moderate 
Voting 
7 Deaths 
Since 1969 
-15 % 
Moderation 
+1565%  -51% 
Moderation 
-36.8%  
Down 80.3% 
Moderate 
Voting 
0 Deaths 
Since 1969 
 -55.1% 
Moderation 
38 Deaths 
Since 1970 
+ 15.5% 
Moderation 
-36.5 %  
Mid 
Ulster 
45.7% 
Moderate 
Voting 
0 Deaths 
Since 1969 
+15.6 % 
Moderation 
9 Deaths 
Since 1970 
-.4% 
Moderation 
+133.3%  
Armagh 68.16% 
Moderate 
Voting 
3 Deaths 
since 1969 
-20.16% 
Moderation 
+1166%  -10.8% 
Moderation 
+52.6% 
Fermangh 
and South 
Tyrone 
48.89% 
Moderate 
Voting 
0 Deaths 
since 1969 
+31.71% 
Moderation 
46 Deaths 
Since 1970 
-49.4% 
Moderation 
+11.1% 
Elections that followed the expected trend are shaded in. 
Source: Cain and McKeown396 
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